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ABSTRACT 
Manpower is a basic resource. It is the indispensable means of 
converting other resources to mankind '.s use and benefit. As a process· 
of increasing the knowledge, skills, and dexterity of the people of a 
society, manpower development is the most fundamental means of enabl-
ing a nation to acquire the capacities to bring about its desired 
future state of affairs -- a more mighty and wealthier nation. 
Singapore's brief nation-building history justifies the emphasis 
accorded to the importance of good quality human resources and manpower 
development in economic and socio-political developments. As a tiny 
island-state with a poor natural resource base, Singapore's long-term 
survival and development depend ultimately upon the quality and the 
creative energy of her people. In line with the nation-building goals 
and strategies of the Republic, as conditioned by her objective 
setting, Singapore's basic manpower development premise has been one of 
"quality and not quantity". While implementing the "stop-at-two" family 
planning and population control programs and the relevant immigration 
measures to guard against the prospect of a "population explosion", the 
Government has energetically fostered various educational programs, 
including vocational training schemes, adult education programs, the 
youth movement, and the national service scheme to improve the quality 
of Singaporeans. 
There is no denying that some of the manpower development measures 
taken by the Government have imposed sacrifice and hardship on the 
Singapore citizens. Nevertheless, they are the basic conditions for the 
island-Republic's long-term survival and development. It is essential 
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to note that Singapore's continuing existence and phenomenal-success 
are largely attributable to the will, capacities and efforts of her 
leaders and people. 
In the final analysis, the wealth and the strength of a nation are 
based upon its ability to conserve, develop and utilize effectively the 
innate capacities of its people. This is true not only of Singapore but 
necessarily of other developing nations. It can be safely presumed that 
since most developing states' concerns about the quality of their human 
resources and the progress of their nation-building work are inextri-
cably bound to those about the quantity of their population, the "quality 
and not quantity" motto of Singapore's manpower development programs can 
also be their guiding principle. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis, as its title suggests, is designed to inquire into 
the functions anci the strategical problems of manpower development from 
the perspective of nation-building through the study of the case of 
Singapore. To put it more precisely, the problems of nation-building 
are viewed from the perspective of what a country like Singapore can 
do to develop the innate capacities of its people. The motivating force 
of this study is made up of two constituent elements. The first element 
is the writer's conviction that man's power -- brain power, skills, 
capaci ties, will and efforts -_. is the basic dynamic of economic, socio-
cultural and. political development. The second element is the writer I s 
perception that as a tiny island-state with a poor natural resource 
base, Singapore's long-term survival and development as a sovereign 
state depend ultimately upon the quali t;y- "wd the creative energy of her 
people. Of course, the writer must admit that his decision to make a 
case-study of Singapore's manpower development and nation-building 
experience is in effect motivated by his deep concern about the vitality 
of this infant Republic with which his destiny and that of his fello"J-
countrymen are and will be bound up. With a view to enabling the 
readers to ~ead this thesis as the writer writes it~ this prefatory 
chapter seeks to specify briefly the major purposes, the basic iproposi-
tions,the· methodology and the struciure of the thesis. 
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1. Purposes of the stu.9:x, 
Briefly put, this study attempts to attain three objectives: 
firstly, a survey of tLe literature about the role which manpower 
development plays in the process of nation-building; secondl;y, a state-
ment of general propositions about manpower development and nation-
building; and, thirdly, a narrowing down of these general propositions 
to be applied in a case study of SingE,pore. 
In undertaking the Singapore case study, the author hopes to 
gain a "VITider and deeper understanding of tr.e objective setting of the 
city-state in which manpower development and nation-building have taken 
place, to analyse how the Singc:,porean manpower development policies 
have been related to Singaporean na,tion-building goals, and to identify 
any special features of the Hepublic' s manpo~iTer development policies 
and strategies. As well, with the aforementioned analysis in mind, it 
is hoped to inquire into the validity and legitimacy of the manpower 
development policies and strategies in relstion to both the objective 
setting and subjective national goals of Singapore, into the effective-
ness and achievements of these policies and strategies and, finally, 
into the possible existence of alte~ative measures and options for 
manpower development in Singapore. 
By and large, this thesis is policy-oriented both in content and 
in purpose. It is only peripherally concerned with the technicalities 
of the subject matter. The author hopes thst this case study will not 
only provide some insight as to the manpower development experience of 
Singapore but also help to enrich the general knowledge of manpower 
development. 
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II. Main Propositions 
Within the confines of the above-mentioned ,plan, this study 
attempts to put forth and analyse the following propositions: 
(1) Manpower development is a prerequisite to successful nation-
building. 
(2) If manpo,ver is to -become an asset and not 8, liabili tJ7" of &~ 
developing Singapore, Itquali ty and not quantity" shoulcL be the 
basic guideline or key motto for all her manpo"\oJer development 
policies and programs. 
(3) In the prooess of developing her manpov,rer for nation-building, it 
seems that the policies and measures adopted by the Singapore 
Goverr:ment are valid and legitimate. For example: 
a. To guard against the prospeot of ttpopulcdion explosionH , the 
Itstop-at-two tt family planning and populcdion control policy 
and the relevant immigration measures are necessary. 
b. To improve the quality of Singaporeans and so to build a 
strong and prosperouEl nation, the improved educational sohemes, 
inoluding vocational training and adult education, the youth 
movement, and the national service scheme are all necessary 
measures as well. 
(4) For the irJell-being of all Singapcreans, each and every Singapore 
citizen should be prepared to tolerate the restrictions which have 
been appliecl upon him or her for the ccbove-mentioned mcw.po1orer 
development purposes. In supporting the "coercive" or "compulsoryH 
measures of the Singapore Government, the author contends that for 
the purpose of creating "the greatest happiness for the greatest 
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number" of Singaporeans, it is a necessity for a respons-ible 
government to Itforce" some of its people "to be free n • 
(5) As a process aiming at the attainment of a certain desired state 
of affairs for the people of a society, the enterprise of 
developing manpower for nation-building is inevitably a hazar-
dous and costly one. It always calls for many painful sacrifices 
and unaccustomed efforts. In addition to the will power and the 
national consciousness of the people, responsible government, 
effective leadership and efficient public administration are 
also necessary coriditions of a successful manpower development 
process. 
(6) Although Singapore's manpower development and nation-building 
experience is a product of her unique objective evironment and 
her "subjectivell needs, it may provide the framework in which 
problems of "manpower o_evelopment and nation-buildingU common to 
a major portion of the "developing worldlt can be explored. 
III. Methodology 
In pursuance of this study, the author adopts a factual analy-
tical approach accompanied by argumentative inference. His 
perception of the meanings and the inter-relationship of manpower 
development and nation-building is refined from the conceptual frame-
works made available by relevant studies. His analysis as to the 
manpower development policies and strategies of Singapore, their 
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validity, legitimacy, effectiveness, achievements, and problems as well 
as the possible solutions to the problems is based not only on data 
collected from various sources, including official documents and 
Singapore newspapers, but also on the author's personal observations 
and interpretations. The author is confident that as a Singaporean who 
has been attentive to Singapore's development, he is in a position to 
make observations on the manpower development and nation-building 
experience of Singapore with considerable accuracy. As a matter of 
fact, he has written this thesis from a Singaporean point of view. In 
reading this thesis, the read.ers may take the writer's national identity 
into consideration. Apparently, if we do not know the background of 
The Prince of Machiavelli, The Shui Nan (The Difficulties of Persuasion) 
of Han Fei-zi and thE;) Itforced to be free" theme of J.J. Rousseau, we 
may well not be able to appreciate the actual implication of these 
three profound works. What has aroused the author's deep admiration for 
Machiavelli, Han Fei-zi and Rousseau is that although they wrote only 
what they saw and sensed without providing any documentary or numerical 
proofs, their works have survived scrutiny for many centuries. 
IV. Structure of the Thesis 
As can be seen from the table of contents, this thesis is 
composed of five chapters. The first four chapters are each divided 
into three sections. Each chapter is preceded by a brief introduction 
which serves to link one to the other. Chapter One seeks to explain 
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the meanings of manpower development and nation-building and to make 
clear in general terms the role which manpower development plays in 
the process of nation-building. Chapter TWo aims to analyse the 
objective settings and national priorities of singapore and the man-
power implications of its nation-building progress. The third chapter 
is the heart of the thesis. It seeks to identify the specfal features 
of Singap,ore's manpower development premises, policies and approaches 
and to inquire into their validity and legitimacy. Chapter Four, on 
the other hand, attempts to evaluate the effectiveness and achievements 
of these manpower development policies; to point out the major 
manpower development problems; and to suggest workable remedies. 
Finally, the concluding chapter, ,,:Chapter Five, is a summing-up of the 
major points made in the preceding chapters. It is at once a retro-
spect and a prospect. 
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CHAPTER 1 
MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT AND NATION-BUILDING 
The notions of manpower development and nation-building are 
actually old ones. What is new, perhaps, is the manner in which this 
thesis arranges and discusses them. As suggested by its title, this 
thesis is designed to inquire into the functions and the strategical 
problems of manpower development from the perspective of nation-
building through the study of the case of Singapore. To serve this 
purpose, we must first examine: 
(1) the significance of human resources and manpower deve-
lopment; 
(2) the meanings and significant features of nation-building; 
and, 
(3) the conceptual and practical relationships between 
manpower development and nation-building. 
Despite this threefold division of the subject matter, the focus of 
attention in this chapter is the acquisition of general propositions 
concerning the role of manpower development in the process of nation-
building. This effort is necessary in order to provide a conceptual 
framework and to ensure that we, the author and his readers, have a 
common understanding about the theme of this thesis. 
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I. The Concept of Manpower Development 
There is no standard definition of manpower development. Never-
theless, there is a consensus that manpower development, which is also 
referred to as human resources development, is the process of increa-
ing the knowledge, the skills and the capacities of all the people in 
a society. In economic terms, it could be described as the accumulation 
of human capital and its effective investment in the development of an 
economy. Tn political terms, it could be viewed as a means of preparing 
people for adult participation in political processes, particularly as 
citizens in a democratic state. In socio-cultural terms, the develop-
ment of human resources helps people to lead fuller and richer lives, 
less bound by unreasonable tradition or ~aestionable cultural values. 
As most would agree, the wealth and the strength of a nationlare 
in essence based upon its ability to conserve, develop, and utilize 
effeQtively the innate capacities of its people. The economic and socio-
political development of a nation, therefore, is ultimately the result 
of human effort, stemming from men's ideas and brought into being by 
their initiative, talents, experience, and skills. It takes able and 
skilled human agents to discover and exploit natural resources, to 
mobilize capital, to develop and apply technology, to produce goods, 
to produce services, to carryon trade, and to manage and protect a 
nation. Thus, in a very true sense, the progress of a society is 
1 In this thesis, the term "nation" is used as a synonym of 
"country" and "staten. 
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determined by the endeavours made in helping its people discover and 
develop their potential. If a country cannot develop its human 
resources, it cannot develop anything else. Even the richest ns,tural 
resources and the best means of producticn will remain unused 
if a nation's people do not know h.ow to put them to practical use. 
Our concern with the development of human resources cannot be 
exclusively a result of new discoveries in academic knowledge and 
research.. Nor is our recognition about the importance of human 
resources in economic and socio-poli tical d.evelopmE:nt a great new idea. 
On the eve of the Industrial Revolution in 1776, Adam Smith, reputed 
to be the founder of "economic science", argued that the quality and 
quantity of manpower resource~ constituted the wealth of nations. 
Everyone who has even a fleeting acquaintance with hiE: great work, An 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, knows 
that for him the human factor in economic life was not peripheral but 
central. Smith built much of his analysis around the forces governing 
the acquisition of skill and its effective utilization. According to 
him, it was the skill, dexterity, and competence of individuals which 
were the basis of individual and national wealth. Although he allowed 
for three agents of production -- land, capital and la-bour it was 
really in the last that he expected to find the basic dynamics of 
economic development. He specifically included the acquired and useful 
abilities of all the members of society in his concept of nfixed capi-
tal n • He said: 
The acquisition of such talents, by the maintenance of the 
acquirer during his education, study, or apprenticeship, always 
costs a real expense, which is a capital fixed and realized, as 
it were, in his person. Those talents, as they make a part of 
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his fortune, so d.o they likewise of tha,t of the society. to which 
he belongs. 2 
Besides Smith, other economists such as John Stuart Mill and 
Alfred Marshall have also tried to tell us that economic analysis, 
whether of developed or underdeveloped countries, must include the 
variable of human capital. 3 Three-quarters of a century ago, Alfred 
]\IIarshall, the leading figure in neoclassical economics, st'ressed that 
the most valuable of all investment was the capital invested in human 
beings. 4 In recent decades, a growing number of today's economists 
have subscribed to a theory of whioh Theodore W. Sohultz is a 
leading exponent -- that human resouroes are a form of oapital, a 
human means of produotion, and the produot of investment. Sohultz 
argued: 
The failure to treat human resouroes explioitly as a form of 
oapital, as a produoed means of production, as the produot of 
investment, has fostered the retention of the olassioal notion 
of labor as a capaoity to do manual work requiring little know-
ledge and skill, a capaoity with whioh, aocording to this 
notion, laborers are endowed about equally. This notion of 
labor was wrong in the classical period and it is patently 
wrong now. 5 
In putting forth these arguments, these eoonomists apparently 
2 Adam Smith, fiE. Inquiry into the Nature and. C2,uses of the Wealth 
of Nation, Cannan ed., (New York: Random House, 1937), I300k II, pp. 
265-266. 
3 Harold L. Sheppard, uThe Conoept and Problems of Human Resouroe 
])evelopment lt , in Edward B. Jakubauskas ancl C. Phillip Baumel, eds., 
Human Resouroes ])evelopment, (Ames: Iowa University Press, 1967), p. 38. 
4 Frederick Harbison and Charles A. Myers, Eduoation, Manpower 
and Eoonomio Growth: Strategies of Human Resouroe .])evelopment, (New 
York: MoGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 3. 
5 J. Earl Williams, "The Eoonomists and Human Resouroe ])evelop-
ment ll , in Jakubauskas and Baumel, Ope oit., p. 39. 
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point their spearheads at those "classical" economists who had directly 
or indirectly denied the importance of human resourQes in economic 
development. As a key representative of the Itnon-manpower-minded" 
economists, Ricardo has become a main,target of criticisms. Ricardo 
asserted that the strategic element in the economy was capital. In his 
view, whether a society would remain on even keel, advance, or regress 
would depend in the first instance on the rate of increase- of capital 
6 
relative to the population that had to be fed and employed. By contem-
porary standards, this view seems quite fantastic. However, if we 
understand the socio-economic situation of Ricardo's day, we should 
note that the emergence of such a view was not accidental. Ricardo, 
writing in the early days of the Industrial Revolution, saw no reason 
to be concerned with the availability of labor. There was a great 
number of rural workers at the doors of the new factories looking for 
employment. The mills of that day had no difficulty in absorbing illi-
terate, unskilled workers so long as they were able and willing to 
submit to discipline. The principal demand of the expanding faatory 
system was for large number of able-bodied men. 
Many other economists shared Ricardo's view and considered labor 
a resource of secondary importance in the development of capitalism. 
They believed that the numbers of workers required would be available 
and that the question of skill would not be a problem, since some 
workers would make the effort to acquire a higher level of competence 
6 Eli Ginzberg, The Development of Human Resources, (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 2. 
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in exohange for a potentially higher wage. In their view, the working 
population was passive and responsive to the conditions in the market-
place. If employment was scarce in one area and heavy in another, some 
of the workers would migrate. If one skill was in surplus and another 
was short, some workers would respond to the demand by acquiring the 
skill which was short in supply. If all able-bodied men were employed, 
the market would begin to draw the required manpower from the periphe-
ral le,bor forces -- the retired, women, the physically and emotionally 
handicapped, or people of other nations. :Based on this "natural demand-
and-supply" assumption, they and the like-minded capitalists certainly 
saw no necessity to be bothered about the availability of manpower and 
the development of manpower resources. 
Apparently, these economists had failed to foresee the great 
changes the Industrial Revolution was going to bring about. First of 
all, the Industrial Revolution created the need for a literate labor 
force, for workers had to be able to read and follow instructions in 
order to operate machines properly. In the early days of mechanization, 
job requirements were relatively simple, demanding mainly brawn and 
manual dexterity, but, as more complicated forms of technology wereintro-
duced and evolved, workers had to be more skilled. Another striking 
transformation that accompanied the growth of industrialization was 
the proliferation of the professions. Each decade saw an increasing 
division of labor with more speoialization. This was true not only of 
the individual workplaoe but of sooiety as a whole. In the early 
days of the faotory system, the owner often served as production 
manager, foreman, engineer and salesman. But as the company grew, 
these several functions came to be assumed by specialists. The manpower 
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needs of such a skilled and professionalized economy naturally could 
be met only by more readily available and more appropriate education 
and training. As a result, free public elementary education became a 
fact early in the lives of most indus.trialized countries. Employers 
began to provide some rudimentary training for their employees. Educa-
tion and training and thus manpower development at length became a 
public matter of concern. 
Of course, the revolution in pyschology in recent decades might 
have also exercised much influence on contemporary views concerning 
manpower, on the acquisition of skill, talent, and competence and about 
the potentialities of education and training. Thanks to the theories 
of human growth and development elaborated and refined since Freud, 
people have come to understand much more than earlier generations about 
human motives, values and behavior. The new psychology has made us 
realize that most human ability is learned and that some people become 
competent while others do not because of the education or training 
opportunities that they have encountered rather than because of their 
genetic potential. Moreover, the personalities of the individuals that 
develop are conditioned by their experiences in childhood. Evironmental 
opportunities have been seen increasingly as a crucial determinant of 
later adult performance. Economists have slowly realized that their 
conception of man must start from the premise that he is not primarily 
a conscious, rational, calculating and pleasure-seeking animal7 but is, 
rather, a complex psychological organism responding simultaneously to 
7 Ginzberg, OPe cit., p. 4. 
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internal and external forces which can be differentiated intc the cate-
gories of basic drives, adjustment mechanisms and value orientations. 
Human nature is pliable, and so human development must be viewed 
dynamically. The simple-minded assumption of economists that there is 
a Scotsman inside of every maD is indeed an anachronism. 
Following the Second World War, economists became intrigued with 
attempting to explain the factors in economic growth so as to help the 
economically less developed nations start on the road toward development. 
What they tried to do was to isolate the main variables that lead to 
growth or that are obstacles to it. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
the stress was still placed on capital as the engine of economic 
progress. As experience was acquired, however, it was discovered that 
capital alone was insufficient, for a new factory could not be operated 
efficiently by workers unfamiliar with technology. Economists concerned 
with economic development gradually realized that the quality of the 
human input -- the skill, dexterity and competence of workers was 
the basic dynamic of economic development. 8 In more recent years, 
therefore, the emphasis in economic development has shifted to the 
quality of the human resource input. As one writer puts it : 
The economy's output may be raised not only by increasing the 
supply of inputs ••• or by technological change ••• but also by 
numerous kinds of alterations in the qualities of the inputs of 
a sort which typically escape the scrutiny of the economic 
theorist. It is apparent that economic development is associated 
with important qualitative changes in the human agent as a 
factor of production. These improvements take such forms as 
changes in knowledge, technical skills, organizational and 
8 For a detailed discussion of the change in the perception 
concerning the key factors of economic development, see Roy B. Helfgott, 
Labor Economics, (New York: Random House, 1974), pp. 470-473. 
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managerial abilities, levels of economic aspiration, responsive-
ness to economic incentives, and capacity to undertake and adapt 
to innovation. The nature of the mechanisms by which these 
al terations take place is as yet only very imperfe'ctly under-
stood.9 
The importance of high-quality human resources is further illus-
trated by what happened after World War II. When the War came to an 
end in 1945, Germany and Japan -- the defeated nations -- saw much of 
their physical capital destroyed by Allied bombing. But fifteen years 
later they were both again major industrial powers of the world. It is 
true that they both had received a c.o:asidi:niable_ amount of American econo-
mic aid, but there is no question that their technical know-how 
their high. levels of human resource development -- allowed them to put 
capital into operation quickly. 
Today, after a muting of the theme for almost two centuries, the 
importance of the human resource factor is increasingly stressed in 
the halls of academia, in the management of industry and in the socio-
political arena. While more and more researchers have been engaged in 
developing theories, assembling facts, and undertaking analyses of 
selected facets of the development and utilization of human resources, 
many countries' governments have moved to a more conscious and deli-
berate attempt to formulate policies and to design programs to direct 
and enlarge investments in human beings as one of the major means of 
assuring higher-speed economic and socio-political advancement. 
9 Nathan Rosenberg, nNeglected Dimensions in the Analysis of 
Economic Change", in George K. Zollscha~ and Walter Hirsch, eds., 
Explorations in Social Change, (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), 
pp. 652-653. 
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II. The Meaning of Nation-Building 
What is nation-building? What is its content? What is its aim? 
As is usual with other conceptual terms, scholars and writers of diffe-
rent disciplines or even of similar disciplines with different outlooks 
have applied this term -- nation-building-- with a wide range _ of meanings 
to serve the various specific purposes of their studies. Many historians 
and political theorists such as Karl W. Deutsch, Rupert Emerson and 
Joseph R. strayer speak of the tlemergence of nationstt; some political 
and social scientists speak of "national modernizationlt; and most econo-
mists have tended to refer to nation-building as "economic development 
of nations". Obviously, the subject is one which straddles several 
disciplines of le2orning. It is unlikely that any definition will secure 
general acceptance. 
However, if we have a close look at the various interpretations 
concerning nation-building, we will note thed although there are many 
different viewpoints surrounding the subject, most writers agree that 
nation-·building is a process by which nations realize certain desired 
goals. It is on this common perception that scholars of various disci-
plines and outlooks study the aspects of the Hnation-building"- process in 
which they are interested. In fact, it is the varied foci of studies 
that have given rise to many superficially divergent sem20ntic interpre-
tations. 
For the purpose of this thesis, the writer prefers to speak of 
nation-building as a process in which the government and people of a 
nation strive to secure a sustained increase in their capabilities to 
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deal effectively with existing and emergent needs of society, to resolve 
internal and external attendant conflicts, and adapt to continuous 
change s of both internal and external origin. Beyond 'doubt, for most 
(if not all) states, the ultimate goal of nation-building has been to 
increase their wealth and strength so as to enable their people domesti-
cally to lead better and richer lives and to strengthen their economic 
and socio-political positions on the international stage. -There has 
never been any nation or people entertaining the hope of becoming "poor", 
"backward" or "underdeveloped". 
The content of nation-building as a process is vast in scope. It 
includes a broad spectrum of activity_ It, in the main, encompasses all 
the a.ctivities and efforts necessary for a nation's economic, social, 
political, cultural and defensive development. We cannot enumerate 
here in detail all the component ,ingredients of the process. But it is 
nevertheless necessary, in addition to the interpretation above, to take 
a brief look at a few general features of the process in order to under-
stand some of the critical problems involved in it. 
As far as we can see, change is one of the most important features 
or requirements of nation-building. As a process, nation-building is the 
transition of a society from what it is to what it would like to be. It 
is an attempt by the people of a nation to bring about a certain desired 
future state of affairs, namely, a politically, socially and economically 
integrated society with built-in capabilities for continuous and orderly 
adaptation and growth. In a general sense, so long as a nation is dissa-
tlsfied with the existing state of things, it is bound to initiate 
change'.3 to pave the way for its "desired state of affairs". In other 
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words, the state of being dissatisfied with the status quo is_ the basic 
psychological dynamics of goal-oriented or correctional change, whether 
it be economic, socio-political or cultural. As a process of meeting 
the prerequisites for the realization of the desired national goals, 
nation-building naturally calls for change in a variety of dimensions 
of society: economic, socio-cultural and political activities, human 
and institutional behavior, and the patterns of allocating values. To 
effect these changes, nation-building also "requires changes in the 
realm of socio-cultural values~ Socio-cultural values are the factors 
that determine ideas about the nature and capacity of man, about the 
role of the individual, about the purpose of society, about the types 
of'relationships that should obtain amongst people, amongst groups of 
people, and ultimately about the n~ture of politics and the economy. 
Changes in socio-cultural values and in patterns of behavior are mutually 
supportive and generative. While changes in the first generate changes 
in the second, changes in the latter reinforce and consolidate changes 
in the former. 
The problem, however, is that value changes and corresponding 
behavior change do not necessari:Ly occur simultaneously or evenly 
throughout society. People may agree to support national objectives in 
the abstract but differ markedly in what they are willing to give up to 
see these ends achieved. Some segments of society may feel critically 
deprived of certain material benefits and their accustomed ways of doing 
things as a result of a new pattern of values. As Mancur Olson puts it, 
"though all of the members of the group therefore have a common interest 
in obtaining the collective benefit (namely, the common goal], they may 
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have no common interest in paying the cost of providing that collective 
good. nlO As a conse~uence, there is always resiRtance, overt or covert, 
against new ways of doing things (expected behavior) and new modes of 
thinking (desired values). 
Under such circumstanoes, if the forces opposed_ to new ways andt 
new modes are strong, the desired changes in value and behavior -- the 
impetus of other changes necessary for nation-building -- may eventually 
be hindered or suppressed. If changes in values and behavior patterns 
and other corresponding changes are to persist, then there must be some 
means by which the desired changes may be effectively generated and 
integrated in society and into the process of nation-building. While 
something must be done to ward off opposition to desired changes in 
value and behavior, some institutional devices must be provided to 
reward and consolidate desired changes. Some existing institutions or 
s;ystems, socio-poli tical and economic as well as cultural, may prove 
to be detrimental to the new ways 8,nd new modes for nation-build_ing, 
in which case they may have to be reorganized, restructured,or even 
abolished. Conversely, some new d.esired institutions and systems may 
have to be established. But, at any rate, proper caution must be employed 
to prevent the emergent systems or institutions from succumbing to 
pressures of old parochial values and patterns of behavior. Axiomatically, 
it follows that another condition vital in the pro<ress of nation-building 
is the matter of how to increase tl:.e ability of government and the 
capacity of society to absorb and intergrate the changes necessary for 
10 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public GOQds and 
the Theory of Groups, (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), 
p. 21. 
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na tion-build.ing. 
Since change in values and behavior patterns neces,sarily leads to 
change in the kind and volume of demands and expectatiop.s, such change 
also necessarily signifies change in the extent and content of support 
for government and other instruments of nation-building. Rising expec-
tations may have the effect of seriously undermining both the existing 
ability and the potential growth and viability of the government and its 
nation-building apparatuses. Demand and support are two sides of the 
same coin. Certain changes and resulting expectations may have the 
effect of increasing support; others may have the opposite effect. More-
over, there are instances of change which may have the effect of either 
undermining the viability of change that has already occurred or 
seriously inhibiting the emergence of further changes. It is for these 
reasons that all desired changes should be carefully engineered and 
controlled if the nation-building process is to proceed without serious 
and destructive obstacles. That is to say, the forward movement in the 
process of nation-building requires all the needed changes to be condi-
tioned in such a way as to render them positively contributive to 
nation-building and to prevent them from weakening the ability of 
government and society to realize the desired goals of the society. 
The ways in which changes in values and patterns of human and 
institutional behavior can be brought about and in which resulting 
changes in social demands and expectations can be integrated and regu-
lated are various. For example, exposure to knowledge and visions of 
"progressive!! modernity and its material lure are a fundamental 
requirement for the generation of the needed changes. Movies, television, 
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transistor radios, newspapers, magazines and other relatively inexpen-
sive mass communications and information methods are all, empJoyed to 
introduce and transmit new ideas and visions. On the other hand, 
progressive "goal-oriented" political·socL1,lization is also a highly 
necessary m:Jans of inculcating into a citizenry those ideas, values and 
attitudes that are contributive to the various tasks of nation-building. 
Proponents of the "liberal" or "indjvidualist" democracy may regard 
such goal-oriented political socialization as mere repressive "brain-
washing" conducive to dictat.orship and detrimental to i ndi vidlJal freedom. 
But, if these "liberals" are not to be merely "arm·-chair" theor:eticians, 
they should admit that even with the unpleasant restrictions on 
individual liberty well-planned and well-regulated changes are vital in 
the process of nation-building. We should bear in mind that nation-
building, as He see, is substantially a hazardous and costly enterprise 
that nearly always calls for mcl,ny painful sacrifices and unaccustomed 
efforts. This is particularly true in the case of less developed states. 
It is evident that, in emphasizing the need to pursue well-planned 
and well-regulated changes through goal-oriented political socialization, 
the writer of this thesis is advocating "guided democracy" -- democracy 
with a strong, effective and responsible government leadership capable 
of enginneering the needed changes and efforts for nation-building. 
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III. Manpower Development for Nation-building 
Having an elementary understanding of the meanings of manpower 
development and nation-building, we should have no difficulty in 
illuminating the interrelation between the two concepts in practical 
terms. Although both manpower development and nation-building are 
"processes" of attaining certain prescribed national goal ~ , they are 
in essence the indications of two different but closely related states 
of affairs. Their differences lie mainly in their immediate goals and 
content. Nation-building, as we have already defined, is the process 
of attempting to bring about a certain desired state of affairs --
a socio-politically and economically integrated society with built-in 
capabilities for continuous and orderly adaptation and growth. Manpower 
development, on the other hand, is basically the process of increasing 
the knowledge, the skills and the capabilities of all the people in a 
society. Its immediate objective is to acquire and develop effectively 
the human resources required for the propulsion of nation-building. It 
is the process by IiIThich the Itmanpower infrastructure" of nation-
building -- the desirable quantity and quality of skills and knowledge 
are brought into being. 
Indeed, as we have noted earlier, the dexterity and skills of the 
people are a major determinant of the wealth and strength of a country. 
Progress, whether it be economic, socio-cultural or politirral, is in 
effect the fruit of human effort. It is merely a truism to say that 
"countries are underdeveloped because most of their people are under-
developed, having had no [or insufficient] opportunity of expanding 
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their potential capacities in the service of societyn. ll Ultimately, 
the wealth and might of a nation rest with its ability to develop and 
utilize the innate capabilities of its people. Manpower development, 
therefore, is the basic necessary condition for nation-building. Tts 
success or failure can be the success or failure of nation-building as 
well as the success or failure of a nation. This is true not only of 
the developing nations but also of the developed ~tates~ 
Only if we look closely at the world in which we now live, we will 
ultimately "discover" that the vast majority of the commonly-called 
"poor" or "underdeveloped" countries are actually not "poor" at all. 
They are poor only in the sense, as widely perceived, that their "gross-
national-product", "per-capita-incomelt and Itstandards of livinglt are not 
on par with the "average international standards"; or that the majority 
of their population suffers from starvation, malnutrition, disease, or 
natural calamities. But they are not poor in the sense that they have 
nothing at all. On the contrary, most of them are "rich" in natural 
resources. Judging from the fact that they possess and supply most of 
the natural materials needed for economic development, they are in a 
sense wealthier than many economically "rich" or "developed" countries. 
Japan, for instance, is internationally recognized as the "richest" 
country in Asia. Nevertheless, when compared with its Asian counterparts 
(except Singapore) in terms of natural resources, it is seen as one of 
the "poorest" among them. If we compare the once great colonial powers 
11 Adam Curle, "Some Aspects of Educational Planning in Under-
developed Areas", Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 32, No.3, Summer, 
1962, p. 300., 
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such as Great Britain and Holland with their former colonies, we will 
note that the former were rich in socio-economic life but poor in 
natural resources, while the latter were rich in natural resources 
but poor in socio-economic life. 
])0 we know the basic reason why these naturally rich nations 
have been socio-economically poor? Anyone who tends to view things 
superficially may blame this nnaturally rich but socio-economically 
poorlt phenomenon on the lack of capital or speedy capital formation on 
the part of the poor c01mtries. He may also attribute it to the non-
existence of certain Itideal types" of socia-political systems and 
order. But none of these interpretations hits the nail on the head. 
Only if we examine this phenomenon cautiously, will we realize that it 
is in effect due to the underdevelopment or imbalanced development of 
the human resources of the socio-economically poor nations. For these 
human resources have not been properly developed. Indeed, capital, 
conducive socio-economic systems and socio-political order are also 
necessary conch tions of socio-economic growth. But they do not come 
out of the empty air. It takes human beings to acquire, develop and 
maintain them. Those who tend to blame the emergence of poor or back-
ward societies solely on external exploitation and oppression should 
also realize that the poor societies concerned should also be blamed 
for being "incapable" of resisting external manipulation. Such condi-
tions like II independence", "freedom from colonial exploitation", 
"prosperity" and "justice in the distribution of wealth and power" 
are all to be brought about ty the will, wits and capabilities of the 
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people who thirst for them. And so, in the final analysis, manpower 
development is too fundamental to the construction, maintainance and 
growth of a nation or a people. 
As a prerequisite to successful nation-building, manpower 
development is a means-oriented process. Although nation-building is 
not entirely an end in itself, it is rather more goal-oriented than 
manpower development. In this way, the relationship between manpower 
development and nation-building can be interpreted as one between 
a means and an end. As a rule, the substance of any "goal-directedlt 
means is determined by the end it serves. Since nation--builcling is 
the immediate Itgoal 'l of manpower development, its content determines 
the content of the later. Ultimately, it is the national· 
goals that directly decides the su-bstance of nation-building and 
indirectly that of manpower development. Acting as an intermediate 
process, nation-building is at once the Itprocess" of attaining 
national goals and the immediate Itgoal lt of manpower development. It 
starts with manpower development and ends with the attainment of 
national goals. 
The goals of nations are political, economic and social as well 
as cultural, implying the desired future states of affairs nation-
states wish to bring about. Broadly speaking, all nations from the 
days of their formation want to become ltproperous" and "mighty". But 
this does not mean that the goals of all nations are exactly the same 
in quantity and quality. National goals, in the main, arise from the 
subjective "needs" of nations. And, as we know, needs emerge not 
only from human instinct but also from the interacting relations 
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between men and the objective setting in which they live. Even those 
commonly shared basic human needs -- the so-called "primary needs" 
such as that of survival -- are responsive to the influences of many 
environmental factors such as geographical positions, the availabili-
ty of natural resources and such man-made factors as economic, socio-
political systems or organizations. Due to the various impacts of 
different objective settings, even the impetus or impulse a common 
basic human need gives to every human agent or group is varied either 
in essence or in intensity. Certainly, the impulse the need for survi-
val gives to countries which have no survival problems is weaker than 
the one it gives to countries which are still struggling to survive. 
It is therefore axiomatic that in view of diverse needs or priority of 
heeds, stemming from different milieu, goals of nations are bound to 
be varied. It also goes without saying that since the goals or 
priorities of nations are not precisely alike, no two countries would 
have exactly the same kinds of nation-building and manpower develop-
ment processes. 
By and large, the human capital for nation-building can be 
developed and acquired in various ways. It can be developed and 
accumulated through formal education in schools, technical training 
centres, colleges, universities and other institutions of higher 
learning. It can be developed in employment through on-the-job 
training, in-service programsof formal training, management develop-
m~nt schemes, part-time adult education classes, and many other 
means. It can be developed in employment through better organization 
of work and better management of people. And finally, it can be 
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developed as a by-product of collective military training. 
Of course, the manpower necessary for nation-building can also 
be imported from abroad through a variety of means such as technical 
assistance, expatriate enterprises, hiring of consultants, or 
immigration. But, strictly speaking, this is not a self-reliant and 
self-contained approach. As a short-term supplementary measure, it 
may be quite helpful.' But, in the 16ng run, it can be a disadvantage 
to the country concerned. Except in the case of an underpopulated 
country, such a measure may not only move a nation into the position 
of excessive dependency on external manpower supplies but also keep 
the local manpower resources und~rdeveloped and underutilized. On 
the other hand, the reliability of external manpower is also question-
able. For instance, can all the manpower a country demands be con-
stantly and satisfactorily acquired through the external sources in 
both quantitative and qualitative terms? And more important, will 
the foreigners employed be loyal to the interests of the host coun-
try? Will they not go away for some unpleasant reasons or leave for 
other countries which can offer them better working conditions? In 
short, can the manpower imported from abroad be effectively 
utilized .by the country concerned to pursue its nation-building 
goals? If a country wishes to free itself from these misgivings as 
much as possible, it had better put more effort into the development of 
its domest~ manpower resources and try not to rely too much upon the 
e;x:ternal sources of manpower. Having suffered from their uependency on 
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Russia for technical assistance one and a half decades ago,12- the 
Chinese leaders in Peking have energetically advocated the principle 
of self-reliance and self-sufficiency -- striving for regeneration 
and pushing forward with one's own efforts. In view of the visible 
achievement of China's self-reliant and self-contained nation-
"building model, we certainly have no valid ground on which to dis-
prove the practicality and the internal logic of such development 
theory. 
With a view to becoming prosperous and mighty, a country cer-
tainly needs able and skilled persons of all kinds such as capable 
political leaders, lawyers, judges, administrators, engineers, doc-
tors, managers, craftsmen, farmers, and journalists as well as 
artists, musicians and writers to man, to initiate, and to spur all 
its nation-building programs. Broadly speaking, the leading builders 
of nations are elites or "advanced workers" of various kinds who 
organize and lead the march toward progress. These elites may be 
revolutionary intelligentsia, nationalist leaders, or members of a 
rising middle class. But, their effectiveness as prime movers of 
nation-building depends not only on their own development and capa-
bilities but also on the knowledge, skills, and dexterity of those 
12 Resenting the Chinese leaders' energetic Challenge to its 
position as the Ubig brother" or chief leader of the Communist camp 
on ideological grounds, the Soviet Government withdrew all its 1,390 
specialists -- engineers, techniCians, scientists, and other person-
nel -- from China during July and August of 1960. The pretext of such 
action was that the Chinese Government had misused and mistreated the 
Soviet personnel employed in China's service. The dramatic move was 
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whom they lead. In essence, nation-building is a matter in which every 
segment of a society is concerned. It is therefore a mass movement. Its 
nrivingforcE$ stems in large part from the 'creative energies-. and efforts of 
the masses~ The ftthree-iii .... one" model of the PeoplestRepublic bfChi:ri.a 
is apparently based on this awareness. It calls for the coordination 
of efforts among the leading cadres, workers and technical personnel 
of the country. There is no denying that without competent and effec-
tive. leadership the masses will -face grave difficul tiesii,:But it 
is also highly inappropriate for a country to place too much emphasis 
on the competence of the leading elites and overlook the power of the 
masses. To stress the importance of the common people, a Chinese pro-
verb says, "three cobblers with their wits combined can equal a master 
mind like Chu Keh-liang. n13 With this in mind, we cannot but contenu 
that in order to' aciJ:tvate a ~ movement of nation-building, a purpose-
ful and ambitious manpower development process must be "mass-orientedn • 
It should aim at enhancing the skills and capabilities of all the 
people of the society. 
highly reminiscent of the Soviet withdrawal of specialists from 
Yugoslavia in 1948, but it was on a much larger scale and had major 
significance for China's reconstruction programs. For a detailed 
account of this event, see O. Edmund Clubb, China & Russia: The Great 
~, (New York: Columbia University press, 1971), Section 32, 
pp. 438-450. 
13 Chu Keh-liang was an eminent Chinese military and political 
strategist who served as the military adviser and commander of Du 
Empire and engineered many successful tactical military moves against Du's 
two opponent.s -Wu Empire and Wei Empire ~ -during the "three kingdom" 
period (220'-588) of Chinese history. In the eyes of Chinese people, he 
was one of the most intelligent historical figures whom they have 
respected until today. And so, while its origin remains unknown, this 
proverb has become common knowledge amongst the Chinese people. In 
much Chinese literature, "Chu Ke-liangn is a synonym of nmaster mindn • 
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No matter whether in terms of quantity or in terms of Cluality 
manpo'iilTer reCluirements anci problems. of no two countries are exactly 
alike. Builders of r~ations need to make a careful and systematic 
assessment of the human resource reCluirements and problems in their 
pa.rticular courLtrics. Such assessment is commonly called "manpower 
analysis". Its objectives are as follows 
(1) the identification of the principal manpower problems such 
as the major critical shortages or surpluses of both 
skilled and unskilled manpOl,1Ter and the analysis of the 
reasons for such shortages and surpluses; 
(2) the identification of manpower reCluirements in terms of 
both Cluantity and quality, and demand and supply; 
(3) the setting of forward targets for human resource develop-
ment based upon reasonable expectations of growth; and, 
(4) the forecast of probable future trends and problems in 
manpower supply and demand as related to national growth. 
strictly speaking, the content of manpower development as a 
process for nation-building is vast in scope. In addition to the 
activities of assessing manpower requirements, locating manpower pro-
blems, developing the required manpower for nation-building, and fore-
casting future trends in manpower supply and clemand, it includes the 
activities of utilizing the developed or developing human resources. 
However, the main focus of this thesis is placed on the question of 
the acquisition cwd development of the desired quantity of good quali-
ty manpOliJer which is critical for nation-building. Consequently, the 
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methodologies of manpower assessments, manpower forecasting and man-
power utilization lie largely b?yond the scope of this thesis. They 
will be briefly mentioned only when the necessity arises o 
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CHAPTER 2 
MANPOWEl1. DEVELOPMENT AND SINGAPORE 
The general proposition that manpower development is a prerequi-
site to nation-building is equally true in the case of Singapore. 
Before proceeding to analyse the manpower development policies and 
programmes of Singapore, the writer would like to account for the 
reasons why human resources and m2,np0jpJer development are important in 
determining the nation-building progress of Singapore. ~o maximize the 
comprehensiveness of this account, he naturally should in the first 
place make a sketch of the objective settings and national priorities 
of Singa"DOre. In so doing, he is certain that this chapter will enable 
the readers to acquire a wide and deep und.erstanding about (1) the 
manner in which the objective settings of Singapore have helped to 
shape the national goals of Singapore; and, (2) the manner in which 
the mAnpower development policies of the Singapore Government relate 
to Singapore!s nation-building goals. And, he believes, a positive 
comprehension of these two aspects will convince the readers of the 
general assertion that a goal-directed manpower development process is 
answerable to the national needs being conditioned by the objective 
settings of the country concerned. 
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I. The Objective Settings of Singapore 
Modern Singapore began in 1819, the year in which the small 
island was transformed into an outpost for the expansion of British 
imperialist and commercial interests in the Malay archipelago. Its 
focal and strategic position made it the headquarters of the Straits 
Settlements14 and a controlling influence on events in the Malay 
states. For much of its history Singapore was a colonial entrepot, an 
appendage of British Malaya. It was only after the Second World War 
that the Islc.nd wi tn:esset:1 rapid constitutional and socio-poli tical 
ohanges. A form of dyarchy was introduced in 1955 and ex officio 
ministers were made responsible for the control of the Island. 15 Four 
years later, Singapore became internally self-governing. 16 In 1963, 
as an effort to end its artificial separation from the Malayan penin-
sula, the Island became a component state of the newly founded 
14 The straits Settlements made up of Singapore, penang and 
Malacca were formed in 1826. Singapore became the centre of government 
for the Settlements in 1832, because of its proximity tID Java as well 
as those countries to the eastward. 
15 Under the Rendel Constitution of 1955, a Legislative Assembly 
was established with 25 out of 32 members elected, a Governor-nominated 
Speaker, and a Council of Ministers with a minority of 4 ex-officio 
members responsible to the Legislative Assembly:u. 
16 Under the new constitution of 1959, all internal affairs were 
to be managed by a cabinet fully responsible to a Parliament of 51 
members all elected from single-member constituences by citizens. 
Foreign affairs and foreign defence remained the responsibility of the 
United Kingdom, while responsibility for internal security lay with an 
Internal Security Council, on which the UK and Singapore each had 3 
members, and Malayan Government one member who virtually held the 
casting vote. On May 30, 1959, the first election was held. The People's 
Action Party won 43 seats out of 51. 
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Federation of Malaysia. 17 This political arrangement, however-, per-
sisted for less than two years. On 9th August 1965, Singapore was 
divorced politically from the Federation and has since then become an 
independent republic. A .new phase in the history of Singapore was 
launched on that fateful day when the separation agreement was signed 
between the governments of Malaysia and Singapore. 
Singapore today occupies a unique position in Southeast Asia. It 
is an insular terri tory of only 584-3 sqUare kilometres, (224.5 square 
miles). It is the smallest and the most densely populated state in the 
region. At the end of 1976, the population of the Island was estimated 
at 2,278,200. 18 This implies an average population density of 3,900 
persons per kilometre (over 10,100 to the square mile). Of the total 
. population some 76.110 (1,734,600) are ethnically Chinese, 15.110 
(342,900) Malays, and 6.910 (156,500) Indians, pakistanis and Ceylonese, 
while the remaining 1.910 (44,200) are drawn from all over the world. 19 
In a consequence, Singapore is the only state in Southeast ~sia where 
the Chinese form an overwhelming part of the population with the Malays, 
Indians and other races as minorities. 
More uniquely, this Chinese-dominated tiny city-state is 
surrounded by, two big conspicuously Malay nations -- Malaysia and 
17 For a detailed description of the formation 'of the Federati~n, 
see Willard A. Hanna, The Formation of Malaysia: New Factor in World 
Politics, (New York: American Universities, Field Staff, 1964) • 
. 18 
Singapore, Department of Statistics, Yearbook of Statistioo, 
1-976-77, p.' 11. 
19 Ibid. 
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Indonesia, in which the Chinese communities have "been resented and 
suspected. As many political analysts have put ~t, Singapore is a 
small island-state situated at tb,e centre of a "big "Malay sean. Singa-
pore is so close to the Malayan peninsula that a three-quarter-mile-
long causway, carrying road, railway track and the vital fresh water 
pipeline from the Johore reservoirs, is all that stands "between it and 
its northern neighbour, the Malayan states of Malaysia. To the East, 
the Repu"blic faces "both the territories of East Malaysia -- Sa"bah and 
Sarawak, and the Borneo territory of Indonesia -- Kalimantan. To the 
South, the smaller Indonesian islands laying off the north-eastern 
coast of Sumatra are visi"ble most of the time. 
Another visible, unique feature of Singapore is that although 
finding itself in a region which is a major source of t~opical raw 
materials, this island-state is the only Southeast Asian country that 
has a very poor natural resou~ce base. It does not h~ve any significant 
natural resources other than a narrowly limited amount of cultivable 
land and a quite inadequate local water supply. Almost all its indus-
trial materials as well as its food-stuff are imported from its neigh-
bouring Southeast Asian or Asian countries. 
The greatest asset that Singapore has is its strategic, location 
,at one of the major maritime crossroads of the world. As can be seen 
on any world map, Singapore occupies a focal position at the turning 
point on the shortest sea-route from the Indian Ocean to the South China 
Sea and the Pacific Ocean (see Ap:pendi:i.x'l). It was :precisely ()W:iilg to the immense 
commercial potentialities latent in such a geographical location that 
the island was brought under British rule in 1819, and was developed 
~ I j 
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by the British colonial authorities to become the greatest pGrt and 
the principal centre of entrepot trade in Southeast Asia. As its 
founder -- Stamford Raffles -- put it, 
The island of Singapore, independently of the Straits and harbour 
of Johore, which it both forms and commands, has, on i t.s . southern 
shores, and by means of the several smaller'islands which lie off 
it, excellent anchorage-and smaller harbours •••• Its position in 
the Straits of Singapore is farmorecommandin,g than even Rhio, 
for our China trade passing down the straits of Malacca, and 
every native vessel that sails through the Straits of Rhio mURt 
pass in sight of it. 20 
As an attempt to exploit this locational advantage to encourage 
the free flow of trade, Raffles established Singapore as a free port. 
This policy of unfettered trade, still largely in force in the 1960s, 
has contributed significantly to the success of the Island as a great 
and busy entr~pot port. Since the days of Raffles, the focal and strate-
gic location has all along played a dominant role in the economic 
transformation of the Island-city. It has made Singapore the natural 
collecting and distributing centre for the primary products of South-
east A::sia and for manufactured goods en route to the region's markets. 
Except for land-locked Laos, all the Southeast Asian countries have 
access to the sea. The general tendency for areas of production to be 
concentrated on. coastal and peripheral locations also serves to empha-
size the importance of seaborne trade. 
Apart. from its .strategic location, another geographical factor 
which has also contributed to the development of Singapore as an 
important trading port is the Island's fine natural harbour. It is its 
20 Emily Hahn, Raffles of Singapore, (Kuala Lumpur: University 
of Malaya Press, 1968), p. 148. 
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natural deep-water harbour that has enabled it to become an excellent 
port for the increasingly important steamer traffic of the region. 
With its excellent harbour and ancillary facilities and its capabili-
ties to act as a transhipment centre iinking the region's major ports 
with other maritim~ nations of the world, Singapore has now become the 
largest trading port of Southeast Asia, the second largest in ASia, 
anrl the .fourth largest in the world. This Island-state certainly owes 
its early development and economic prosperity tb its strategic geogra-
phical position and fine natural harbour and iisfunction as the 
trading centre for Southeast Asia. In the absence of other natural 
material. resources, tliese income-earning geographical factors can well 
be regarded as a natural resource of immense importance for Singapore. 
It is a resource as real and as important to it as oil is to Brunei 
and Saudi Arabia. 
In recent decades, following the gradual downfall of its tradi-
tional entrepot·trade, Sina:apore has increasingly relied on commerce, 
servicing and manufacturing for its livelihood. Since the initiation 
and the implementation of its ambitious industrialization program, the 
Island's industrial economy has been growing steadily. As is widely 
accepted, Sin~apore has become the most industrialized country in South-
east Asia. Its people have enjoyed'the reg-ibn. ts highest standards of 
. 'living. It is now a society which is almost wholly oriented towards 
objectives similar to those found in western industrialized countries, 
namely, the acquisition of material wealth and the production of goods 
and services beyond basic subsistence needs. At the same time, indivi-
dual initiative and the entrepreneurial sp~rit are dominant and 
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acti vely encouraged, and ",rants tend to be unlimited. Being the most pro-
perous industrialized and commercialized Southeast Asian state, Singc"pore 
has at the same time become one of the most urllanized societies in the 
region. In contrast, most of its Southeast Asian neighbours are tradi-
tional agriculturally based rural societies. 
In short, Singapore's position in Southeast Asia is quite a unique 
one. As the most densely populated, inclustrialized and urbanizect tiny 
island-state vd th a poor natural resouroes base, the problems of the 
Republic are those of a highl~r urbanized city-state, and differ markedly 
from those of the other Southeast Asian states, where the problems are 
rural and agrioultural rather than urban and oommercial and. industrial 
in nature. Yet while standing out BO distintivaly from the rest of the 
Region, Singapore has always been and v;ill oontinue to be part and. parcel 
of the Southeast Asian soene. It is not only that its history is 
inextrioably tied up vJi th its neighbours but that its fate and future 
are linked olosely with those of the region. 
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II. The National Priori ties of Singapore 
Ever since SingEtpore became a sovereign state , its. central 
problem has been O1':e of survival. Needless to say, most of the 
problems that have challenged Singapore's viabili t;y- are essentially 
the result of her unique objective settings. 
First of 2,11, due to the ccbsence of a strong natural resource base, 
the economic foundation of Singapore is far from solid. Until the time 
of independence, Singapore owed its ecomomic life and progress to its 
1\ 
traditional entrepot trade. But since the begining of the 1960s, its 
traditional role as entrepot port for Southeast Asia's primary export 
;J • t '.;J , h b d'" h' 22 COmmOl-Cl les. anu consumer gooas .as een lmlnls,lng. This is me,inly 
because the indepenclent governments of its neighbours have gradually 
built up their own processing, marketing, and port facilities to bypass 
Singapore and deal directly with the original suppliers and ultimate 
consumers. 
As early as 1960, the People's Action Party (PAP) government, in 
power since 1959, realized not only that the Island's economy could no 
A longer depend solely on the entrepot trade but also that adapting to 
the changing circumstanoes was neoessary. With the advice of e, United 
Nation Industrial Mission headed by Dr. Albert Winsemius,2 3 the 
22. The entrepot trade I s estimated contl'i bution to Singapore 
economy has fallen from IiIlell over 25% in the early 1950s to about 18% 
in the first half of the 19608 and is now less tl:.an 12%. See Koh Foong 
Yin, "Singapore: Economic Survey", in Europa Publications Ltd., ed., 
Southeast Asia: An Introduction, (London: Staples Prin.ters, 1973), 
p. 149· 
23 The UN Industrial Mission conducted a detailed perspective study 
of Singapore's industrial potential. Tts report provided the framework 
for the policies that followed. After the Mission had completed its task, 
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Government soon saw a solution to the problem in industrializfl,tion. In 
August 1961, the Economic Development Board (EDB) was established to 
formulate and implement an ambitious aneL intensive program of indus-
trialization. Planned industrialization, henceforth, became a conscious 
strategy of economic development in Singapore. While serving as a 
fundamental means of diversifying the Island's economy, the government-
led industrialization program aimed to create employment opportunities 
to 2,bsorb the groirdng 18,bour force so as to meet the existing and future 
unemployment problems. The magnitude of the employment problem was 
clearly outlined by Winsemius who estimated that to achieve full employ-
ment 214,000 new jobs would have to be created in the economy between 
1961 and 1970. 24 Other reasons for industrialization include the 
objectives of increasing the standard of living of the popUlation and 
net foreign exche,nge earnings. 
Nevertheless, the lack of raw materials is a major handic8,p to 
Singapore's industrialization program. Although Singapore can tap the 
fund of raw materials available from other better-endowed countries at 
a cost, it has no direct control on these resources. And, tariff 
barriers or political considerations may put an otherwise easily 
accessible resource beyond its reach, or stop the flo\'\I from an existing 
source .• With a view to reducing dependence on imported primary raw 
materia.ls, it has been the Singa,pore Government's policy to concentrate 
the Singapore Government reta.ined t:te services of the Dutch economist 
who headed it, Dr. Albert Winsemius. For further information on Dr. 
Winsemius's role in Singapore's development, see J.T.S. George, Lee 
Kuan Ye",y's Singapore, (Lonclon: Andre Deutsch, 1974), pp. 96--99· 
24 Goh Chok Tong, "Indm.ltrial Gr01rJth, 1959-6611, in Ooi Jin Bee 
and. Chiang Hai Ding, eds., Modern Singapore, (Singapore: University 
of Singapore Press, 1969), p. 128. 
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industrialization efforts on second-stage manufacturing and assembly 
to import semi-finished goods for assembly, finishing and packaging. 
Much emphasis has also been given to "servicing" which is considered to 
include the repairing and servicing of equipment, machinery and vehicles. 
But the problem is that as an industry which is less dependent on 
imported raw materials, second-stage manufacturing is a less labour-
intensive industry and is thus less capable of creating job opportunities 
to meet the pressing employme~t problem in Singapore. The creation of new 
employment opportunities in the manfacturing sector in the first five 
years of industrialization thus fell critically short of the required 
target. 25 
Indeed, during the 1960's Singapore suffered three dramatic set-
backs: the Indonesian Oonfrontation campaign of 1963-66, the separation 
from the Malaysian market in 1965, and the British Government's decision 
in 1968 to withdraw its forces from the Island. The Indonesian Confronta-
tion meant the official suspension of trade with a major partner. 
Expulsion from Malaysia dealt a fatal blow to many of the infant manu-
facturing industries which had been set up in the Island on the assump-
tion that they would serve the pan-Malaysian market. And the uncertainty 
which followed over the financial relations between the two territories 
also gave a concern to investors. Fortunately, these blows were neutra-
lized by the construction boom which was kept going during the second 
half of the 1960s by the Government's accelerated urban renewal program 
25 During the period from 1959 to 1966, the average annual increase 
in the number of workers engaged in manufacturing was only 3,886, or 
only 39.7% of the target of 9,800 jobs per year required of the manu-
facturing section to achieve full employment in the economy. The rate of 
unemployment, on the other hand, was 10.9% per annum. See Ibid., 
p. 135. 
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and its vigorous push to the lagging hotel industry.26 
To encourage more foreign investments in the Republic, the Govern-
ment in 1967 passed the Economic Incentives Act, offering, among other 
things, a five-year tax holiday for companies manufacturing approved 
products, and tax concessions for approved export-oriented companies. 27 
The EnB also began to concentrate on the promotion of suitable industrial 
information to international companies interested in setting up manu-
facturing plants in Singapore. These efforts proved very successful. They 
were followed by an abundant flow of foreign investment into the 
manufacturing sector. 
But just when the economy began to show sign of recovering from the 
shocks of Indonesian confrontation and Singapore's separation from Malay-
sia, the British Government announced in January 1968 their intentions 
I 
to phase out their defence commitments east of Suez. It would not be an 
exaggeration to say that this news was received with alarm and despon-
dency in the Republic. Some of the questions widely asked were: What 
would happen to more than 40,000 base workers who would lose their 
jobs? How could Singapore make good the loss of its GNP, variously 
estimated at between 15 to 25 per cent? Fortunately, this setback was 
r· 
26' By 1970, 42 urban renewal sites were sold by public tender to 
the private sector, yielding a record investment of $700 million and 
providing employment for 60,000 people. See Alan F.C. Choe, "Public 
Housing, Urban Renewal and Transformation of the Environment", in 
Singapore, National Trade Union Congress, ed., Towards Tomorrow, (Singa-
pore: Eurasia Press, 1973), p. 26. 
27 Singapore, Ministry of Culture, Singapore 1974, (Singapore: 
Koon Wah Lithographers, 1975), p. 127. 
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later proved to be a false alarm. When the British Government actuated 
its military withdrawal at the end of 1971, the steadily growing indus-
try was able to make good the losses that had stemmed from the British 
action. While the Gross Domestic Product increased from 3,043.4 million 
dollars in 1965 to 6,680.4 million dollars in 1971;;N3 the UJ:ilLemployment 
rate had fallen from well over 8.7% to 4.8% over this seven-year period. 
In mid-1973, the unemployment rate was as low as 4.5% while the GDP 
stood as high as 9,092.8 million dollars~9 And thus, the problem of 
unemployment was alleviated. 
In recent successive years, manufacturing has remained the 
main stimulus of Singapore's economy. Its increased earnings accounted 
for one-third of the total increase of the GDP in 1973. Yet another 
area in which government encouragement has helped to start a new source 
of income is banking and finance. Since its inauguration-in 1968, the 
UAsian Dollar Marketn of Singapore has been growing. 
But unfortunat!ely, tlgood times never lastu • In the last two years, 
the world has fallen on difficult times. It has been experiencing a 
period of depression. Steeply rising prices for oil, food grains and 
other natural raw materials have inevitably brought a grave world-wide 
inflation which proved more disastrous to most of the developing Itthird 
worldtl countries. As an economic entity which has been so vulnerable to 
external influences, Singapore has been hand hit., Tts economic growth rate 
28 
29 
Singapore Yearbook, 1974, p. 288~ -
Ibid. 
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has fallen from 12% in 1973 to 5% in 1975. 30 In 1974, although the 
unemployment rate did not exceed 4.5% of 1973, the total number of laid-
off workmen amounted to 20,000, accounting for 2~ of the 0.6 million 
workforce. 31 Fortunately, the number of laid-off workmen has gradually 
gone down as the industries which caused two-thirds of the lay-offs, 
namely, electronic, garments and timber, have been recovering. Since the 
end of 1975, Singapore's economic situation has been greatly improved. 32 
In order to provide a more reliable and better livelihood to its 2.2 
million population, Singapore certainly has no choice but to strive 
continuously "to achieve at the same time the four obJectives of any 
national economic policy first, a rapid economic growth; second, a 
healthy balance of payments position; third, full employment; and fourth, 
a slow rate, if not 8, total absence, of inflation, which would not affect 
stability in price.,,33 
Apart from the problem of how to provide a livelihood to the 
population, another grave problem confronting Singapore is the one of how 
to' allocate its extremely limited space to meet the housing requirements 
of its 2.2 million people. As a port with no hinterland of its own, 
having an area of only 584.3 square kilometres, Singapore has extremely 
limited living space. The problem of living space has been 
30 Sin Chew Jit Poh, one of the most widely read Chinese newspapers 
in Singapore, January 1, 1976. 
31 Nanyang Siang Pau, a well established Chinese newspapers of 
Singapore, January 4, 1975, p.26. 
32 With a 7% growth rate for 1976, Singapore would seem to have "noved out 
of the debilitating effects of the recession. See Asia Yearbook 1977, 
(Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review Ltd., 1977), p.283. 
33 These four national objectives were singled out by Singapore 
Finance Minister, Mr. Hon Sui-sen, for discussion at a seminar. See The 
Mirror, Vol. 10, No. 16, April. 22, 1914, p. 1. 
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accentuated not only by population growth and increasing hbus~ng de~ 
mands, but also by the need to allocate some of the Island's limited land 
resources for industry, commerce, agriculture and public uses such as 
defence installations, water catchmen't and roads for public transport. 
As a matter of fact, as early as the beginning of this century, 
Singapore had an acute housing problem. But it was not until the coming 
of Singapore Improvement Trust (SIT) in 1927 that any attempt was made 
to tackle it. In its 32 years of existence, the SIT constructed exactly 
23,019 housing units. 34 This proved grossly inadequate. The bulk of the 
population was concentrated in the congested slums in the central city 
area. These pS\ll:s>le wlul. were uilahl.e to £inaa:ooommodation in these slums 
moved out to the fringe of the city where thei erected haphazard shelters 
of wood, attap (coconut leaves), corrugated iron or. scrap materials. 
They eventually grew into squatter resettlements and formed a ring of 
squalor and misery around the central city area. These areas often 
became death traps and breeding grounds for disease and crime. 
When the present PAP Government came into power in 1959, housing 
was rated as a top-priority commitment. The Housing and Development 
Board (RDB) was established in February 1960 to replace the SIT. The 
Board immediately worked out a ten-year (1961-70) housing developmentL 
plan, establishing that 150,000 housing units would be required in 
the following ten years to meet the housing shortage and provide alter-
native acoommodations for people affected by slum clearance and urban 
34 Nanyang Siang Pau, December 23, 1974, p. 32. 
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renewal schemes. Of this, 50,000 units would have to be built by the 
private sector. 35 
At the end of the First Five-Year Building Program (1961-65), the 
backbone of the housing problem had been broken. The Board built some 
53,000 flats at a cost of $230 million, housing more than 250,000 people~6 
During the Second Five-Year Building Program (1966-70), the HDB built 
over 67,000 flats costing $305 million for about 350,000 pe~ple~7 Another 
113,000 new flats were constructed during the Third Five-Year Building 
Program (197l-75)~8 By March 1976, the number of people residing in public 
housing estates increased to more than half the total population~9 At 
present, the HDB is undertaking its Fourth Five-Year Building Program. The 
target is to construct another 125,000 housing units1° 
The Government's housing policy, in providing houses for the people 
at rents or prices they can afford, is regarded as a public service. A 
socialist feature of the public housing program is that its first attention 
was given to the housing problem of the lower income people1l Since 1964, 
35 Choe, Ope cit., p. 26. 
36 Teh Cheang-1N"an, "Public Housing", in Ooi Jin-bee and Chiang Rai-
ding, op.' cit., p. 174. 
37 Singapore Yearbook, 1974, p. 220. 
38 Singapore Yearbook, 1976, p. 196. 
39 Ibid., p. 195. 
40 Ibid., p. 196. 
41 The first five-year building program emphasized the provision of 
a basic shelter and amenities with a high ratio of one-room and two-room 
flats. The second five-year building program had few one-room with more 
three-room flats. The third five-year program was almost devoid of one-
room flats. More and more larger and better four-room and five-room flats 
were constructed. While the one-room and two-room flats were built to 
meet the housing requirements of the lower income group, three-room flats 
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the Government has implemented a uHome Ownership for the Peopl.e" Scheme 
to enable the lower income group to own HDB flats. Under this scheme, the 
purchaser needs only make a down-payment of 20% of the selling price, the 
balance to be repaid monthly over 20 years. To further assist the lower 
income people to have houses of their own, the Government in 1968 am.ended 
the statute governing employees' compulsory savings to allow the purchaser 
to utilize his credit in the Central Provident Fund (CPF) 42 to pay for the 
flats or to meet the initial down-payment. 
Besiaes trying to tackle the housing problem, the Singapore Govern-
ment has also launched a nation-wide urban renewal program to re-develop 
the slum-ridden areas in the strategic and valuable central city area. To 
prepare for the Republic's growth and ultimate progress, the Government 
has striven to allocate more strategically located land for t~e develop-
ment of trade, commerce, industry, transportation facilities, public 
utilities, recreational, cultural, educational and environmental improve-
ment facilities. Its major urban renewal task is not only to identify 
areas that must be demolished and rebuilt, but also to identify those 
areas worth preserving and initiate a program to improve them and make 
them habitable with improved environment. Moreover, it has been the Govern-
ment's responsibility to rehouse those people affected by the renewal 
scheme. 
Since the inauguration of the Urban Renewal Program in 1966, wide 
for middle-income group, the four-room and five-room units were built to 
meet the housing requirements of the higher.,....income group. 
42 The CPF is a compulsory savings scheme to which both employers 
and employees contribute, covering almost all persons employed in 
Singapore under a contract of service. From July 1, 1973, the rate of 
contributions applicable to the private sector has been 26% of ordinary 
wages and contributions at this rate are paid by employers and employees 
at the rates of 15% and 11% respectively. 
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ranging new developments have taken place in various parts of the city. 
More and more slums have been replaced by modern well-planned housing 
complete with a whole range of socio-economic amenities.' By 1975, more 
than 206 hectares in the central city area consisting of_decaying slums 
. 43 had been systematically· cleared and redeveloped. And, 55 urban renewal 
sites were sold by public tender to the private sector, yielding an 
investment of $760 million and providing employment for more than 65,000 
peopl.e~4 The construction boom which Singapore has enjoyed since the 
second half of the 1960s is the net result of the ambitious urban 
renewal campaign. 
Another important emphasis of the urban renewal scheme is to improve 
the Republic's environment. Aside from providing socially and economically 
viable projects, there have been ambitious projects to beautify the city 
and so to provide a more congenial living and working environment for 
Singaporeans. These include the development of recreational parks, sports 
complexes, playgrounds, community centres and hawkers centres; the 
preservation and renovation of buildings and sites of historical or archi-
tectural interest; and the development of proper drainage systems, modern 
sanitation facilities and other anti- pollution measures. As tourism has 
become an important industryj5 the Government has striven to provide more 
tourist facilities and amenities such as tourist complexes, hotel, 
shopping centres and landscaped sites. 
43 SingaPore Yearbook, 1976, p. 197. 
44 Ibid. 
45 In 1973 alone, there were 1,000,685 tourists in Singapore, 
compared with 780,000 in 1972 and 710,000 in 1971. Earnings from tourism 
in 1973 were $528.3 million, an increase of 27.9% over $412.9 million 
for 1972. See The Mirror, Vol. 11, No. 33, August 18, 1975, p. 7. 
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In order to preserve more space for socio-economic development, the 
Government has striven not only to save living space by building skywards 
but also to enlarge the Island's land area by reclaiming land from the 
sea. By March 1976, a total of 1,000 hectares of the east coast had been 
reclaimed at a cost of $123 million16 It is likely that such a "competing 
with sea for land" movement will continue in the years to come. 
In addition to the problems of economic viability and living space, 
Singapore, like many other newly emergent nations, has al'so been faced 
with the dual problems of achieving political integration and protecting 
her territorial soveriegnty. While the former is a matter of internal 
unity, the latter is a matter of national defence. But they are not two 
separate states of affairs. Both of them are not only interwoven with each 
other but also supportive to each other. They are equally important to 
the overall security and stability of Singapore. Broadly speaking, the 
complexity of Singapore's security problems stems largely from the geogra-
phical location of the Island, the heterogeneity of its population, and 
its artificial historical origin. 
As we have noted earlier, Singapore is a Chinese-dominated tiny city-
state surrounded by the big Malay-led states of Malaysia and Indonesia. 
Quite naturally, the people and the PAP leaders of Singapore have been 
plagued by an encirclement complex. As early as 1960, the Singapore 
leaders, in placing a merger of the Island and the Malayan Peninsula 
in the forefront of their political aims, had envisaged the predi-
cament of an independent Singapore. It was feared not only that 
46 Asia Yearbook 1977, (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review Ltd., 
1977), p. 288. 
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Singapore's political isolation would be inimical to her economic and 
social stability, but that an independent Singapore would become "an 
Isreal in Sbutheast Asian. Unfortunately, for all the effort they 
invested in bringing merger to fruition, Singapore remained in the 
Federation of Malaysia for only a year and eleven months. 47 In accord-
ing Singapore independent status, the act of separation revived the 
Island's former fears for her territorial security. And obviously, such 
fears were further sharpened by events in the 1960s. While the two-year 
Indonesian Confrontation has induced the Republic to perceive Indonesia 
to be a living potential threat, the hatred generated during the dispute 
between the PAP and the Alliance Governments has introduced a new 
animosity in relations between Singapore and Malaysia which prior to 
their merger in 1963 was not apparent. On the other hand, the large-
scale anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia, which followed the abortive 
coup d' etat_of October 1965 and the largely anti-Chinese "May-13" 
communal riots in Kuala Lumpur in 1969 have also given a feeling of 
danger to the Singapore leaders and people. 
Owing to the unusual geo-political character of the Island and 
the special ethnic composition of her population, Singapore's survival 
as an independent state has been predicated on her ability to come to 
terms with her environment. From the very outset of her independence, 
she has tried hard to maintain good relations with Malaysia and 
47 ~riefly, the separation of Singapore from Malaysia was attri-
butable to the tangled threads of clashing economic, social, cultural, 
personal and party interests, ambitions and racial feelings that bound 
the Singapore and Malayan leaders in conflicto For a more detailed 
investigation into the causes and reasons of separation, see V. Surya-
narayan, "Singapore in Malaysia", International Studies, VoL 11, 
Noo 1, July 1969, pp. 1-43. 
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Indonesia.. To repudiate the notion that the Republic is a "Thi~d China", 
the PAP Government has taken great pains to stress Singapore's place as 
part of the world of Southeast Asia and of Malaysia rather than of China. 
In reference to Singapore's relations with China, it has made it fairly 
clear that the Republic would establish diplomatic relations with China 
only after all the other members of the Association of Southeast Asian 
48 
Nations (ASEAN) have done so. 
Whilst striving to promote a sense of "good-neighbourliness" with 
its two immediate Malay neighbours and other states in the Region, the 
Singapore Government has also been trying assiduously to prevent Singapore 
from becoming " a Chinese state in the Malay sea" or "an Israel in South-
east Asia". Since Singapore's independence in 1965, efforts have been 
afoot to create a multi-racial, mul ti-lingua,l and multi-religious nation 
of Singapore. The present Singapore leadership believes in a concept of 
) nationalism which is not linked with race, religion or language. It has 
striven energetically to foster and promote a common Singapore sense of 
identity -- a sense of Singaporean nationalism on a multi-racial basis. 
The removal of all barriers of language, race and religion has been seen 
as the prerequisite to the achievement of this aim. 
In Singapore, Malay has been mao.e the national language whilst 
English, Chinese (Madarin) and Tamil share with it the status of official 
tongues. Care was taken to choose a Malay as the first and a Eurasian as 
the second indigenous head of state. Meritocracy has been adopted as the 
48 The ASEAN consists of five Southeast Asian states, namely Indone-
sia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philipines. Of these five 
ASEAN states, only Indonesia and Singapore have not had diplomatic 
relations with the People's Republic of China. 
-46-
guiding principle for the allocation of employment opportunities, scholar-
ships, government flats and other social services. And, much government's 
energy has been bent towards maximizing the sense of community between the 
cEfferent racial groups, making them more tolerant of each other's culture. 
All thi.s is aimed not only at strengthening intercommunal harmony, political 
integration and civil peace but at curtailing the Chineseness of the 
Republic. The Singapor'e Government has recognized that any emphasis on the 
Chineseness of Singapore would only increase the suspicions of its neigh-
bouring countries that the Island was an outpost of Chinese influence and 
a potential agent for Peking's ambitions in the Region. In his a.ddress to 
a Chinese clan in Singapore in July 1975, the Foreign Minister of Singapore, 
])!fy. Rajaratnam, solemnly declared: 
Everyone in Southeast Asia is watching very closely for the "real 
nationalistic feelings" of the Chinese community here •••• There are 
some people who claim that Singapore Chinese are Chinese first and 
Singaporean second. Unless we convince them that the 80 per cent 
Chinese population in the Republic regard themselves primarily as 
Singaporeans and not as Chinese, they will go on thinking this •••• 
You may be a Lee, a Tan, a Ching or Chong, but the fact that you 
are a Singaporean must come first.49 
In its regional policy, Singapore has been a staunch member of ASEAN. 
To the Republic, the regional Association is a,t once a vehicle for streng-
thening domestic economies and a clearing house for mutual consultation 
among member states contributive to the development of intra-regional 
cc-operation and trust. With regard to the question of regional security 
and stability, the Singapore Government has agreed to the creation of 
Southeast Asia as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. It has advocated 
that the best way to 813cure a peacef-c:tl neutraliseo_ Southeast Asian zone 
49 Straits Times, a most widely read English newspaper in Singapore, 
July 8, 1975. 
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is to let all interested powers to come in and develop a stake in the 
Region, thereby ensuring that no single major power gets into a dominant 
position. Such a neutralization concept apparently subscribes to the 
theory that the major powers being global powers with world-wide economic, 
political and strategic interests will maintain their presence in the 
Region. It differs from the Malaysian neutralization proposal that the 
major powers should stay away from the Region?O 
In order to promote a regional balance of power underpinned through 
the play and involvement of multiple external forces, the Singapore 
Government has sought to represent the Island-Republic as a "global city" 
with the world as its hinterland. Its main aim is to encourage the major 
powers to develop a stake in the Republic's continued survival. In 
delivering his speech at the Eightieth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on May 
13, 1975, Singapore Foreign Minister, Mr. S. Rajaratnam said: 
The Singapore Government believes that for Singapore, small countries, 
the more big powers are around in this area, the better for us 
because our options are bigger. But if through some unhappy accidents 
we have to contend and choose only between two powers then life 
becomes more difficult. Worse still if we have no choice but to come 
to terms with one power, then that is disaster.51 
While striving to promote a balanced involvement of external forces, the 
Singapore Government has been aware of the need to avoid being involved in the 
competition and conflicts of the major powers in the Southeast Asian 
region. It has adopted a policy of non..,-alignment and n~utraIity aimed at 
50 An explanation of Malaysia's neutralization proposal is proved by 
M~ Ghazalie bin Shafie, a senior minister in the Malaysian Cabinet, in 
"Neutralization in Southeast Asia", Pacific Community, Vol. 4, No,. 2, 
October 1971, pp. 211-220. 
51 "Asean Unity: The Best Safeguard", The Mirror, Vol. 11, No. 22, 
February 6, 1975, p. 1. 
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maintaining friendly relations with all countries willing to respect the 
Republic's integrity. 
Partly for the purpose of maintaining internal security and partly 
for the purpose of assisting in the development of national self-confidence, 
the Singapore Government has also made a vigorous effort to establish a 
modest self-defence force sufficient to d~ter other nations from attacking 
the Republic. In view of the Republic's limited manpower and financial 
capabilities, the Singapore ministers and service chiefs in 1961 saw a 
solution to the defence problem in the introduction of National Service. 
Since then, the three arms (land, sea and air) of the Singapore Armed 
Forces have been in the making. The British Government's decision to thin 
out their military bases on the Island certainly served as a stimulus to 
the rapid growth of the Singapore forces. 
With a view to creating an attractive climate for foreign investment 
and socio-economic development, the PAP Government has made every endeavour 
to maintain the civil peace and political stability of the Republic. Besides 
external infringement, communalism and communism have been seen as another 
two major threats to the security of Singapore. Whilst striving to promote 
multi-racialism and to enhance the national consciousness of Singaporeans, 
the PAP Government has taken stern disciplinary measures to fight 
local communalism and communism. By banning communally-oriented publica-
tions and arresting racial chauvinists, communists and other pblitical 
extremists, the PAP Government has made clear its attitude that it will 
stamp harshly on communist subversion, or any attempt to exploit racial 
or other social issues at the expense of Singapore's stability and security_ 
In its effort to promote industrial peace, the Government has encouraged 
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consolidation of small trade unions into the laI'ger ones leo_ b;y the 
government-guided National Trades Union Congress and introduced the com-
pulsory arbitration of disputes. In recent years, the PAP Government has 
Come under increasing criticism for its high-handed social control policies. 
But there has been no weakening of these policies. In one of his public 
speeches, Premier Lee proudly told his critics: 
We are an authoritarian lot because we are prepared to discipline 
oursel ves. If balancing our budget and refusing to go along 1rJi th 
the fads and fancies of the contemporary permissive societies of 
the West, if that is authoritarianism, well, so be it. Singapore 
is solvent."52 
By and large, in comparison with the other Southeast Asian states, 
the political scene of Singapore in the decade from 1965 to 1977 has 
displayed exceptional stability. The visible phenomenal success of the 
Republic -- rapid economic growth and social construction like public 
housing, urban development and land area's enlargement through reclama-
tion -- is attributable to the civil peace ana. political sta-bility the 
PAP Government has tried hard to maintain. Whether all this can persist 
into the 1980s remains to be seen; but what seems certain is that Singa-
pore's central problem of survival is not yet over. Owing to its minute 
size, poor natural resource base and exposed geo-political position, the 
Republic's nation-building is bound to be a long testing process. 
52 Asia Yearbook, 1975, p.271. 
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III. The Importance of Manpower Development to Singapore 
Although it is a truism that the larger and more varied the 
resource base of a country, the more potentialities and opportunities 
it has for economic and socio-political advancement, it must be borne 
in mind that the mere possession of these resources does not guarantee 
that such advancement would necessarily take place. It must also be 
borne in mind that the existence of poor "have-not" countries and rich 
"have" countries is not a matter of natural arrangement or an arrange-
ment of ·'God". It is by and large a man-made phenomenon. Even from the 
most superficial point of view, we are quite safe tc say that the rich 
"haven states are more capable than the poor "have-not" ones in terms 
of non·-congeni tal capacities and knowledge of their people and leaders. 
From the positive advancement of those countries which do not have a 
sound natural base, we should not have much doubt on the believability 
of the notion that man -- man's will and man's power -- certainly can 
overpower natural forces. 53 
Indeed, while natural resources count in the nation-building 
process of a nation, human resources count too. It is evident that the 
post-independence development history of Singapore also conforms with 
this re-emphasis accorded to the human factor in nation-building. As a 
result of its minute size, poor natural resources endowment and exposed 
geo-political position, Singapore's continued survival as an indepen-
dent state has consistently been a matter of doubt. Even the PAP 
53 This notion is translated from the old Chinese saying, uren 
ding sheng tian (A,1itI¥.t:1<.. )n. Its superficial meaning is: man (ren) must 
be able to (ding) overpower or conquer (sheng) heaven (tian). The word 
"tian" is used by Chinese people to imply natural or superhuman forces. 
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leaders themselves in the late 1950s and early 1960s described the 
notion of an independent Singapore as "1aughable lt and "ludicrousn • In 
1960, a policy statement -by the Cen-eral Executive Committee of the 
PAP eloquently argued: 
Merger between the Federation and_ Singapore is historically 
inevi table. The man-made bound2 . ry at the Straits of Johore 
will disappear as all the other freak colonial frontiers be-
queathed to newly independent colonial territories by the 
map drawers and surveyors of the colonial era •••• Colonialism 
has made a technically international frontier on the Straits 
of Johore and created two states. But no soldier can devise a 
front to make Singapore and the Federation two instead of one 
mili tary situation. He "lATha conquers Mal,qa conquers Singapore. 
The Japanese proved it. And conversely he who holds Singapore 
absorbs Malaya. Stamford Raffles proved it •••• And no pol i'1;i--
cian has yet devised a method to prevent news and events from 
spreading C),cross the causeway • Every political action in the 
Federation, in la,ngucl,ge, education and all other field:;:, of 
g~vernmen~ affects and has repercussion in Singapore.54 
In taking the trouble to pursuade the Ivlalayan leaders to merge Singer 
pore with Malaya, the PAP Government clearly took the view that 
Singapore cannot stand alone, and that the road to economic stability 
an(i full political o.evelopment lies through merger. It is for this 
reason that the PAP leaders and their supporters felt independence 
was forced on Singa.pore against thai!" wish by the Malaysian Government 
When tha Malaysian Government IS decisi.on to expel Singapore from 
the Federation of Malaysia came into effect on August 9, 1965, the 
prospects of the Island's continued survival were as dim as it had been 
54 Tae Y. Nam, Racism, National ism "wd. Nation-builcling in Malaysia 
and Singapo~['e, (Nel,'J Dehli: Sadhna Prakashan, 1973), pp. 22-23. 
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prior to its merger with Malaya. Compounding its difficulties-were its 
declining entrepot trade, its pressing unemployment, its fast growing 
population, and its weakening defence in the face of impending :British 
withdrawal. With independence forced on it, Singapore was left to its 
Own devices for survival and security. Two of the questions widely 
asked and discussed were: Was the newly created Singapore state viable 
and how would the Republic protect itself from the regional resentments 
and global fluctuation which overhang its future? In the first few 
years of Singapore's independence, very few people really believed that 
the Island-State would have survived until today. Many people, especially 
those who disliked the PAP Government and its leaders, even expected that 
this infant Republic would collapse and die within a few years. 
Unfortunately, such speculation has suffered a crippling blow 
from the fact that Singapore has not only survived but prospered until 
today. Even those writers such as T.J.S. George55 and lain :Buchanan,56 
who have been highly critical of the PAP Government and Singapore's 
development pattern, have not attempted to deny that the Republic has 
achieved considerable success in its post-independence nation-building 
endeavours. 
In their attempts to explain the causes of Singapore's phenomenal 
55 ~.J.S. George, Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore, (London: Andre Deutsch, 
1973). The author drastically critizes Mr. Lee Kuan Yew and his PAP 
government. He and his readers may be taken aback that this book has not 
been prohibited in Singapore. 
56 .rain :Buchanan, Singapore in Southeast Asia, (London: G. :Bell & 
Sons, 1972). The author is very critical of Singapore's development 
pattern. For brief account of :Buchanan's arguments,.· see Review Article: 
G. Raman, "The Israel of Southeast Asia", Pacific Community, Vol. 2, 
No.3, 1972, pp. 301-305. 
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success, writers and analysts differ from each other in their-findings and 
views. Many writers attribute it mainly to the strategic position and 
deep-sea harbour of the Island. Some analysts view that it is a product 
" of the Island's traditional entrepot trade. As lain Buchanan puts it, 
" ••• Singapore's prosperity is due to the fact that it is the base for 
the import of goods from foreign countries and for re-export to Malay-
sia and Indonesia.»57 Besides, some writers tend to hold the view that 
Singapore's prosperity was related to the Vietnam War because, prior to 
the end of the War in April 1975, Singapore had been a major trading 
partner of South Vietnam and the United States had become its largest 
single source of foreign investment. 
Although these views are varied, they seem to imply that the 
phenomenal success of the Republic is primarily an incidental product 
of its natural settings, its historical entr~pot trade, and world 
events. In other words, they share the view that the continued survival 
and the success of Singapore are a matter of luck. They seem to approve 
the fallacy that the rise and fall of a country, if it is not an 
arrangement of nature or "God", is merely a fortuitous phenomenon or a 
happening by chance. If this is the case, we need not give much_thought to 
explain the rise and fall of all nations. For instance, we can explain 
the emergence of China as an influential world power as a mere chance 
because it is gifted with a big territory, a sound natural base and a 
stimulating world situation "conducive to its development ll • Of course, 
by applying the same logic, we may argue that India's current poverty 
57 Raman, OPe cit., p. 302. 
is not attributable to its natural resource endowment but because of 
the accidental phenomenon that the world tide has been inimical to its 
advancement or simply that it has no good fortune. The absurdity of 
such "fortunate-unfortunate" thesis is quite axiomatic. People of this 
idea commit a common error of neglecting the importance of manpower in 
the nation-building process of a country. They take no account of the 
fact that the will, attitudes, latent capacities and expertise embodied 
in the citizenry influence considerably the pace of development. At the 
least, people of this view cannot prove that the leaders and people of 
Singapore have done nothing in the past ten years but just waited for 
their fortune to bring them prosperity. 
Of course, there are many men of opinion who can present a more 
precise picture of Singapore's development. One of the most comprehen-
sive views is that Singapore's advancement is not only due to its 
strategic location, fine natural harbour and "chances" to recieve bene-
fits from world events; but largely attributable to its other five 
great assets: efficient and incorrupt government, political stability 
with civil and industrial peace, a high level of education, an ambitious 
entrepreneurship, and a hard working population. To put it more pre-
cisely, it is brought about by the efforts of Singapore leaders and 
people. As a matter of fact, such conditions like good leadership, 
efficient bureaucracy, sound education, quality work-forces as well as 
ambitious entrepreneurship are all man-made in nature. It is exactly 
these man-made conditions thathave enabled Singapore to adapt to its 
objective milieu and so to survive and prosper. In reality, even the 
mechanism of adaptation is also a sort of human ability •. We must 
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be aware that a country which can adapt is also a country which has 
the capacities to adapt. For the same logic, a nation which can survive 
and prosper is a nation which has the capacities to survive and prosper. 
Otherwise, it should have ceased to be a national entity. 
As a tiny island with a poor natural resource, Singapore's long-
term viability depends ultimately upon the quality and the creative 
energy of its people. It needs a high quality manpower made up of the 
local decision-makers, such as governing elites,administrators and 
entrepreneurs, to initiate, organise and lead its nation-building. It 
also needs trained technicians, engineers, doctors, social workers, 
and skilled workers as well as trained soldiers to man and carry out 
its nation-building programs. It is for this reason that the Island's 
2.2 million people have all along been seen as the only reliable major 
resource of the Republic. In his official address to a youth conference 
in Singapore, Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam pointed out: 
The only major resource that Singapore has is human resources --
intelligence, ability, social discipline, up-to-date knowledge 
and skills and an infinite capacity for hard work. These are our 
substitutes for tin and rubber, petrol and iron, rice and copra 
and all those that come under the term "natural resources" .. o. 
They are very real and very important. The bustle, prosperity 
and orderliness which are all the products of the intangible 
quality we call "human resources1l • And one thing about 
human resources is that unlike rubber or oil or iron and other 
natural resources they are inexhaustible. Not only inexhaustible 
but they can be expanded and accumulated without limit.58 
Therefore, the decisive factor of Singapore's nation-building is 
the matter of how to develop and increase the knowledge and the 
58 "Youth and Nation-Building", The Mirror, Vol. 10, No. 29, 
July 22, 1974, p. 8. 
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dexterity of its people. Since human resources are the only major 
resource in which the Republic is not lacking, the success or failure 
of its manpower development is naturally an integral part of its life 
and death struggle. Eve'r since Singapore became a sovereign state, the 
Singapore Government has plz,ced manpower development in the forefront 
of its nation-building plan. 
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CHAcPTE.R 3 
SINGAPORE'S liflANPOWER DEVELO p]\IIEWr STRATEG IES 
In the foregoing chapter, we have asserted both the importance 
of human resources and manpower development in Singapore's nation-
building process and the human implication of the Republic's current 
development progress in the context of her natural as well as econo-
mic and socio-political settings. On the basis of this perspective, 
the writer is going to layout in this chapter the major manpower 
development premises, policies and strategies of Singapore. In so 
dOing, the focus of the writer's attenti.-on is placed on two fact-
finding attempts. The first one is to single out the special features 
of Singapore's manpower development policies and measures. The second 
one is to investigate the validity and legitimacy of the Singapore 
Government's manpower development policies and approaches in the 
light of Singapore's objective settings and subjective national needs. 
By and large, this inquiry is "policy-oI'iented"both in content and 
purpose. It is therefore less concerned with the technicality of the 
subject matters. 
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To Basic Manpower Development Premises 
In Singapore, the major problems of manpower deve~opment have 
fallen into two broad categories: (1) those related to shortages of 
"high-level" manpower with critical skills and competence; and (2) those 
related to surplus -of unneeded manpower. While the former stems largely from 
the intensifying industrialization and other S{)f;io-ec6riomic d.evelopment programs 
of the Republic, the later is mainly due to the smallness., the limited living 
space-and the narrow employment oppO'!t'tunities of the Island-State. In other 
words,- the first problem is a matter of how to acquire the desirable 
quantity and quality of skills and F~owledge required for the actuation 
of nation-building. The second problem is a matter of how to control 
population growth so as to avoid population explosion and large-scale 
unemployment. It is therefore unmistakably clear that Singapore's 
concerns about the quality of her human resources and the progress of 
her nation-building work are inextricably bound to~those about the 
quantity of her popula±ion. 
In order to be meaningful, any statement a"bout the size of the 
hUman population must be based on consideration of many environmental 
and man-made factors, in addition to population density -- numbers of 
people per unit of land area. Much more critical than population 
density alone, as we can reason with ease, is population density in 
relation to available resources, geographical factors like climate, 
topography and ecological conditions, and such man-made production 
means like technology and economic organizationso The Sahara Desert, 
for instance, is populated at a much lower density than the tropical 
island of Tahiti. However, as Paul Ro Ehrlich observes, more people 
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are able to live well on the resources of the island than they could on 
the resources of an isolated piece of desert:9 Of course, the discovery 
of valuable resources like oil or water under the desert might alter the 
situation. The oil could be exchanged for food, commodities, other need-
ed materials as well as technological know-how and various serviaes. ~ne 
water might make possible the conversion of·desert into arable land. 
And, in time, the desert might develop into a local population centre of 
high density. This, in fact, happens around many oases. The fertile 
soils of some tropical lands, as in some parts of Africa, ar~ sparsely 
populated because of the diseases endemic to those areas. Conversely, 
some poor soils, as in Japan, support dense populations because the 
inhabitants are capable of building up the resource base of their eco-
nomy and getting more output from given inputs due to their improving 
tJchnology. The logical consequence of these observations is that at any 
time, and for given conditions, the density of population for a given 
area can be too much, too little or about right. It is very difficult to 
say what populcJtion size in any country is the ideal. Even development 
planners and economists would be hard put to assert what the ideal 
population size in a country should be. A general conception can be 
acquired to serve the purpose of this study is that: the number of 
people that live in a given area depends on the number of people it~ 
current resources, economy and socio-ecological bases can support or 
accommodate. 
Man is no doubt the basic component element of a nation. Bu~ the 
59 Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne R. Ehrlich, Population, Resources and 
Environment, (San Francisco: W.R. Freeman and Company, 1972), p. 257. 
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size of a population reflects nothing but the numerical strel1gth of a 
country. It is anything but a real picture showing the substantial qua-
lity of the human agents which make up the human grouping. A country 
which does not have adequate quantity of skilled and competent people 
to spur its nation-building programs is not necessarily underpopulated. 
And, a nation which has a big population does not necessarily have an 
abundance of skilled and competent nation-builders. What everyone can 
see in the third world is an abundance of population. Many developing 
states are even overpopulated~ And yet most of them are faced with the 
common problem of having insufficient good quality manpower to man and, 
actuate their nation-building proc_esses. The problem of maintaining an 
appropriate balance between_ the ,quantity and the quality of population 
is all too evident. 
It is also important to note that the quantitative strength of a 
population alone does not tell us anything a-bout the substantial quali tati ve 
strength of a country in economic and socio-political termso This is 
true not only of the countries with small-populations but of those 
states with large populations. A state of small population is not necessa-
rily weak or poor. And, a nation of large_-populationiS1'.).ot bound to be 
rich ~nd strongo From ancient times till now, there have been such 
persistent phenomena that while many countries with small populations are 
rich and strong, many countries with large populations are poor and weak. 
Of course, it has happened that while many states of small popul~tion 
are poor and weak, many states of big population are strong and ricrh. It 
is therefore obvious that the size of a population is not a comprehen-
siva determinant of the wealth and strength of a nation o Aociomatically, 
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the wealth and strength of a nation are mainly determined by the 
dexterity and skills of its people and not by the size of its 
population. 
In addition to these recognitions, we should also be aware that 
a big or overgrown population may prove to be of no advantage or harm-
ful to the nation-building process of a nation. It is beyond dispute 
that man's survival is in essence a natural resource-consuming process. 
A living man needs not only oxygen, water and food as other anim2,ls and 
plants do, but also clothing and shelter. If he is to live more effec-
tively and more meaningfully, he also needs medical care, education and 
entertainment. To succeed in attaining these means, a man who is not to 
live a parasitical life must have a promising job, whether it be 
economic, socio-cultural or political. 
A large population or a high rate of population growth may impede 
the nation-building progress mainly because: (1) it may consume many 
national resources, material and financial, which can otherwise be 
employed to accelerate the progress of development plans; (2) it may 
result in widespread poverty, food shortages, malnutrition, starvation, 
diseases, illiteracy, ignorance, a high rate of unemployment or under-
employment and a persistent socio-political instability; and, even 
worse, (3) it may diminish the vitality of a state if itcreates a large 
Quantity of poorly educated, unproductive, or socic-economically redun-
dant manpo,ver. While the resultant dependency burden60 may be a crippling 
60 The dependency burden is here defined as the number of non-
productive persons per productive worker. Logically, the bigger is the 
the number of non-productive people, the heavier the dependency burden. 
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blow to national growth, the lack of quality manpower will eventually 
deprive a nation of not only its capacity to create wealth but also of 
its capacity for long-term survival. 
It is a great pity that these disadvantages of overpopulation are 
not merely theoretical. They have been the grim realiiies facing most 
of the developing countries. Such striking features of "underdevelop-
ment" like slow socio-economic progress, widespread ,poverty, ignorance, 
diseases and large-scale unemployment have been both the produ~~s and 
the symptoms of overpopulation. A large population with a high growth 
rate has been widely seen as a major liability and not an asset of the 
developing countries. It is certain that when a country has more people 
than its current resources, technology and socio-economic organizations 
can support or use productively, both the qWZlityof its people and the progress 
of its nation-building efforts are at the same time bound to suffer a 
decline. 
For these reasons, we should think and speak of manpower develop-
ment as a process with two dimensions. On the one hand, as we have 
iterated,' it is concerned with the problem of how to develop 
the skills and knowledge of all the people of a state so as to acquire 
the desired quantity and quality of skills and knowledge necessary for 
nation-building. On the other hand, it is a matter of how to reduce the 
rate of population growth and thus the population pressure which may 
impede the the rate of national growth so as to minimize the quantity 
of redundant, underutilized or even unneeded manpower and the dependency 
burden. Anyone w.ho tends to' look atlthings superficially may hold the view 
that these two facets of manpower development are two separate matters. 
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One is related to the quality of a population and one is related to the 
quantity of a population. Nevertheless, if we examine them cautiously, 
we discover that they are in effect not only inter-related but mutually 
supportiveo It is simple logic that,by reducing the amount of redundant 
manpower and the dependency burden, a country will be able to allocate 
more resources and initiate more promising efforts to build and increase 
the knowledge and skills of its people. 
In dealing at length on the interrelationships between the quantity 
and the quality ofmanpo101er, we have in fact sketched out the main con-
cerns of Singapore's manpower development. Only if we have some elemen-
tary knowledge regarding the objective settings and thanational priori-
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ties of Singapore, we should be able to appreciate the Quality-and-not 
quantity manpower development premise of the Singapore Government. Since 
the first day of the Republic's independence, the Singapore Government 
has realized and consistently made clear to its citizens that if the 
Republic is to succeed in her socio-economic and defence developments, 
she has to be a nation of trained and skilled people. And hence, high 
quality manpower with critical skills and competence has been seen as 
the only reliable substitute for the Republic's meagre natural resource 
endowment. 
In view of the infant Republic's pressing unemployment problems 
and its increasingly high population density and serious housing shor-
tages, the Singapore Government also realized that Singapore had 
61 See supra., pp. 27-55. 
more people than her current resources and socio-economic organizations 
could support or use productively. Singapore leaders recognized the 
necessity to control the growth rate of the population. They have, 
from the beginning, cautioned the Singaporeans against the danger of the 
population explosion and particularly of the many ill effects of over-
population. 
In the course of events, in supplementing the Singapore Govern-
ment's efforts to develop and increase the skills and knowledge of 
Singaporeans, birth control has become an indispensable part of Singa-
pore's manpower development process. In arguing for the necessity of 
population control, the Government has energetically striven to bring 
Singaporeans to recognize the reality that what Singapore urgently 
needs is not a large population but an appropriate quantity of skilled 
and competent manpower. While a large population with a high growth rate 
has been interpreted _ as a serious threat to Singapore's progress 
and vitality, high quality manpower with skills and competence has been 
seen as a prerequisite of Singapore's long-term viability and growth. 
Precisely because of these considerations, "quality and not quantity" 
has become the basic premise of Singapore's manpower development 
policies and programs. 
110 Policies for Population Control 
In the first two decades of the nineteenth century, Singapore was 
almost devoid of people. Then came the Island's development as a major 
f\ 
entrepot and strategic centre under the British colonial rule. With the 
massive influx of labourers from China and India, the Island experienced 
a steady growth in population. Up to the mid-1940's, as can be observed 
from the data in Appendix 2, migration was the 'principal cause of pop1J.la-
tion growth. Before the beginning of the 1920's, relatively low crude 
birth rates combined with relatively high crude death rates resulted in 
negative natural increase. But for the large-scale inflow of immigrants, 
the population would/have suffered a decline. Since 1921, however, 
natural increase became a positive factor in population growth and its 
importance has grown since. From the 1930's, it became the dominant 
cause of population growth whilst the increasingly stricter immigration 
contro~ imposed by the British and Singaporean Governments brought an 
end to the importance of international migration as a factor of popula-
tion growth. The population of Singapore, at any rate, grew steadily 
with higher rates in the first two post-World War II decades. It in-
creased from 938 thousand persons in 1947 to 1,446 thousand persons in 
1957 at an annual growth rate between 2.4 to 3.9 per cento 
When it became an independent Republic in 1965, Singapore had a 
population of 1.9 million with a growth rate of 2.5%. But, as we know, 
Singapore is a mere 584.3 square kilometres in land area. With the 
population density standing at 3,385 persons per square kilometre in 
1965, the newly independent Republic was already one of the most denSely 
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populated countries in the world. Although s:ingapore has never suffered 
from any large-scale starvation, serious shortages of food, or wide-
spread diseases, it did show other symptoms of overpopulation. Apart 
from its high population density and growth rate, the Island's other 
most striking overpopulation features in the pre-independence years were 
its over 8~7~ unemployment rate ,62. its serious housing shortages and its 
widespread poverty as revealed by the heart-rending slums ·in the central 
city area and the miserable squatter settlements around the city. 
As a matter of fact, as early as the mid-1930's, the problems of 
overpopulation had "become a matter of public concern in Singapore. 
According to the accounts of George G. Thomson and T.E. S1nith, the issue 
of popUlation control crossed the threshold of public discussion in 
January 1935, when the leading English language newspaper -- The Straits.; 
Times -- introduced many arguments for and against family planning and: 
birth control. Religious arguments of the Roman Catholic Church made up 
the bulk of oppo"si te opinions. Secular progressive opinions based their 
support for birth control chiefly upon general economic argumeniis. and 
, 
welfare considerations such as the health of the mothers and the 
opportunities for the children.63 Vigorous debates around the subject 
of family planning continued in the pre-war years, but it was not until 
the coming of the Family Planning Association (FPA) in 1949 that any 
substantial attempt was made to introduce birth control. Defining ita 
62 Singapore Yearbook, 1974, pp. 274-75. 
63 George G. Thomson and T.E. Smith, "Singapore: Family Planning 
in an Urban Environment", in T.E •. Smith, ed., The Politics of Family 
Planning in the Third World, (London: George Allen Unwin, 1973), 
pp. 217-225. 
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aims primarily in terms of individual welfare, the Association said that 
it wished "to bring to the people of Singapore the means by which those 
wishing to do so could plan their families and thus help to make happier 
lives for 2011".64 Initially all its work was voluntary. Soon, however, 
official patronage "\"las sought and obtained. In the first ten years of 
its operation, the numl,ers of people using FPA clinics rose from 1,800 
in 1949 to 34,551 in 1959. 65 Nevertheless, this proved groBsly inade-
quate. That a much more widespread service was needed was indicated by 
the data that in the ten years from 1947 Singapore's population had 
grovm from 988,100 to 1,445,900. 
On coming into power in 1959, the PAP leadcJrship was apparently 1;lell 
c:.umre of the seriousness of the Island I s pressing population problems and 
the urgent necessity of birth control. In their 1959 election manifesto, 
the PAP leaders had made clear their commitment to family planning. One 
part of the manifesto argued: 
Unless something is d.one to restrict this, vIe shall never be able, 
no matter how hard we work, to provide the schools, hospitals and 
the employment our people need. The present family planning 
arrangements are totally inadequate for the task of spreading 
knowledge among the masses. The PAP intends to expand the family 
planning organization considerably so that it v~ill effectively 
reach the people allover the island. 66 
In the early 1960s, the Government launched a massive family 
planning campaign to stimulate an awareness of intelligently planned 
parenthood among the adult popUlation. Starting -with a series of large-
scale state-sponsored exhibitions, the campaign aimed to set the social 
64 Ibid., p. 224. 
65 Ibid., p. 225. 
66 PAP Election Manifesto, The Task Ahead: PAP's Five-Year Plan 
1959-65, Part II, p. 19. 
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climate in which family planning ""wuld attract greater public -interest. 
Subsequently, coloured posters and literature on family planning were 
distributed and displayed throughout the Island. Forums were organized 
in community centres; courses were held in higher learning institutes 
and classes vvere given in junior schools. The traditional and religious 
attitudes obstructive to the campaign were challenged by official and 
non-official family planning promoters and their supporters. 
In November 1963, in his speech to the Parliament, the Yang di-Pertuan 
Negara) Singapore's Head of State; made public that plans had been fina-
lized to provide family planning services and supplies at all maternity 
ami child welfare clinics~7 This announcement visibly implied that the 
Government was now prepared to playa more active part in the field of 
birth control. After revising the current social climate and the perfor-
mance of the FPA, the determined PAP leaders believed that it was time 
for the Government to take steps to take over all the major family 
planning 1iJOrk from the FPAo In March 1965, a Review Committee lrJas 
appointed to suggest which of the current family planning activities were 
to be transferred from the FPA to the Ministry of Health. The final 
report of the Committee recommended that the ]\hnif3try should take over 
the responsibility for the provision of family planning services at all 
except three of the clinics, for which the FPA liJou1d continue to remain 
responsible. The Committee also suggested that the responsibilities of 
promoting family planning education and research should rest "liJi th the 
68 
Ministry of Health. 
67 Thomson and Smith, Ope cit., p. 238. 
68 Ibid., p. 240. 
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J"ust a feliv ,,'lTeeks after the separation of Singapore from Malaysia, 
a White Paper entitled Family Planning for All was tabled in the 
Parliament. In endorsing the Review Committee's Report, the White Paper 
proposed that the first day of 1966 should be the operative date for the 
new arrangements. Set in the context of Singapore's Second Five-Year 
Development Plan, the White Paper was in effect a master-plan of family 
planning. The chief purpose of family planning was defined as to liberate 
Singapore women from the burden of bearing and raising an unnecessarily 
larger num-ber of children and so to increase human happiness. As the 
White Paper put it: 
Singapore's present population is over 1.8 million and each year 
about 60,000 babies are born. Our annual crude birth rate of over 
30 per thousand is too high. Far too many mothers are bearing too 
many children, at the cost of their health and too many bread-
winners of families are hard put trying to earn enough to feed the 
many hungry children that are being brought into the ,'lTorld each 
year. There is too much unnecessary human misery in Singapore, and 
this can be effectively stopped through a determined effort on the 
part of government to provide family planning on a mass basis. 69 
To effect the recommendations of the White Paper, the Government 
launched a National Family Planning and Population Program. In January 
1966, the Family Planning and Population Board (FPPB) was inaugurated to 
function as the sole agency for promoting and disseminating information 
pertaining to family planning in the Republic. According to the Singapore 
Family Planning and Population Board Act, it is also the responsibility 
of the Board to initiate and undertake population control programs and to 
advise the Government on all matters relating to family planning and 
69 Singapore, White Paper entitled Family Planning for All, 
(Cmd. 22 of 1965), (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1967), para. 
1.2. 
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population controlIO The :establishment of the FPPB signified full 
government endorsement of family planning. 
After its inauguration, the FPPB took over the work of family 
planning and set about its mass family planning education work with an 
intensive publicity campaign. As in the past, the emphasis was on the 
small family. Nevertheless, the appeal was directed more to the advan-
tage of the individual than to the common interest of the -society. As 
slogans of the campaign put it, "small families own more~t, "small 
families have more to eat", "small families have a better education", 
and so, nsmall families live better". Even so, the social significance 
of small families has not been totally forgotten. It is self-evident 
that only when an increasing number of married couples plan for small 
families, then can the total population be kept within appropriate 
numerical bounds. 
Apparently, what could be a controversial problem is the definition 
of a small family. Through a survey conducted in 1974, the FPPB found 
that the desired average family size amongst Singapore couples is 3.6 
children whilst the actual completed family size is 4.3 children on the 
average71 If this finding is representative and trustworthy, it reveals 
that in the eyes of many Singapore adults a small family is one having 3 
to 4 children. If Singapore families persist in having 4 to 5 children, 
however, the population will double to 4.5 million in one generation or 
about 26 years' time, as there are 4.3 children replacing every married 
couple. And, if this practice continues, the population will continue to 
70 Singapore, Family Planning and Population Board Act, (Singapore: 
Government Printer, 1970), para. 13.1. 
71 Margaret Loh, "The Two-Child Family A Social Norm for 
Singapore", NYLTI Journal, Vol. 7, March 1974, p. 59. 
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double every generation and the nightmares of population explosion will 
inevitably come to bother Singapore. Largely because of this apprehen-
sion, the Singapore leaders and family planning workers have contended 
that if population explosion is to be avoided, the ideal size for the 
Republic is 2 children. As Premier Lee put it: 
Every person, genius or moron, had a right to reproduce himself or 
herself. So it can assumed that a married pair will want to be 
allowed tvJO children to replace them. That is already the average 
family size of the skilled industrial workers in ~~rope •••• In 2 
Singapore, the Government still allows for three for good measure? 
In illustrating both the disadvantages of big families and the aclvan-
tages of small families, Mr. Lee said: 
We can reach a point where Singapore becomes so crowded that life 
is unpleasant and unbearable. Slums in America, the richest coun-
tries in the world, are warning examples. Life is barely worth 
living. Then people take to drugs, hippieism and escapism. Because 
they need drugs, they need money. Because they need money, they 
kill to get the money. The ideal family is for two children. If 
you must have more, then three. Only in this way can we make Sin~ 
gapore a clean, green and gracious place to live, a garden city in 
VJhich vJe can nourish and nurture our young for a better future. 73 
In recent years, though allowing for 3-child families, the Govern-
ment has made an all-out effort to induce Singaporeans not to have more 
than 2 children. "Small family" has therefore been officially defined 
as family 1rJhich does not have more than two chilclren. And the theme, 
I'stop at two", has become the guiding principle of Singapore I s current 
family planning and population control programs. Since the beginning of 
this decade, as can be seen from the official pamphlets and posters 
distributed and displayed for the campaign, the motto of family planning 
has been shifted from "Singapore wants small families" to "Singapore 
72 Alex Josey, Lee Kuan Yew: The Struggle for Singa,Eore, (Sydney: 
Angus and Robertson, 1974), p. 59. 
-
73 Ibid. 
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wants two-child families". With the backing of Radio-Televisi_on Singa-
pore and other state-run mass media, the FPPB. has embarked on a mass 
family planning education program to implant the idea of the two-child 
family in the minds of Singaporeans. 
In this mass education process, government officials and family 
planning promoters have gone all out to uproot those forces standing in 
the t-vay of family planning progress. Needless to say, the traditional 
Chinese beliefs that "more sons means more wealth" and the "sons are 
better than daug:hters" have been the main targets of pul81ic criticism. 
This traditional bias towards large families and male children is the 
legacy of old China's agricultural society where it was economically 
feasible to have many children. In that society, male children were a 
great asset to the family because they lJ'Jere able to assist with the 
family agricultural activities at a very early age and hence contributed 
economically to the family. Parental belief that sons are better than 
daughters is also attributable to the existing traditional socia-family 
system that sons bear the family name and continue the family line. 
Moreover, according to the old marriage customs, girls are "married out" 
and hence of little economic use to their parents. Boys on the other 
hand bring home their ,,1Ti ves. And as a rule, daugthers-in-law are to 
serve their husbancls' parents dutifully while it is the sons' un'luestion-
able duty to support financially their parents to the end of their days. 
People who uphold these traditional practices naturally find that more 
sons bring more happiness to them. 
In a speech at a conference held on "The Population of Students in 
the Asian Region", Dr. Wu San-san, a senior doctor of the Singapore 
Heal th Ministry, revealed that there were still many old women liTho did 
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not have much education unwilling to accept the idea of family_ planning. 
Dr. Wu heard many women, to whom she gave family planning advice, complain 
that their traditionally-minded mothers-in-law wanted them to bear more 
children and preferred to have grandsons74 Clearly, this must be one of 
the reasons why many young couples who wish to have a ntwo-child" family 
cannot "stop at two". If the family planning program is to succeed, the 
removal of this traditional attitude is unquestionably a prerequisite. A 
new slogan of the campaign therefore says, "Girl or boy, two is enough." 
Generally speaking, the family planning campaign of the 1960s was 
one of mass persuasion. There was no element of pressure. But, it has been 
the Government's conviction that if mass persuasion is to succeed in 
stimulating all Singapore parents to keep their families small, it should 
be supplemented by certain measures which can discourage the people from 
inclining towards large families. Speaking in the Parliament on December 
29, 1969, Premier Lee said: 
Our problem is how to devise a system of disincentives so that the 
irresponsible, the social delinquents do not believe that all they 
have to do is to produce their children and the government then owes 
them and their children sufficient food, medicine, housing, educa-
tion and jobs. Until such time when moral inhibitions disappear and 
legislation or administrative measures can be taken to regulate the 
size of families, we must try to induce people to reduce their fami-
lies and give their children a better chance.75 
As early as 1965, in his first National Day message, Mr. Lee had pointed 
to the anomalies of certain welfare services from a population policy 
point of view. He said: 
We have to revise all our social values so that no one is required 
to have a large family in order to qualify for a Housing Board flat, 
75 Singapore, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (First Session of 
Second Parliament); Part IV, Vol.-29, (1969), Col. 322. 
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for social relief and so on. Today, strange as it may seem, we are 
giving priority to people with large families, thereby encouraging 
people to have large families. This requires a revamping of all 
our socia,l services, f:::'ee :Jrimary schools, free hospi tal~l and free 
maternity clinics regardless of how large the family is and the 
bigger social allowance given to the bigger families.76 
These statements were not simply brought forward to pulJlicize the 
family plcuming campaign. In reali i!y, they served as the overtures of 
the impending government actions. In its efforts to induce the Singapore 
parents to be satisfied with small families, the Government has taken 
certain administrative measures quite outside the field of family 
planning and birth control. The following are some of the administrative 
clisincenti ves which have been implemented by the Government. 
1. No priority is given to large families in the allocation of HDE flats. 
2. Only families with no more than three child.ren will 1)e eligible to 
sublet rooms in their H:DE or Jurong Town Corporation flats under 
certain conditions. 
3. No paid maternity leave will be given for delivery of the third and 
subsequent children. 
4. :Delivery charges in government materDi ty hospitals increase 1,ri th each 
additional child in the following order: 
Ist Class 2nd Class 3rd Class 
First Child -------------~ $ 250 $ 100 $ 50 
Second cb.ild ----................ -------.,- 300 150 75 
Third Child -- ... -----,,-------- 350 200 100 
Four"th Chil(l ----------_ .. _ ..... 400 250 200 
Subsequent Children ------ 400 300 250 
76 Thomson and Smith, Ope cit., p. 252. 
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5. Lower priority for the choice of primary school for children of 
the fourth birth order and above. 
6. No income tax relief will be given to the fourth and subsequent 
children born on or after August 1', 1973.71 
Apart from implementing these disincentives, the Government and 
the FPPB have also done their utmost to devise measures to help 
Singapore couples exercise birth control. They have realized that 
there may be many people having large families simply because they do 
know how to exercise birth control. With the intra-uterine devices and 
the contraceptive pill proved as safe and effective birth control 
methods, the Government has made much effort to introduce them to the 
Singapore people. Advice and supplies for these family planning 
methods have been made readily available at all maternity and child 
welfare clinics. Both the contraceptive pill and the intra-uterine 
devices have been sold consistently at subsidized prices. 
With the passage of the Voluntary Sterilization Act in December 
1969, sterilization has also become a form of family planning in the 
Republic. It has been considered as the best method of birth control for 
those who have completed the number of children they want. The Act was 
amended in 1972 to simplify the procedures of administering voluntary 
77 Singapore, Family Planning and Population Board, Social 
Policies Related to Family Planning (pamphlet), (Singapore: Singapore 
National Printer, 1974). 
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sterilization and so to secure a wider acceptance of this me±hod 
amongst Singapore couples. The Bill allowed sterilization not only 
on medical and therapeutic grounds but also on social grounds such as 
family size and financial circumst0nce. In order to encourage more 
people to accept sterilization, the Government has provided three 
administrative incentives.to persons who are sterilized. 
1. Delivery charges for Third Class patients in ma.terni ty hospitals 
will be waived if sterilization is carried out after delivery. 
Ward charges will be remitted on application if sterilization is 
accepted by either parent. 
2. For those who are sterilized after delivery, medical leave will be 
issued on generous terms. 
3. Priority for choice of primary school for children of the fourth 
order will be similar to that of the first three children if one 
of the parents is sterilized. 78 
The assumption that many people would not have large families if 
they were given the choic-e is not a mere guess. It is based on the 
observation that 500 women on average were annually admitted to hospital 
after attempted abortions and that the number of illegal abortions 
actually performed must be considerably greater.79 In the late 1960's, 
owing largely to the revelation of several deaths from unsuccessful 
abortions undertaken by unauthorised and unqualified "back lane lt physi-
cians, the dangers of illegal abortion were of current public concern. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Thomson and Smith, OPe cit., p. 242 • 
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Partly for the purpose of curtailing illegal abortion and partly with a 
view to miniz.izing the number of "unwanted" infants in the context of 
population control and social 1JIJelfar@, the Government decided to enact a 
new law to make abortion under government supervision a legalized method 
of birth control. The Abortion Act was proposed in 1967 and finally 
passed in December 1969. In the process of its enactment, this Act met 1rJi ih 
strong criticism from doctors and religious groups. The Singapore Medi-
cal Association opined that legalized abortion was not a suitable method 
for controlling population growth because of the significant health and 
mortality risks it carried. "Unless a liberized abortion law is applied 
with care and a full awareness of the possible social medical conse-
quences," its spokesmen said, "it might lead to some women depending on 
legalized abortion rather than contraceptive methods to control the size 
of their families ••• with a possible undesirable impact on our present 
family planning campaign. IISO The Christian group argued that the Bill 
would encourage permissiveness in sexual morality which was not only 
obnoxious to religious feelings but also in contradiction with the long 
term aim of the Government as revealed by its calls towards ruggedness, 
discipline and self-sacrifice. 81 In arguing for the passage of the 
Abortion Act, Mr. Lee Kuan-yew said: 
The crucial yardstick by which we shall have to judge the result 
of the new abortion bill ••• will be whether it tends to raise or 
lower the total quality of our population •••• Until the less 
educated themselves concentrate their limited resources on one 
80 Singapore Government, Report of Select Committee on the 
Abortion and Voluntary Sterilization Bills, ParI. 6 of 1966, (1969), 
p. 26. 
81 Ibid. 
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or two to give their children the maximum chance to climb up the 
educational ladder, their children will always be at th-e bottom 
of the economic sca1e.82 
In addition to these -birth control methods and supplementary 
administrative measures, stricter immigration control has also been an 
important means of popu18,tion control in Singapore. In the years before 
the 1930's, as we have pointed out, the rapid growth of Singapore popu-
1ation was chiefly due to the unrestricted and continuous inward 
movement of Chinese and Indian laborers from their home-lands. First 
introduced in the 1930's, restrictions on further immigration were 
enforced during the post-war period. From the day of Singapore's inde-
pendence, immigration has been virtually prohibited. Entry is restricted 
to persons who can contribute to Singapore's socio-economic development, 
those who can provide specialized services not available locally, fami-
lies of local residents, and others on special compassionate grounds. 
Under the Constitution of Singapore, Singapore citizenship may be 
acquired not only by birth and descent b~t by registration. Besides 
citizenship certificates, the Immigration Department of Singapore issues 
six categories of other immigration permits and passes. 
(1) Entry permits for persons granted permanent residence in 
Singapore under the provisions of the Immigration (Prohibi-
tion of Entry) order of 1973. Eligible applicants are persons 
who hold professional qualification; who possess specialized 
and technical 'skills; and who are wives or children of local 
residents. 
82 Alex Josey, cp. cit., p. 59. 
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(2) Employment Passes for 8.1iens seeking employment inf'irms 
established in the Republic. priorit.y is normally given to 
skilled and experienced professional workers. 
(3) Dependents! Passes for wive~ and dependent children of persons 
on Employment Passes. 
(4) professional Visit Passes for artistes and entertainers for 
the duration of their performanoes in Singapore. 
(5) Social Visit Passes issued to aliens for temporary stay in 
Singapore, including tourists. 
(6) Student Passes issued to foreign students admitted to local 
schools ami institutions of higher- learning. 83 
Another measure taken by the Singapore Government to strengthen immigra-
tion control is the provision that,with effect from July 1, 
1973, Work permit holders wishing to marry Singapore citizens must 
obtain approval from the Commissioner of Employment. 84 This aims to stop 
aliens from using marriage with Singapore citizens as a means of acquiring 
Singapore citizenship. Of late, the Government further proclaimed that the 
Work permit holders who lire-apply" to the Government for permission to 
marry Singapore citizens should sign a "pledgen saying that they will 
accept sterilization immediately after their second child is born.85 
Clearly, the main purpose of this measure is to ensure that Work permit 
workers marrying Singapore citizens with government permission 
observe the tttwo-child family·1t norms of the Republic. 
83 Singapore Yearbook, 1974, pp. 72-73. 
84 For a detailed account of the new marriage proVlslons, see 
M.G.G. Pillai, "Singapore: Ne"\'\T Marriage Laws", Far Eastern Eoonomic 
Review, Vol. 81, No. 27, July 9, 1973, p. 16. 
85 Nanyang Siang Pau, January 26,1976. 
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On the whole, it is not an exaggeration to say that the-basic 
rationa£ of the Singapore Government's population control policies is 
one of Itthe end justifies the means". Recognizing the paramount impor-
tance that population control plays in the socio-economic progress of 
the country and the well-being of the people, the Government has 
persistently instituted nation-wide Family Planning and Population 
Control Programs and stricter immigration control measures to curb the 
rapid rate of population growth. While mass family planning education 
was carried out and indirect incentives were introduced to persuade 
Singapore parents to plan for two-child family, many administratively-
oriented disincentives have been adopted to discourage the people from 
having large families. In simple psychological terms, these are the 
means of positive and negative reinforcement the Government has employed 
to enhance the effectiveness of its family planning and population 
control programs. Realizing that the traditional attitudes in favour 
of large families and male children are a serious obstacle to the 
success of its efforts in promoting family planning, the Government has 
energetically and consistently striven to mobilize public opinion to 
uproot them. In order to enable Singaporean couples to exercise birth 
control more effectively, the Government has enacted laws to introduce 
voluntary sterilization and abortion. 
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III. Approaches to Improve the Quality of Manpower 
The transmission of knoirJledge and skills, in the broadest sense 
of the word, depends on education and training. In this sense, manpower 
development is in essence an educational process concerned with the 
development of man's brainpower, skills and dexterity. From the indivi-
dual's point of view, it is a learning process through which individuals 
learn to acquire the knowledge and skills which will enable them to 
put their latent abilities into full use. In Singapore, the educational 
process of human resource development is quite a complicated one. 
Broadly speaking, it encompasses five basic constituent and inter-relcded 
elements: formal education, vocational education, adult education, youth 
movement and community development, and compulsory" military training. 
When Singapore was part of the British-controlled Straits Settle-
ments, education in Singapore was essentially geared to the needs of the 
Colonial Government. Until the Second World War, education was left in 
the hands of the Christian missions ctnd various local communi ties. 
Education in the various language streams developed independently. 'rhe 
Government officially supported the English and IV1alay schoohl while 
education in the other languages 1IlTaS left to the individual communi ties. 
The education provided was a literacy type. While the mission schools 
concentrated on the local languages and religious instruction, the 
government-supported English schools emphasized the learning of the 
English language and secular subjects in the promotion of English civi-
lization. Supported IrJhOlly by the Chinese communities , Chinese-medium 
schools in large me2,surebecame instruments for the inculcation and 
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transmission of Chinese nationalism and culture. English-med~um educa-
tion on the other hand was primarily aimed at providing the necessary 
personnel to fill clerical and junior administrative ranks in the 
colonial civil service and in commerce. 
In the decade from 1947 to 1957, the development of education in 
Singapore was greatly fostered by the British Government. With the 
implementation of the 1947 Ten-Year Plan and the 1950 supplementary 
Five-Year Plan, free primary education was afforded to children of all 
races.86 While primary and secondary education was reinforced, voc.a-
tional and higher education was generally developed. Followin~ the 
establishment of the University of Malaya, ,novJ known as Singapore 
University, in 1949, the Teachers' Training College and the Council for 
Adult Education were set up in 1950, and the Singapore Polytechnic was 
established in 1954. Much of this expansion, however, was again confined 
to the English stream. The predominance of English education and the 
benefits it conferred were naturally resented by other communities. 
Opposing such an education policy, the Chinese community decided to 
launch a university to provide tertiary eduoation in the Chinese lan-
guage medium for the benefit of high school leavers from the Chinese 
s~ream. As a consequence, Nanyang University was established in 1956 by 
means of funds from philanthropists and people from all walks of life. 
The appointment in 1956 of an All-Party Committee to examine the 
situation in the Chinese schools was a significant development in the 
educational history of Singapore. The most far reaching recommendations 
86 Gwee Yee-hean, IIEducation and the Multi-Racial Society", in 
Ooi Jin-bee and Chiang Hai-ding, OPe cit., p. 210. 
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of the Committee were: (1) the parity of treatment for the four streams 
of education -- Malay, Chinese, Tamil and English; (2) the encouragement 
of intermingling of pupils from different language streams; (3) the 
establishment of common curricula and'syllabi for all schools; (4) the 
introduction of bilingual education in primary schools, and trilingual 
education in secondary schools; and (5) the encouragement of tIle fusion 
of the best elements of the various cultures to build up a common local 
cUlture.87 These recommendations were incorporated in the government 
White Paper on Education Policy published in 1956 and the Education 
Ordinance enacted in 1957, and were implemented by the PAP Government 
in 1959. 
When Singapore was a component state of Malaysia, it retained 
autonomy in the fields of labour and education. Its education policy 
remained unchanged. Both the English and the Chinese systems, inherited 
from colonial days, continued to concentrate on the learning of the 
humanities, the civics and the local languages. The objective was to 
develop a common loyalty through a common content curriculum on the one 
hand, and the mastery of two or more languages on the other. 
Since independence, a major change in the purpose and content of 
Singapore's educational curriculum has been underway. The days when 
education was merely an instrument for the inculcation of needed cleri-
cal skills have gone. The education system has been revamped to ensure 
full human development and successful nation-building as well as the 
collective well-being of Singaporeans in the context of independence. 
87 Ibid., p. 212. 
The education policy of the Republic has been given a national outlook. 
Education is a strenuous, costly and time-consl~ing enterprise. But it 
is one of the major inputs to the economic growth and social upgrading 
of a nation. In order to ensure that ,the Republic's nation-building 
under its leadership is successful, the Singapore Government has from 
the beginning taken great pains to foster the development of 
education. 
First of all, as in the case of other developing countries, the 
Singapore Government has striven to maximize the number of literate 
people and so to increase the general knowledge level of all Singapore 
citizens. It is self-evident that only when men are literate and 
e~uipped with some basic knowledge, can they fully understand and adapt 
more effectively to the environment and needs of their society and only 
then can they be taught to master knowledge and skills at higher levels. 
In Singapore, schooling at the primary level has been free for all 
children and financial help has been provided to those unable to afford 
the supplementary expenses for educational materials. Although fees 
are charged at secondary and advanced levels, scholarships and other 
forms of aid are readily available for ~ualified students whose parents 
cannot meet these costs. Although there is no compulsory education 
system in Singapore, it has been the intention of the Government to 
provide at least ten years of education for every child starting from 
the age of six. 
At the primary level, the curriculum includes a variety of sub-
Jects with much emphasis on the medium of instruction and a second 
language. At present, the Ministry of Education is working on a scheme 
j 
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to help those pupils who find difficulty in attaining even the basic 
skills of literacy and numeracy within the present maximum of eight 
years of primary education. This scheme may include an extension of 
another year to nine years. 88 At the secondary level, the pupils follow 
a common curriculum in the first two years. On completion of Secondary 
Two, they are given the option of joining the academic, technical or 
commercial streams. Up to 1968, the secondary school system was heavily 
biased towards academic education. In recent years, however, there has 
been a shift in emphasis from academic to technical and science educa-
tion to meet the needs of the Republic's modern and increasingly 
diversified economy. Students are encouraged to join the technical, 
science and commercial streams. But the final selection of students for 
the technical stream is based on aptitude tests and their performance in 
workshop practice and related science subjects. To enable, more students 
to receive technical education, many technical subjects such as technical 
drawing, metalwork, woodwork, and basic electricity have been introduced 
and emphasised in the first two years of secondary education. 
In addition to the technical schools at the secondary level, 
Singapore has two technical institutes at the intermediate level for the 
education of technicians and advanced craftsmen. They are the Singapore 
Technical Institute, established in 1969, and the Ngee Ann Technical 
College, founded as a private institution in 1963 but made a government 
school in 1967. The vocational and technical educational hierarchy is 
capped by the Singapore polytechnic. The polytechnic gives diplomas for 
88 For an account of this scheme, see "Adjustments in Education 
Policy", The Mirror, Vol. 12, No.3, January 19, 1976, pp.l & 8. 
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advanced technical training in the various branches of industrial techno-
logy as well as in nautical studies. 
Besicles the conventional sohools, there are twelve government-run 
vocational institutes in Singapore. They offer training COl.-crses in the 
metal, woodv'1Orking, electrical, electronics, mEmual and applied arts, and 
building trades at artisan and trade levels?9 Cour~es in printing and the 
hotel and catering fields are available at other training establishments. 
The Industrial 'I'raining Board viras established _in April 1973 to promote 
and co-ordinate various forms of industrial training in the Republic. 
Upon the request of the Government, many private companies have also run 
their own training programs to inculcate the needed skills. ]\IIany well-
established firms have even sent many of their employees to local or 
overseas vocational, technical and commercial institutes for on-the-job 
or off-the-job training. 
Singapore has two uni versi ties -- the Uni versi t;y- of Singapore and 
IJanyang University. Generally speaking, the University of Singapore has 
put more effort in developing its applied sciences and social sciences;90 
and, IJanyang University has concentrated more on the development of its 
commercial, arts and linguistic studies as well 2,S mathematics~l These 
89 For a description of the vocational institutes and their courses, 
see Industrial Training Board, Annual Report 1973-1974, (Singapore: 
~1cGraw Hill, 1975). 
90 The University of Singapore offers degrees in arts, sciences and 
social sciences, has professional schools in law, medicine, dentistry, 
engineering, architecture, education, accountancy and business adminis-· 
tra tion, and provides postgraclu2cte training in these fields. In addition, 
it has research institutes in Economic Research and various medical and 
biological subjects. 
91 Nanyang Uni versi ty gives degrees in the ccrts, science and 
commerce, has professior.al institutes of Asian studies, busine::,s studies, 
natural sciences, mathema,tic~ and social sciences, and provides post-
graduate ed.ucation in these fields. The Uni versi ty was foul'lrled in 1956 
under private auspices but has become increasingly government-regulated 
and finn.nced. 
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two universities ha.ve become a major source of high-level manpower supply 
to both the Government and tte industrial-commercial sectors. They have 
produced numerous lm'IT;y-ers, administrators, doctors, engineers, teachers, 
social workers and other categories of professional personnel. 
In recent years, the question as to the role of higher learning 
insti tu"tions has heen a matter of public concern. In the eyes of the 
Government, as pointed out b;,{ Premier Lee, the local uni versi ties and 
other higher learning institutes have to fulfil two major missions. First, 
they should produce the teachers, the administrators and the men to fill 
the professions -- accountants, architects, l2~wyers, technocrats. Next 
they should lead informed thinking into the problems the nation faces. In 
criticizing the previous tertiary education s~Tstem of Singapore, Mr. Lee 
Kuan-yelN said: 
We have established a more or less educc:ded elite in the sense that 
they can IiITrite, they" can read, they Can compose their thoughts, ••• 
but they are unable to increase the things that the people want to 
conS1.une. Our men who produce our modern industrial society, •• ~ our 
technocrats, are missing.92 
He, on tl18 ether hanel, believes that "the biggest dearth of talent in the 
l.mi versi ties in the developing nations, is not just a lack of zlcills in 
the technologies required for a developed society, but ev~n more important 
and ur~ent, the corps of informed thinking, to lead, to formulate and guide 
national thought on constructive lines. n93 By and large, the higher learn-
ing institutes of Singapore have continuously adjusted to conform to the 
policies laid d01iJn by the Government. They have been geared to a. high out-
put of scientific, technological and managerial manpower to meet the 
increasing demand for such perE~onnel by the country-. 
92 Alex Josey, Ope cit., p. 65 
93 Ibid., p. 66. 
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Broadly speaking, education is a social process tied up with all the 
people of a society. It is not and should not be confined to conventional 
schools, colleges and universities. In Singapore, adult education has been 
greatly fostered by the Government and has in recent years become an in--
alienable part of the Republic's educational system. '1'h8 Adult Education 
Board, established in 1964, conducts a wide range of courses for the 
general pul,lic. Besides offering language and general eeiucaiion at secon-
dary and pre-uni versi ty levels, it E"lso provides commercial and vocational 
education. With the establishment of their Extra-Mural Studies Department, 
the two local uni versi ties have conducted a varied and continuing educa--
tion program for Singapore adults. The extramural courses cover various 
fields, including appreciation of music and tbe arts, philosophy, natural 
sciences, economics and management, applied sciences, languages, law and 
social sciences. Apart from the Adult Education Board and the two univer-
sities, the 178 community centres, set up by the Government in various 
pB,rts of the Island, have also played a significa,nt role in the development 
of adult education. Educational and vocational classes conducted in the 
communi t;y centres are many and varied, ranging from textile handicraft, 
decorative a,rts, cooking and orcbid cultivation to language classes. 
As a necessary conch tion for manpower development and nation-building, 
education in Singapore is in fact a two-pronged process. It aims not only 
to d.evelop the knowledge and skills needed for rapid socio-economic 
development, but also to inculcate in Singaporeans the habits, values and 
attitudes conducive to the development of adaptability, creativity, social 
reBponsibility and loyalty to the Republic. 
Since Singapore I s expUlsion from M8,laysia in 1965, the City-State IS 
leaders have been endeavoring to foster a separate Singaporean identity 
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as both the major source of its citizens' personal senses of socio-
cultural identity and the primary focus of their social loyalties. Their 
efforts in this direction are positive and varied. Both in formal school-
ing and in socia,l acti vi ties, all means likely to be effective are employed 
for infusing the people -- both the younger and older generations -- with 
strong feelings of pride in the Republic's accomplishments and loyalty to 
it as a sovereign political entity in the international system. But this 
task ca,nnot be accomplished quickly or easily because the socio-poli tica-
lization and acculturation processes are by nature slow and the particular 
socio-cultural factors involved are complex and ambivalent in Singapore. 
The latter characteristics arise largely from the Republic's ethnic diver-
sity and peculiar regional situation. While trying to weaken the ties to 
China of the Chinese majority and to India, Malaysia and Indonesia of the 
Indian and Malay minority, the Singapore leaders have been striving to 
lessen the incompatibilities and resentments among the different ethnic 
groups. To ;inculcate a sense of "we-feeling" cvmong the people, the Govern-
ment has made every attempt to instill into their minds the positive value 
of multi-racialism, multi-lingualism, multi-culturalism and communal equa-
lity. All students of primary, secondary and vocational schools, summoned 
to attend the "raising-flag" ceremony held every morning pefore classes, 
are to sing the national anthem -- Maju-lah Singapura -- and pledge: 
We, the citizens of Singapore, pledge ourselves as one united people, 
regardless of race, la,nguage or religion, to builD. a d.emocratic 
society based on justice and equality so as to achieve happiness, 
prosperity and progress for our nation.94 
94 The writer himself had·taken part in the recitation of this pledge 
for three years. It is hard to find any school student who does not know 
how to recite it. 
-90-
Besides national consciousness and multi-racialism, the Government 
has gone all out to infuse Singaporeans, especially the young generation, 
with feelings of social responsibility and discipline ana a spirit of 
industriousness and thrift. Government leaders have availed themselves of 
every opporiunity to urge the Singapore people to exercise self-discipline 
so as to ensu.re for themsel bes a high standard of sociB,l order and organi-
zation; to work hard and to save to build the planned future; and to think 
more of the common interests of the society than of their individual or 
parochial group interests. The other pioneering virtues they have repeated-
ly stressed are self-reliance and mutual aid to cope with existing problems, 
understanding of the City-State's difficulties to motivate efforts and 
sacrifices for national cause, and sound minds in sound bodies to assure 
the desired Quality of life. 
In. striving to inculcate the attitudes and behavioral norms that are 
conducive to the improvemei'1t of manpower Quality, the Singapore leaders do 
not leave the City-State's people much choice in avoiding those habits and 
attitudes they consider bad. In order to protect the health of the people 
from ruination, the Government has frowned on smoking and drinking. No 
commercial advertisements of tobacco products are allowed in or on local 
newspapers, publications, TV and radio programs, and sign~boards. Smoking 
is strictly prohibited on buses and in community halls, cinemas and govern-
ment offices. In recent years, taxes have been continuously raised on 
tobacco products and alcoholic beverages. To stop people from becoming 
social parasites, beggars are apprehended and ordered to be rehabilitated. 
In promoting the "work ethic", the Government has consistently proclaimed 
that "nothing is for free" in Singapore. As a move to accelerate the 
development of Singapore as a clean city and to enhance civic consiousness 
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and socie;,l discipline, the Government has embarked on an anti-litter cam-
paign. Persons IAlho litter are liable to a fine of 500 Singapore 0.011ars. 
Since the PAP came to pOvJer in 1959, its government leaders have 
consistently warned against the "unwanted byproducts of the Western IATay of 
life". Hippies, drugs, long hair, free sex and unconventional clothes have 
been thought to be fashionable in North America, Europe and some Pacific 
countries like Australia and Japan. They have affected the young people of 
many developing countries. Philosophers and citizens of these modernities 
may have good reasons to rationalize their fashionable mannerism. It is 
however the Singapore Government I s belief that ~1Thile hippyism will encou-
rage young people to become permissive escapists disregarding the destiny 
of their country, drug-taking vTill stop them from becoming strong-bod.ied 
men, and chaotic "free sexit and blind imitation of Western sub-cultures 
are injurious to public morals and the development of creativity. 
In its campaign against "yelloilJ" culture -- pornographic culture, the 
Government censors movies, TV and radio programs, and publications of all 
kinds. Playboy, Playgirl, Penthouse and other literature of this kind have 
been banned outright. Long hair95and deviant patterns of dress and 1Jehavior 
are rigorousl;y di:01couraged in young people and foreign "hippies" are not 
permitted to remain in the CitY-State. Policemen are authorized to question 
any person with long hair and trim his hair. All civil servants are 
instructed to keep their h.air short and dress properly. Those who make 
regular contact with the pu"blic have "been directed to send lithe long haired 
people" to the back of the queue. In an effort to prevent Ute sale and use 
95 In government offices posters are displayed showing illustrations 
of a "reasonable" hair 2,tyle. According to the Government IS d.efini tion, 
long hair is hair that falls across the forehead and touches the eyebrow, 
or covers the ears, or reaches below an ordinary shirt collar. 
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of drugs from becoming a serious social problem, flogging and severe 
prison sentences have been introduced to punish drug addicts and capital 
punishment is also applied to deter drug pushers. 
With a view to minimizing the frequency and necessity of applying 
these unpleasant disincentives, government leaders of Singapore have not 
only consistently warned their people of the harm that the "unwanted by-
products of Western sub-cultures" can cause to the society and themselves, 
but also made an all-out effort to induce them to take part in sports, 
games and socio-cultural activities which they consider healthy. 
With the guidance of the Ministry of Education, all Singapore schools 
have undertaken a comprehensive range of extra-curricular activities. 
Various sports and games, including martial arts of different sorts, are 
widely and vigorously promoted at all levels. In every secondary school, 
varied student organizations have been set up to carry out cultural acti-
vities. The most widely established ones are: the Art Association, the 
Dancing Group, the School Choir, the Bridge and Chess Club, the Chinese 
Orchestra and Study Societies of the arts, science, commercial and tech-
nical subjects. Activities in the fields of art and music are particularly 
emphasized. In addition, uniformed units constitute another remarkable 
facet of the extracurricular program. Every secondary school has run its 
own National Police Cadet Corps, National Cadet Corps, Brass Band, Boy 
Scout and Girl Guide Groups, and st. John or Red Cross Ambulance Corps. 
All school teachers are requested to take part in the activities of one or 
two student organizations as advisers, supervisors or instructors. 
Teachers who do not have the required skills and knowledge are sent for 
training or learn by themselves through active participation. The entire 
extra-curricular program reaches its climax am~t the colour and pageantry 
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of the annual (one-month) Youth Festival where pupi.ls demonstr_ate the 
skills and discipline inculcated in school. Students earning high ratings 
in their performances are selected for specialized training to become 
student leaders in schools or national. rep:resentives in regional and 
international competitions. Although all extra-curricular activities are 
undertaken on a competitive basis among or within schools, emphasis is 
always placed on participation. 
The youth movement is not confined to schools. There are many socio-
cultural organizations in Singapore awaiting young people to play an 
active part in their activities. The mainstay of the post-school youth 
movement is made up of those well-established nation-wide social groups 
like the Singapore Scout and Girl Guard Association, the Singapore Art 
Association, the Musical Arts Centre, the National Spqrt Council, the 
National Theatre Company, the St. John Ambulance Brigade, the Red Cross 
Association, the Boy Brigade and other social welfare organizations. They 
run their auxiliary organizations, co-ordinate the functions of other 
socie-cultural groups, and provide leadership as well as training for 
student organizations. With the encouragement of the Government, Singa-
pore adults and commercial and industrial groups have also contributed 
much to the development of the movement. Their personal participation or 
their generous donations have been very encouraging to the young people. 
From the government point of view, the youth movement is a highly 
desirable mass mobilization process. It is through this movement that the 
government leaders can inculcate in the people the attitudes and values 
which are considered conducive to the development of national conscious-
ness and the advancement of nation-building progress. Naturally, it is 
also an attempt by the PAP leaders to win the "hearts" and "minds" of the 
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masses. In ord_er to ensure that the youth movement is on the r_ight track 
or up to its expectations, the Government has remained its chief promoter 
and director. Incorporated in July 1960 as a statutory authority under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Culture" the People's Association has be-
come an important government-directed agency entrusted with the responsi-
bility of organizing and promoting mass participation in socio-cultural, 
educational and recreational activities and, in the process, to establish 
a dialogue between the Government and the masses. To date, the Association 
has set up a comprehensive network of 178 community centres in various 
parts of Singapore. 96 
In addition to formal education, vocational and technical training, 
adult education and the youth movement, compulsory military training, is 
another important facet of manpower development in Singapore. Since the 
passage of the National Service Bill in February 1967, all young able-
bodied:Singapore males who reach the age of eighteen have been eligible 
for conscription for two years. After completing the national service, 
they return to the normal routine of their civilian life but still remain 
a part of the reservoir of defence manpower for the next ten to fifteen 
years. Leaving the army as fully-trained soldiers, each year they are 
recalled to their reserve battalions for refresher training. 97 In the 
early years, due to the underdeveloped training capacity, the Government 
allowed young men who were already working or planning to go for higher 
studies to be exempted from national service. But this practice resulted 
96 For a detailed introduction of the community centres, see Seah 
Chee-meow, Community Centres in Singapore: Their Political Involvement, 
(Singapore: Sing~pore University Press, 1973). 
97 For a discription of the regulations of the national service 
scheme, see Singapore, Enlistment Act (Act 25 of 1970), (Singapore: 
Government Printer, 1970). 
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in a shortage of leadership material as enlisted national servicemen 
tended to be of rather low education. To make good this shortage, the 
Government enlisted university graduates as well as recruits into the 
civil servioe. In 1970, a decision was taken that young men leaving 
secondary schools to join universities either in Singapore or abroad 
must first do their national service. Young men 'who were born before 1949 
or are "unQualified" for full-time military training are reQuired to do 
part-time national service either with the Special Constabulary or with 
the Vigilante Corps. 
In the Singapore context, this national service scheme is admittedly 
a pragmatic approach to defence-building. Singapore's population, although 
considered large in view of the small land area and poor resource base of 
the Island, is too small in defence terms. If the City-State was to main-
tain a standing army of regulars, as pointed out by Singapore Defence 
Minister~\Dr. Goh Reng-swee , either it will have to be a small army, 
ineffective as a deterrent, or else the Government has to spend enormous 
sums of money in maintaining a larger force~8 We know that Singapore is 
not a rich country with the economic capability of maintaining a large 
regular army. Furthermore, when a person becomes only a soldier, he does 
not contribute to the produotivity of the country. Therefore, the most 
economical and best possible way to build up an effective larger defence 
force for the Republic is to create a "citizens' army" which involves 
every able-bodied man of the country. 
When national service was first introduced, it was repugnant to 
many. The young people opposed it on the ground that it is an 
98 Goh Keng-swee, "National Service and Defence Policy", in 
Singapore, National Trade Union Congress, ed., Towards Tomorrow, (Singa-
pore: Eurasia Press, 1973), p. 56. 
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encroachment upon their personal freedom. The Chinese parents- opposed 
it because they held the traditional view that "good sons do not become 
soldiers". Soldiers and uniforms also had unhappy memories for the older 
generation. Theyhave not forgotten the excesses and brutality committed 
by Japanese troops. The pacifists opposed the idea of compulsory mili-
tary training because they were opposed to war, arguing that it would 
make the nation war-minded. Many people even did not see any reason why 
Singapore should waste its money and manpower resources to establish its 
own defence force. They argued that due to its small area and population 
and its economic dependence on sea routes, the Island-state could not 
be defended successfully against any determined attack by a well-equipped 
and sizeable qombination of sea, air and land forces. Eut these arguments 
cannot withstand scrutiny. 
All nations, big or small, need a feeling of security. For security 
is a necessary condition for effective survival. Eut security is not a 
state of affairs begotten out of nothing. Its existence or non-existence 
is largely determined by the defence capability of a country. This is 
true not only of big countries like China but of small states like 
Singapore. Defence, in the true sense of the word, is to take precautions 
against calamity beforehand. Living in a world of grave disturbance and 
uncertainty where every country is armed to protect its own interests, 
it is very unwise for a ccuntry to disarm. Unless a,ole -to obtain protection 
from other source{s), a completely disarmed state is deprived of the 
capability to gird up its loins against any hostile attack upon its 
-
right to exist. Those people who assert that a small state which cannot 
be successfully defended against a determined attack by a sizeable force 
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should not make defence preparations are either defeatists or-persons 
who are not concerned about the destiny of the country concerned. The 
logical consequence of their thinking is that Singapore must accept 
absorption by any country prepared to march its troops onto the Island. 
Pacifists, who indiscriminately consider Singapore's defence-
building efforts as war-minded, are idealists who either do not know the 
actual meaning and purpose of defence or are ignorant of the development 
of international reality. No doubt, aggressive war-minded governments 
or people may mc"ke and employ "defence arrangements" to pursue imperia-
list aggressive conspiracy. This is what the Germans and Japanese did 
three decades ago. But, there is also no denying that there have been 
many peace-minded people and governments making defence arrangements only 
for the purpose of safeguarding their Gvm legitimate rights and inte-
rests. When they initiate military actions to resist external interfe-
rence and aggression or exploitation, as the national fighters of many 
developing nations have done, they are actually forced to be "war-minded". 
If pacifists advocate that the victims of aggression should abandon their 
resistance movements for the sake of "peace", they are not true peace-
lovers. Their upeace-mindedtt thinking in fact approves the vaulting 
ambition and conspiracy of aggressive war-minded nations at the expense 
of many peace-minded national defenders. Singapore is after all a small 
fish which has the natural desire to live peacefully wi th ot:ter small 
and big fish in tho international ocean. Even if all its 2.2 million 
people are trained to become soldiers, it still does not have the mili-
tary might to pose any serious threat to any other nation. Realizing 
that the City-state is too weak tc resist a determined attack by a 
powerful force, the GovernmeLt leaders of Singapore recognize that the 
most reliable way to preserve the state by deterring external encroach-
ment is to enable it to become a upoisonous fish" -- a fish which can 
hurt Qr kill its eaters, that is to build a defence force having the 
capability to make its aggressor or conQueror pay a higher cost. Although 
Singapore is.not without friends who may come to her rescue in her hour of 
need, it is in her own interest to accept the guidance of -the old 
Chinese saying that "self-reliance is better than relying upon the 
otherstt. In stressing the importance of self-reliance in defence, Mr. 
Lee Kuan-yew is Quoted as hewing said: 
It will not do merely to depend on others to defend us. We would 
be in a very difficult situation if there is trouble one day in 
our country, if there are enemies invading us, and those defend-
ing us belong to another state, and are people who are not loyal 
to our nation but only soldiers employed by us and paid by us. 
It would then be too late for us to feel sorry about it •••• 99 
To make his point more comprehensive, he should also have mentioned that 
there could be some friendly states which wish to extricate Singapore 
from difficulties but have no ability to render assistance in her time 
of need. 
In the Singapore context, the build-up of a self-defence force has 
not only the positive effect of deterring other nations from attacking 
the Island-state, but also the effects of helping maintain internal 
security, assisting in the development of national self-confidence, and 
enabling the state to have an eQual place in any desirable regional 
military alliance. At the same time, it allows Singapore to conduct its 
99 Ibid., p. 53. 
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regional diplomacy from a position of some credibility. Toso~e extent, 
a national defence force is also necessary for economic reasons. In a 
public address to students at Nanyang University at the end of 1969, 
Premier Lee said: "Without adequate security arrangements, investments 
may slow down. If people believe that we are weak and defenceless, even 
our own wealthy citizens will move part of their capital abroad. ulOO 
Dr. Wong Lin-ken, the former Minister for Home Affairs, told a group of 
national .servicemen that "no foreign investor will put his money in 
Singapore, and no one will think this nation has a future, if he does 
not think that you contribute towards the defence of our country.nlOl 
No one can argue that defence-building by means of national 
service does not impose sacrifice and hard"ship on young Singapore 
citizens. Yet, it is necessary and inevitable for the simple reason that 
the Republiamust rely mainly upon her own efforts to defend herself. 
And, as we have mentioned earlier,. national service is the most economiaal 
and best possible way to build up a defence force sufficient to protect 
the Republic from external encroachment. Viewing Itindividual freedomtt 
from the perspective of a citizen's obligation to his country, no one 
can effectively argue that the Singapore Government does not have good 
reasons to enlist young able-bodied Singaporeans in the Singapore Armed 
Forces for two-year full-time compulsory military training. No matter 
under what political system, it has been a universally accepted rule 
that a legitimate government has both the responsibility and authority 
to require its citizens to perform whatever duties that are deemed 
100 Sunday Times, an English newspaper (Singapore) which is no 
longer in existence, December 14, 1969. 
101 Straits Times, January 22, 1970. 
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necessary for the fulfillment of common national causes. Individual 
liberty is not something untouchable when confronted with the common 
interests of the society. 
As a matter of fact, by serving in the army, they work not only for 
the security of the nation but for their long-term well-being and that of 
their families. The relation between the country and them is one between 
the lips and the teeth. When the lips are gone, the teeth are cold. When the 
indepeirden~eof the nation is lost, the personal liberty of its people 
will ,he :g6ne.~ The older Singapore people should know this better. 
They should remember the inhuman treatment given to them by the Japanese 
conquerors thirty years ago. They should be able to tell their children 
what freedom or liberty they had during that period of Japanese rule. With 
~he unhappy memories in mind, are they then rational in holding the tradi-
tional view that good sons should not become soldiers? Is this view not 
merely an unfounded prejudice against soldiering? Have they not realized 
that this Confucian idea had misled China for centuries? Learning from 
their history, the Chinese people in today's China have uprooted this 
fallacy. The Chinese parents in Singapore should do the same if they are 
to be considered as contributors of the Republic's defence development. 
Apart from fulfilling military requirement, the national service 
scheme has other non-military educational functions also. The foremost 
among them is that it can help develop a sense of discipline and social 
responsibility which is called for in every walk of life. The tough train-
ing on the other hand gives young Singaporeans a good opportunity to learn 
to face difficulties and dangers manfully. Moreover, the various establish-
ments of the Singapore Armed Forces (especially the logistic bases) have 
provided national servicemen with a wide range of vocational or technical 
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training. When the national service personnel return to civilian life with 
acquired attitudes and skills in the army which are in demand by indus-
tries, they will not only find jobs with ease but contribute directly to 
the economic growth of the country. Above all, national service greatly 
contributes towards the creation of a cohesive society by giving young men 
of diverse ethnic, religious and economic backgrounds the opportunity to 
live and vJork closely together. The intermingling of races and classes 
will have the effects of promoting mutual respect and comradeship, streng-
thening the sense of national unity, and hence uplifting the national 
character. 
As a whole, manpower development in Singapore is basically a govern-
ment-run process. In this process, every attempt has been made by the 
Government to ensure that all the necessary educational and training pro-
grams are in conformity with the nation-"building goals and strategies of 
the Republic. Inevitably, as in the fields of family planning and popula-
tion control, many measures taken for the improvement of manpower quality 
-- especially those adopted to combat unhealthy western influences and to 
implement the national service scheme -- are unpleasant and oppressive to 
the personal freedom of young Singapore people. Nevertheless, if Singapore 
is to succeed in her struggle for survival, they are highly necessary. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SINGAPORE I S IVIANP01rJER DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE 
Having outlined the Singapore Government IS manpOiJller development 
policies and approaches, we shall now proceed to seek a general evalua-
tion of them. In addi tim; to assessing the effectiveness and achievements 
of the manp0l,Ver clevelopment programs, we shall also assess the manpower 
development problems still confronting the leaders and people of Singa-
pore. Finally, the author will turn his attention to what the Singapcrean 
leaders and people can do tc overcome these problems. Because of the 
inadequacy of data, many comments and judgements are derived from the 
author's personal observations and perceptions. 
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I. The Achievements of Manpower Development Programs 
By the "achievements" of manpower development of Singapore, the 
writer refers to the measurable or visible effectiveness 
of Singapore's maLpower developmeLt efforts. In more general terms, 
achievement also means noutput" or Uprogress'ti. Since Singapore's man-
power development is concerned with both the Quantity and the Quality 
of the people, the question as to what is its progress should be also 
divided into two parts. Firstly, has Singapore been able to~control 
effectively the growth rate of its population? Secondly, has Singapore 
succeeded in its efforts to improve the Quality of its people and to 
allow them to aCQuire the skills and knowledge needed for its nation-
building endeavours? 
As can be observed from the data in Appendix 3, the answer to the 
first Question is in the affirmative. During the first five years of the 
National Family Planning and Population Program,. some measure of success 
was achieved. The target of the First Five-Year Program was to lower the 
birth rate to around 20 for every thousand persons was achieved.l02 The 
crude birth rate decreased from 28.3 per thousand in 1966 to 22.1 per 
thousand in 1970, while the total number of live births decreased from 
54,680 in 1966 to 45,934 in 1970. The rate of natural increase, which is 
the difference between the crude birth rate and the crude death rate , 
fell from 2.3% in 1966 to 1.7% in 1970. During this five-year period, 
the number of new family planning acceptors had been steadily increased. 
102 Singapore, Facts and Pictures, 1975, p.147. 
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In 1966, the total number of acceptors was 30,410 (see Append~x 4). By 
the end of 1970, it had reached 165,556. On the other hand, the annual 
number of female sterilizations increased from 477 persons in 1966 to 
2,310 persons in 1970, with the total. number of sterlized women raised 
from 447 to 5,929. 
The Second Five-Year Family Planning Program (1971-1975) aimed at 
lowering the birth rate to arolmd 18 for every thousand persons by 1975. 
An annual target of 16,000 new family planning acceptors was set for 
th ·f" " dl03 D " th f" t t f" th d f e . lve-year perlO. urlng elI'S wo years o· e secon i ve-
year program, however, the downward trend in the population growth 
figures reversed. The crude birth rate rose to 23.1 per thousand in 
1972 from 22~1 per thousand in 1970. This was the first time that 
Singapore experienced an increase in the rate of population growth since 
as far back as 1956. In reality, there was no indication that the 
National Family Planning and Population Program has suffered a serious 
set-back. By the end of 1972, the total number of family planning 
acceptors rose to 191,971 from 165,556 in 1970. This figure constituted 
60ifo of all married women aged 15-44 years. In addition, it was estimated 
that about another 20% were practising family planning either on their 
own or under the medical supervision of private practitioners. Further-
more, the number of women sterilized was on the rise from 5,929 in 1970 
to 15,619 in 1972. These figures suggest that family planning had been 
widely accepted by the people of Singapore. So, where did the problem 
lie? Demographic studies reveal that the major factor is the increasing-
ly large number of women coming into the reproductive age group. 
103 Ibid. 
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In just seven years between 1966 to 1972, the number of women in the 
reproductive age group of 20 to 40 years had almost doubled, rising 
from 57,000 to about 110,000 (see Appendix 5) • This irJasattributable to 
the Itbaby boom" of the immediate post-war years experienced in Singa-
pore. Those young men and women who were born in these years are now 
getting married and having their own babies. Another factor causing the 
rising population trend is that many people in Singapore still want to 
have a large sized family~04 
Fortunately, this upward trend in the populEdion growth figures 
did not last long. From the end of 1972, there has been again a steady 
downward trend. With the total number·of live births decreased from 
49,700 to 44,100, the crude birth rate decreased from 23.1 per 
thousand in 1972 to 19.5 per thousand in 1974. Parallel to these, the 
rate of natural increase had dropped from 1.8~ to 1.4~ over this two-
year period. It is important to note that the crude birth rate of 19.5 
per thousand E~nd the natural increase rate of 1.4'10 were the lowest 
population growth rates in Singapore I s demographic history-. When com-
pared with the growth rates of 1966, the crude birth rate had. decreased 
by 8.8 babies per thousand persons and the natural increase rate had 
dropped by 0.9 per cent. By the end of 1975, according to the 
demographic data released by the Statistics Department of Singapore, 
the natural popUlation increase rate was further lowered to 1.3 per 
105 cent,meeting the target of the Second Five-Year Family Planning and 
Population Program. 
104 See supra., pp. 70-72. 
105 Nanyang Siang Pau, February 2, 1976, p. 12. 
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Evidently, the steady decline in the population gro'\dh rates is 
owing to the continuous increase in the number of family planning accep-
tors. By the end of 1974, the total number of family plcwning ctcceptors 
was 229,400 persons and the total nl1mber of sterilizations numbered 
27,850, including 26,714 ",TOmen and 1,146 men. From 1970 (when the Abor-
tion Bill was passed) to 1974, the total number of abortions done in 
government clinics was 9,100 (see Appendix 4). And, more than 9010 of these 
abortion cases were those of married women~06 This data evidently dis-
proves the theory of those who opposed the passage of the ~bortion Act 
that legalized abortion would result in widespread moral corruption. 
And, the absence of death or surgical mishaps resulting from abortions 
indicates that legalized 8,bortion is a safe and effective supplementary 
measure of population control. In addition, the success of family plann-
ing and population control is reflected in the fact that the num'ber of 
infants available for adoption at social welfare homes has been steadily 
decreasing in recent years. The cases of adoption fell from 247 in 1972 
to 101 in 1974. Married couples who ,vish to adopt a child have now to 
107 vmit at least three years. The days when there were many "unwanted" 
infants looking for a proper home are over. 
As far as the quality of manpower is concerned, any attempt to 
evaluate the effectiveness or achievement of a manpower development 
process is bound to be a difficult task. In a broad sense, manpower 
quality is made up of many constituent ami inter-related elements. In 
106 Nanyang Siang Pau, November 8, 1974. 
107 Sin Chew Jit poh awl Nanyang Siang Pau, February 4, 1975. 
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the context of Singapore, it refers not only to skills and knowledge but 
also to social discipline, national consciousness, sense of responsibi-
lity and capacity for hard work. Nevertheless, things like intelligence, 
knowledge, skills, discipline, sense of responsibility, national con-
sciousness and industriousness are all abstract and intangible things 
and cannot be effectively measured with accuracy. First of all, as con-
cepts with built-in ambiguity, these qualitative human values could mean 
many different things to many different people. Although scholars and 
researchers of various disciplines have striven enthusiastically to 
devise methods for measuring tbese concepT-i.1al values, none of them has 
succeeded in working out a set of COmIJrehensive and "agree-to-·all" mea-
Sl:lrement inclicators. Believing that any micro-assessment of conceptual 
human values will lead us to an indefinite blind alley of philosophical 
disputes, the writer can only adopt a gross analytical approach to 
evaluate the manpower development progress of Singapore in qualitative 
terms. What he goes after is just a bird's-,eye view of the subject 
matter. In applying this approach, he is fully aware that his personal 
observations will inevitably become a determinant element. And he has 
to admit that hi~ judgements in selecting measurement indicators are 
conditioned by the data he has in hand. 
To begin with, let us first assess the manpower development pro-
gress of Singapore in respect to the literacy rate. Literacy, in the 
broadest sense of the term, means ability to read and write. In the 
absence of other better criteria, educational achievement has been 
widely accepted as a major index of literacy. In most cases, an illite-
rate is defined as a person who [:.as no formal education. This definition 
imperfectly assumes that a person with no formal education is a person 
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who oannot read and write. To our regret, we oannot but acoept it as an 
index of knowledge level. In Singapore, the oaloulation formula of 
literaoy rate is: 
Total number of persons with eduoation 
Literaoy Rate -----------------------------------------------.. x 100 
Total number of persons 10 Y'ears of age and over 
Aocording to the 1957 population census report, the literacy rate was 
dl08 . .,109 52.3700 By 1970, it had risen to 72%. From 1970 to 1973, the literaoy 
rate continued to inorease. About 77% of Singapore1s 1,729,034 persons 
aged ten years and over in 1973 were literate (see Appendix 6). Of the 
eoonomioally aotive population of 837,409 persons ten years of age and 
over, about 84% IATere literate, while only 68% of the eoonomioally 
inaotive population of 891,626 persons aged ten years and over were 
literate. The steadily growing literaoy rate implies that the eduoa-
tional level of the Singapore people has risen generally. 
In Singapore, as we have pointed out, formal education, vooational 
training and. adult education are the indivisible parts of the manpower 
development prooess. Naturally, we should. take the progress of their 
development into oonsideration. Due to the non-existence of other oom-
prehensive indioes and data, we oan only assess them in terms of growth 
in student popula.tion and ed1..1oational expenditure. From the data in 
. Appendix 7, we oan see that the number of students admitted to seoondary 
'sehools, technioal and vocational institutes, uni versi ties, and oolleges 
108 Jaoen T. Hsieh, "National Eoonomio struoturel>, in Singapore, 
Committee for Radio Courses, Singapore Eoono.!!!l., 9th issue of radio 
oourses' hand-book, (Singapore: Adult Eduoation Board, 1967), p. 17. 
109 Asian Yearbook 1970, (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Eoonomio Review 
Ltd., 1970), p. 245. 
1 
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had been generally on the increase in the first ten years of Singapore's 
independence. As a result, there has also been a steady increase in the 
government expenditure on education of post-primary levels (see Appendix 8). 
Only in the primary schools, due to decline in birth rate during the first 
half of the 1960's, did the enrolment start gradually to decline after 1966. 
One of the most striking features of Singapore's post-independence edu-
cational development is that the technka~,vocational and commercial educa-
tion have experienced most rapi.~ expansion. The number of students pursuing 
these three kinds of education has increased at a higher speed. The data in 
Appendix 9 clearly reveal that a stronger bias towards applied sciences and 
management studies has also become a matter of fact in the higher learning 
institutions of the Republic. In the light of the rapid expansion in techni-
cal, vocational, commercial and other scientific education, we can safely 
presume that the educational institutions of Singapore have contributed 
much to the growth of scientific, technological and managerial manpower to 
meet the increasing demand for such personnel by industries. It is obvious 
that the various adult education programs have also given an impetus to 
the development of skills and knowledge. This observation is evidenced. by 
the figures of. App€:nidix 10. 
Generally speaking, the strategic tasks in modern societies are 
commonly performed by high-level personnel. From their ranks emerge the 
political, economic, socio-pultural and military leadership. In this 
sense, insufficient and inappropriate supply of high-level manpower may 
be a serious impediment. to nation-building progress. The labour force 
in a country can be differentiated roughly by skills levels ranging 
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from professional men and women to illiterate unskilled labourers. High-
level manpower generally corresponds to the upper segment of this hie-
rarchy. But any definition of high-level manpower is bound to be 
arbitrary. The one put forth by Harbison and Myers is no exception. In 
their definition of high-level manpower, they include the following 
personnel: 
(1) Enterpreneurial, managerial ancl administrative personnel in 
both public and private establishments ;. 
(2) Professional personnel such as sCientists, engineers, doctors, 
architects, economists, lawyers, accountants, journalists, etc.; 
(3) "Qualified" teachers, defined as those who have had a minimum 
of twelve years of education themselves; 
(4) Sub-professional technical personnel, such as agricultural 
assistants, nurses, engineering assistants, technicians, senior 
clerks, supervisors of skilled workers, the highest level of 
skilled craftsmen, and skilled clericc>l workers; and, 
(5) Top-ranking political leaders, labour leaders, judges and 
no 
officers of the police and the armed forces. 
According to their definition, such persons in the category of high-
level manpower need to have at least a secondary education. Thus, lithe 
stock of high-level manpower in a country could be measured by the total 
b f " th ddt" h" h 1" n the 1 t" .tIl num'er 0 persons Wl secon ary e uca lon or 19 er popu a lone 
If we analyse the manpower situation of Singapore in accordance with this 
cri terion, we will come to a general concl_usion that the high-level 
110. Harbison ahd Myers, op.cit.,p.16. 
III Ibid. 
_J 
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manpower pool of the Republic has experienced rapid expansion. In 1973, 
the total number of persons who had upper secondary and tertiary educa-
tion amounted to 76,802, constituting 3.53% of the 2.2 million popula-
tion. In that year, 7.52% (63,020) of the RepubliC'S 837,409 economically 
active people had upper secondary or tertiary education. Only 2,362 
persons of high-level manpower category were economically inactive. 
In reality, as evidenced by the manner in which the Government 
classifies the labour force, high-level manpower in Singapore has been 
defined in terms more of skills and occupational positions than of 
educational achievement. As will be seen, the Singapore way of manpower 
classification is ~uite different from that of Harbison and ~Wers. In a 
1957 report on labour force survey, the stock of high-level manpower was 
distributed into six broad categories: (1) teaching profession, 
(2) administrative - managerial professions, (3) health professions, 
(4) construction professions, (5) dcientifi~ professions, and (6) other 
professional, technical and related workers (see 4ppendix 11). 
Since Singapore became independent, these six categories of high~level 
manpower havB'-bee'n. regrnuped into two broader divisions. As can be seen 
from Appendix 12, the first category is "professional, technical and related 
workers", including professionals and sub-professionals in the educa-
tional, medical and engineering fields. The second category is uadminis-
trative and managerial workers". In other words, while the second 
category inherits the "administrative - managerial professions" category 
of 1957, the first category is a condensation of the other five catego-
ries of 1957. Based on the current classification, we note that the 
32,822 persons of high-level manpower stock comprised 8,699 administrative 
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and managerial workers and 24,123 professional, technical and related 
workers. In the two decades from 1957 to 1976, the strength of these two 
high-level manpower groups had been growing by steady steps. By the end 
of 1976, it rose to 114,563 persons ata rate of more than 4,000 persons 
a year. Comparatively speaking, the growth rate of professional, techni-
cal and related workers has been greater than that of the administrative 
and managerial workers. 
Of course, while attending to the development of high-level manpower, 
we should pay some attention to the development of !flower-level" manpower. 
As we know, without the efforts of the masses at lower knowledge and 
skill echelons, the high-level manpower minority will be of no use to 
the country in the nation~building process. Only a brief look at the data 
on workers not classified as high-level manpower in Appendix 12 will show 
that the overall strength of such ·workers has also beer+ growing. In 1969, 
one year after the Government began with an all-out effort to promote 
technical and vocational education, the population of the various 
ordinary workers was 341,612. In 1976, it was raised to 755,971 and was 
thus double what it was eight years ago. 
Making a start soon after gaining independence in 1965, Singapore 
has gone a long way towards the build-up of her own defence forces. At 
the time of independence, the Republic virtually had no defence force of 
its own. The initial target of the Government was to build a well-equipped, 
highly trained and mobile defence· force consisting of a hard corps of 
regulars backed up by as many part-time volunteers and national servicemen 
as possible. The starting point was the passage of the National Service 
Act and the establishment of the Israeli-assisted Singapore Armed Forces 
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Training Istitute (SAFTI) in 1966. The Israeli advisers, whos~ numbers 
reached 42 at the peak, played a crucial role in training and advising 
the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF):12 In 1967, just at a time when Britain 
decided tq wind up its military bases ea$t of Suez by the mid-70s, 114 
officer cadets -- the first graduates of the SAFTI -- were commissioned. 
Since then, with more and more able-bodied young men passed out from 
their officer cadet and non-commissioned officer training bourses, the 
responsibility of training has been gradually taken over by the various 
expanding training institutes of the SAF~ The number of Israeli advisers 
was reduced to fewer than a dozen in 1973 and eventually fell to zero by 
It3 
mid-1975. Following the rapid growth of its training capabilities and 
capacity, together with the steady enforcement of the national service 
scheme, the manpower base and thus the overall strength of the SAF have 
been steadily enlarging. 
In speaking at the Commissioning Ceremony of SAF Officers on July 
12, 1974, Singapore Defence Minister, Dr. Goh Keng-swee, proclaimed for 
the first time that, after having worked hard in the previous years, the 
Republic has built up a defence force adequate for her protection. In 
citing the gradual decline in defence expenditure to substantiate his 
statement, the Minister said, "In terms of percentage of our GNP, defence 
expenditure stood around 1010 some years ago and had been steading dropp-
ing till now when it is just over 510. In later years, this will drop 
below 5%, which is what many countries keep their defence expenditure 
112 Goh Keng-swee, "National Service and Defence Policy", in 
N~T.U.C., Ope cit., p. 60. 
113 Asian Record, Vol. 9, No.7, August 1975, p. 465. 
! 
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at. I • 114 Data of both government and non-government sources reveal that 
by the end of 1973 the estimated quantitative strength of the qingapore 
Armed Forces is as follows: 
Land Forces 
(1) 7 active infantry battillions with a commando battalion, orga-
nized into 2 infantry brigades having their complement of 
support arms artillery, engineer, signals and armour; 
(2) 1 armoured unit of light tanks and armoured assault vehicles; 
(3) 12 reserve battalions of national servicemen, with a growth 
rate of 3 battalions each year; 
(4) 8 battalions of People's Defence Force (PDF), including 2 
volunteer battalions and. a PDF (Women) Company; 
Sea Forces 
(5) 1 squadron of six 33.5-metre fast patrol crafts and 6 missile 
gun-boats equipped j,1Ti th sophist ica ted weapons , receiving 
instructions from the Maritime Command; 
Air Forces 
(6) 1 squaclron of Siai Marchettis; 
(7) 1 squadron of BAC 167 Strikemasters ; 
(8) 1 squadron of Alouette helicopter and E1- squadron of Skyvan; 
and, 
(9) 2 squaclrons of Hunters supported by a radar lli'1i t and 2, Blood-
hounds surface-to-air missile squadron. ll5 
114 "Our Defence Forces are A.dequate lt , The Mirror, Vol. 10, 
No. 29, July 22, 1974, p. 8. 
11,5 Singapore: Facts and Pictures, 1974, pp. 181-184. N.T.D.C., 
op.cit., pp. 55-56. 
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In the fields of internal security, the growing Special Constabu-
lary (SC} a:g.d Vigilante C'orps (VC) of national servicemen have become 
two important support arms of the Singapore Police Force'. By the end of 
1973, the strength of the SC amounted to 9,688 men, comprising 9,020 
national servicemen and 648 volunteers, while the Police Force had only 
116 . 6,458 personnel of all ranks. After pasSlng out from their training 
courses, the part-time special constables are detailed to perform 
policing duties, assisting the regular police force in the maintainance 
of lc,w and order. ,:[Ihe VC, orginally formed in 1964 as a voluntary social 
security force to face the Indonesian confrontation, was re-organized in 
1967 as an arm of National Service. Since then, part-time r.ational 
servicemen hEwe been channelled into the va for training -by two intakes 
117 
a year. Each intake is about 1,500 men." Trained national servicemen of 
the C()rps have been dispatched to provide general community service, 
civil defence service and commvnity security service. 
It is not surprising to learn, as a result of the national service 
scheme and the extra-curricular programs of various lmiformed organiza-
tions at school and national levels, that very few Singaporeans aged 
between 10' to 130 years do not have some association with some 'uniformed 
organizations. It is also interesting to note that although Singapore 
girls are exempted from compulsory military training, their participar.-
tion in voluntary uniformed activities as part of their school or post-
school life has been remarkably keen. One needs only attend th~.parades 
of the Youth Festival and the National Day Parade as well as the annual 
116 Singapore Year Book, 1974, pp. 101-102. 
117 Ibid., p. 104 
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parades of some student and adult voluntary uniformed groups, ~e will find 
that the numbers of girls standing in the files of marching contigents and 
brass bands are consistently comparable to those of their' male counter-
parts. Despite the criticism of some p~ople that Singapore is getting more 
and more mili tarilized, the Singe,pore Government continues to promote these 
uniformed 8,nd other collectively organized socio-cul tural and sport activi-
ties. It is through these activities that the government leaders continue 
to infuse the Singapore people with a sense of multiracial nationalism, 
social discipline, community responsibility and the spirit of industrious-
ness. 
The findings of some social surveys suggest that these organized 
activities have succeeded in fostering these desired values. For instance, 
the Singapore National Identity Survey by sociologists of Singapore 
University confirmed that progress has been made in fostering a sense of 
Singaporean nationalism on a multi-racial basis. The Survey revealed, 
though on a rather small sampling, that nine out of ten Singapore citizens 
no"i prefer to identify themselves as "Singcvporeans" rather than "Indiansn , 
"Ma,lays", "Chinese", etc. The Supervisor of the Survey, Dr. J.A. MacDougal.l, 
commented: 
The vast majority of Singapore citizens of all communities identify 
themselves as Singaporeans. When confronted with the choice of being 
called a Singaporean or a member of their own community, by far the 
most prefer to be called Singaporean. Most want to live in Singapore 
rather than any other country in the world. llS 
In commenting on the same subject, Dick Wilson observed that: 
Singaporeans increasingly sense when they travel abroad the extent to 
which they have become an integral part of their small island-Republic. 
Singaporean Chinese who visit Hong Kong or even China itself inva-
riably return with unashamed relief to their familiar tropical 
lIS Straits Times, ~,lay 11, 1970 
environment. To a lesser extent the same is true of Singaporea,n 
Indians who journey to India, and of Malay or Javanese Singa,poreans 
who visit Malaysia and Indonesia. 1l9 
In a social survey on Singaporeans' racial consciousness~20conducted in 
mid-1970 by a study group of Nanyang University undergraduates leGE 
by the author, it was found that a great majority of Singaporeans accept 
and observe the principles of multiracialism, multiculturalism and multi-
lingual ism. They condemn racial chauvanism and feel regret about the 
bloodshed of "May-13" communal riots in Kuala, Lumpur in 1969. Touching on 
the Kuala Lumpur riots, it is important to mention that although there 
was a mild spill-over of rioting in Singapore in late May of that year, 
tr.le racial ch2,uvanists failed to transplant the bloodshed into the Republic. 
The national service troops thus mobilized for the first time played an 
important internal security' role. Of course, if most Singaporeans had not 
had a multi-racial consciousness and. a sense of social discipline Emd 
responsibility, a riot vJOuld have been inevitable on the Island. In July 
1964, as most Singaporeans T/\Tould be quick to point out, a racial riot more 
serious than the Mc,y-13 accident broke out in Singapore. Even after the 
mobilization of security foroes and the introduction of a curfew, the riots 
continued at irregular intervals and vdth various intensity for some months. 
The Government had to take the immediate post-independence years to 
convince the Chinese and Ma12";)!, communi ties of the values of communal peace. 
119 Wilson, Ope cit., p. 17 
120 This study project was approved and assisted by the Department of 
Government and Public Administration, Nanyang University, and the Ministry 
of' Education. In this survey, questionnaires were issued to 400 secondary 
school teachers selected from 12 Chinese and English schools on the basis 
of random d.raw. In addition to the survey report submitted to GPA Depart-
ment of ]\Janyang Uni versi ty, the v,(ri tel' wrote Em separate article in Chinese 
language, entitled "Singapcreans' Racial Consciousness: A Comparative So-
cic:ol Research", in the Journal of Government 2.nct Public Administration, 
(Singapore: GPA Society of ]\Janyang University), Vol. II, 1969-70, pp. 73-85; 
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In view of the IIfacts" and figures presented above, the w;r-iter 
tends to presume that the manpower development programs of Singapore have 
achieved some measure of success. The declining population growth rates 
and the increasing numbers of family planning acceptors suggest that the 
National Family Planning and Population Program is a great success in 
comparison with the progress of the pre-independence family planning and 
population control efforts~2l However imperfect and ambiguous the data and 
resultant interpretations regarding the development of manpower quality, 
they do help a great deal to convince the writer that the training and 
educational mcmpower development programs have made much progress in 
enhancing the skills, knowledge and dexterity of the Singapore people and 
thus in improving the overall quality of Singaporeans. In order not to 
commit the serious logical error of "seeing only trees but not forests", 
we should also bear in mind that the phenomenal success of Singapore in 
her socia-economic developments is the most important and comprehensive 
indication of the Republic's success in her manpower development enter-
. 122 prlse. 
and in the Journal of Social Sciences (Singapore.: Social Sciences Publica-
tion Ltd.) Vol. IV, 1970, pp. 17-21. 
121 See supra., p. 67. 
122 See sup~a., p. 49. 
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II. Problems of Manpower Development 
In the face of the factual data presented in the previous section, 
the writer certainly has little doubt as to the validity of the overall 
observation that the various manpower development efforts of Singapore 
have been quite a successful experiment. Nevertheless, as suggested by 
this reserved comment, it is by no means certain that Singapore's manpower 
development experience is a perfect model. On the contrary, it should be 
noted that, as a process on the march, the manpower development of the 
Republic has been faced with many problems. Recognizing that a full 
detailed account of all relevant problems is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, the writer attempts to give only an overview of the major manpower 
development problems of Singapore. 
First of all, despite the great success achieved in the endeavours 
of the National Family Planning and Population Program, the possibility 
of population explosion has not been removed. In spite of the facts that 
the natural increase rate of the population has decreased from 2.3% in 
1966 to 1.4'~ in 1976 and that over 88~ of the married couples have adopted 
123 family planning methods to exercise birth control,· .. 'the population of 
Singapore is still growing. The main cause of the continuous population 
123 Dr. Liu Ching-sin, the Secretary of the Singapore Family 
Planning and Population Board, released this information when she spoke 
at the Conference on ItFamily Planning and Population Problems" sponsored 
by the International Labour Organization and the Singapore National 
Tr.ade Union Congress, held in October, 1974. See Nanyang Siang Pau, 
October 30, 1974. 
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growth is that Singapore is by nature a "young" .nation. In 1974 alone, 
65.8% (1,460,800) of its 2,219,100 population were below the age of 30 
years, while the number of ilirOmEn falling in the generative ages from 15 
to 44 years increased to 584,800 from 367,900 of 1966~24 Even with the 
lower natural increB,se rate of 1.410, the populcdion increases at a rate of 
100 babies per day. Because of the young age str'ucture of the Singapore 
populsotion, even if each family has an average of two chilclren today, 
the population lIwuld still continue to grow to about 2 or 3 times its 
size in the next 50 to 60 years before zero population growth is achieved. 
In other words, even if the family size is maintained at 2 children, the 
population would increase to 4 to 6 million before it could stabilize at 
zero growth rate. Speaking at the C~nference on the "Student Pcpulation 
Of Asia" 1'"eld in Singapore in June 1975, the Executive Secretary of the 
Singa,pore Family Planning an,i Population Board, Dr. Margaret Low, pointed 
out: 
In Singapore, the population target is to reach a zero growth rate 
as soon as possible. The present population c3.ensi ty of Singapore 
is 3,787 persons per square kilometre. And, 47 per cent of our 
population are below the age of 20 years. If the prescribed target 
of two children per family is achieved and maintained in the years 
after 1980, Singapore can achieve a zero population growt~ rate 
only until 2030. At that time, our population will double and thus 
increase to 4 million.125 
This calculation in fact had been made long ago by Dr. Lee Chiaw-meng, 
the form.,n' Minister for Education. When he spoke at the official opening 
of the Seminar on "the Education of Family Planning and Population", 
which was held for Singapore school teachers in Maroh 1975, Dr. Lee said: 
124 Singapore, Department of Statistics, Singapore Yearbook of 
Statistics, 1974-75, pp. 11, 16 and 18. 
125 Sin Chew Jit Poh, June 16, 1975. 
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We want every child to be wanted and brought up with loving care, 
i.e. a child who is provided with good clothing, good food, good 
lodging, good medical care and good education. ~'\Te can do this 
only when every family has a smaller number of child_reno And so, 
let us stop at two ••.• But, due to the special feature of our 
population, even if we achieve the target of two children per 
family immediately, it will take us 50 years to achieve a zero 
rate of population growth. At that time, our popUlation will reach 
4 million, about 2 times the present size. l26 
No doubt, the continuous popul2otion growth as pro jected is 
somewhat beyond the control of the Singapore Government and is thus not 
a failure of the government-led family' planning ano. popUlation control 
program. We cannot expect the Government to reduce the popUlation growth 
rate from 1.4 to zero per cent overnight. But it has caused the Govern-
ment leaders and people VlTho are concerned about the future of Singapore 
much anxiety. One of the most fundamental questions is: Will Singapore IS 
economy be expanded fast enough to provide 4 million people with adequate 
employment opportunities, education, housing facilities, medical care 
and other socio-cultural amenities? And, when the population grows to 
twice its present size, can the Singapore people continue to enjoy as 
higha standard of living as they do now? So far, no one can provide a 
convincing answer to these questions. 
Wi th more and more young SingCloporeans graduat ed from various 
educational institutions, the manpower base of Singapore's economic 
development has no doubt been expanding. Yet, shortages of skilled 
workers, technicians and other high-level manpower have continued to 
become a common problem confronting the industries of Singapore. In the 
first ten years of Singapore's independence, the industrial labour 
126 Nanyang Siang Pau, March 15, 1975. 
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force had increased from 75,000 in 1965 to 231,000 in 1974~27 Due to the 
rapid growth in the industrial sector, the demand for industrial workers 
has been greater than the supply of such manpower. In Oc'tober 1975, the 
Singapore Government made public the fact that the Republic would be 
short of 600 technicians and 3,800 skilled workers each year for the 
1- f" . 128 nex·u lve yea~s. In disclosing this, the Parliamentary Secretary 
(Education) Dr. Ahmad Mattar said that the technicians shortage would be 
felt particularly in the fields of architectural draughtsmanship, 
electrical and electronic engineering, chemical engineering and mechani-
cal engineering where the shortages range from 11% to 2310. The major 
skilled workers expected to be in acute shortage between 1976 and 1980 
are metal machining, metal fabrication, maintenance fitting, general 
welding, building and electronic servicing. Shortfalls in these skills 
129 
are expected to range from 5 to 20 per cent. Although these shortages 
are attributable to rapid economic growth and not the failure of the. 
manp9wer development efforts, they may become a great restraint on the 
progress of the Republic}s economic development if they are not properly 
remedied. 
There is no denying that the government leaders of Singapore have 
been deeply concerned about the --mental healthU of the Singaporeans, 
especially that of the younger generation. As noted earlier, it has been 
their vigorous attempt to inculcate habits, attitudes and values which 
they consider conducive to the build-up of a lIrugged and. properous1t 
Singapore nation. It is largely due to their endeavours that Singaporeans 
127 Jacen T. Hsieh, Ope cit., p. 14. 
J28 Singapore, Ministry of Culture, Singapore Bulletin (monthly), 
(Singapore: National Printers), Vol. :4, No. 2, Oct9b~rI975, p. 2. 
1~9 Ibid. 
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have been increasingly known as a hard-working', well-discipli1).ed and 
well-organized people. But again, this is after all a bird's-eye view 
of Singapore •. If. - we dissect the social development of the Republic 
carefully,W6will find that there are,still many Singaporeans whose 
social attitudes and sense of social responsibility, community disci-
pline' and industriousness are not up to the expectations of the 
government leaders. 
Since independence, Singapore has continuously enjoyed rapid 
economic growth and rising economic 1iITelfare. But" to the disappointment 
of Singapore leaders, many Singaporeans have been carried away by their 
new affluence and lulled into a dangerous complacency. Having no know-
ledge of the bitterness the elders had experienced in the past, many 
young people of Singapore, especially those who came from richer fami-
lies, have tended to take everything for granted. They ignore and thus 
do not try to cuI ti vate the virtue of industriousness and. thrift. This 
helps explain the reluctance of many young Singaporeans to take more 
menial jobs. In view of the ample employment opportunities made availa-
ble by rapid economic expansion, young workers and young graduates have 
become used to hopping from job to job, seeking more comfortable working 
conditions. As such, they are shying away from construction and. other 
heavy jobs. Some of them even do not bother to start with "hard jobsu • 
They prefer to sit at home to wait for the successful results of their 
applications for soft jobs. Before they get the jobs they desire, many 
of them will refuse to become an employed worker. In order to meet the 
manpower requirements of various menial or heavy jobs, the Government 
cannot but adopt an "open door" policy in issuing work permits to 
foreigners who do not mind doing the hard jobs for Singapore. In 1974, 
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while the local "unemployed" persons numbered 39,OOO,the estimat~d strength 
·130 
of non-citizen workers was as high as 100,000. These figures suggest 
trlat if the local "unemployed" people did not want to be "unemployed", 
Singapore should have experienced a perfect full-employment situation 
and needed only 61,000 foreign workers. This is indeed an abnormal and 
ironical phenomenon. And yet, it seems that it still exists today. 
According to Labour Ministry registers, as reported by Premier Lee in 
hj:i.s message to the nation on the eve of the Tenth National Day (August 
9, 1975), SingE;pore had an increase in unemployment to 4.510 (about 
39,000 persons). But there has been no drop in the number of work permit 
holders~31 
Parallel to the predisposition of young people to find soft jobs, 
there has developed a widespread and sharpening prejudice against labo-
rious "blue collar" work. Personal observation suggests that even many 
parents who have been menial workers tend to look down upon menial work. 
They wish to see that their children occupy a higher position in the 
ranks of those "respectable" occupations like 18owyers, doctors and 
managers. If their chilQren become blue collar workers, they will feel 
inferior when they have to mention their chilQren in their conversations 
with other people. But, if their children are higher ranking white 
collar workers, they will keep all their acquaintances informed of their 
chilo.ren's respectable occupations. The interaction of these inferior 
and superior feelings has brought about the "social expectation" that 
good sons and good daughters should not be in the blue collar ranks. 
130 Seah Chee"'meow, "Singapore in 1974: Consolidation amidst Uncer-
tainties lt , in Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, ed., Southeast Asian 
Affairs 1975, (Singapore: FEP International, 1975), p. 142. 
131 The Mirror, Vol. 11, No. 33, August 18, 1975, p. 1. 
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Consciously or unconsciously, instead of resisting the pressure of this 
unwholesome parental expectation, many young people tend to accept it 
as a norm. They do not see that this is a social chain Of which they 
themselves are the victims. Consequently, with the white-collar minority 
feeling great- pride in their Iloccupational achievement n , the blue collar 
majority' feel regret at their "occupational failures". This is no 
doubt a great handicap to the mental health of Singaporeans and the 
progress of manpower development. 
As a consequence of the bias tOvvards white collar work, the already 
existing socio-pyschologiaal prejudice against military service has also 
been greatly reinforced. No matter judged from what angle, soldiering is 
a laborious job. The prejudice against laborious jobs therefore helps to 
support the traditional belief that "good sons should not become sol-
diers". This way of thinking prevails not only among parents but 
increasingly among the national servicemen. Thinking that the;y are forced 
by the Government to undergo military training, they 0.0 not consider 
their national service as an honourable contribution to the country. 
Instead, many think that they are being forced to do nhard labourlt.o This 
attitude, though giving rise to no outright opposition against the 
national service scheme, is evidenced by the grumblings we can hear from 
time to time from parents of national servicemen and from the national 
servicemen themselves. A more serious obstacle to the development of 
defence manpo~rer is that there are many national servicemen discriminat-
ing against people who become regular soldiers or join the SAF as full-
t.ime vocationalists. They ridicule these people by naming them as 
nthan~chia-peng,,132-- people who become soldiers to earn a living. This 
132 This is spoken in Hokkien, which is one of the Chinese dialects. 
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insul ting nickname has been very dic3couraging to professiona.l soldiers 
and national servicemen who are interested in military careers. Echoed 
by like-minded ordinary people, this prejudice has become a great psycho-
logical burclen to those uniformed persons who work professionally fay" 
the national defence~ As far as the writer can see, this irresponsible 
attitude is in part the cause of the high turnover of many defence 
workers. In the long run, it is harmful to the morale of the Singapore 
Armed Forces and thus the development of defence manpower. 
On the other hand, the continual stress on economic progress has 
led to a tendency to equate success with wealth. And there has been 
concern thc:d Singaporeans are propagating a cult of "moneytheismu • As the 
Foreign I!linist €Or, IvIr. Ra jara thnam has 1Jvarned, Singaporeans are in the 
danger of becoming those ugly people "who know the price of everything 
and the value of nothingu~33 It is not wrong for a person to work hard 
to earn a considerable income. But there are many Singaporeans who 
want only money and not work. Some of them even think of getting rich by 
devious means like gambling, smuggling, robbing, kid_napping, murdering, 
swindling and corrupt practices. They can d_o much harm to the law and 
order of tlH3 society. Al though the crime rate is under control, it has 
risen in recent years. Apart from eroding the social morality of the 
Singaporeans, the growth of Umoneytheiswtl can be a gr53at blow to the 
work ethic the Singapore Government has striven to promote. It has made 
many Singaporeans less able to appreciate the values of ls,bour and the 
socio-economic contributions of the working people. Since "moneytheistsU 
133 "Singapore: Social Affairs", in Asia Yearbook, 1971, p. 267. 
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tend to equate wealth with success, they look down upon worki~g people 
simply because their incomes are not generally on par with those white 
collar workers like doctors, company managers and lawyers. 
Furthermore, the cult of ttmoneytheism" and materialism has been 
contributory to the growth of vanity. As Mr. Lee Kuari-yew has observed, 
more and more people have been sucked into the consumer society, buying 
more and more things on credit~34 Some even tend to buy more than what 
they can afford. As one Chinese saying puts it, there are people trying 
to swell up their faces to show others that they are get~ing fatter. As 
a state of mind paying more attention to the acquisition of flashy 
coms"luner goods than to the virtue of frugality, vanity has tempted many 
Singaporeans to beome more short-sighted, more corrupt and more inclined 
to indulge in self-glorification as well as self-deceit. Step by step, 
the people with this mentality become less capable of exercising self-
control, less accustomed to hard work and rough living, and thus less 
able to take care of themselves. This is particularly true of many vain-
glorious Singaporean youths. Brought up in an easy environment and 
accustomed to parental protection, many young Singaporeans appear to 
have been deprived of the capability and will to become self-reliant. 
Money theism and materialism have been accompanied by the growth 
of individualism. Interested only in promoting personal career and 
acquiring greater wealth, many Singaporeans have paid little attention 
to the well-being of their fellow countrymen.and the destiny of the 
country. Having thei}~ attention taken up by their own interests, very few 
134 "Soft Options are Out tt , The Mirror, Vol. 10, No. 33, August 
19, 1974, p. 1. 
'i 
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self-centred persons have a sense of social responsibility. Or]. the con-
trary, they tend to think more of what they can get out of the society 
than of what they can contribute to it. Even when they show much concern 
about the developments of certain public events, they tend to judge the, 
events mainly in' terms of their personal interests. In order to safe-
guard their self-absorbed well-being, they will oppose any social policy 
which will benefit the masses and the society at the expense of their 
interests. And so, some of them pay no heed to the "population explosion" 
warnings of the Government and persist in having the number of children 
they want. Some resent the "two-child family" policy and the resultant 
population control measures mainly because they find that they are 
contrary to their tlbig family" aspirations. Many young men resent the 
national service system only because it has been implemented at the 
expense of their "freedom" and "easy life". Many parents grumble at the 
national service scheme because they only take note of the f.act that it 
has brought their beloved sons many hardships. They are not far-sighted 
enough to recognize that in denying the validity of these manpower 
policies, they are denying their long-term interests. They even fail to 
understand the simple truth that when the population explosion occurs 
and when the nation declines or falls, they themselves and their child-
ren will suffer even more. 
Singapore's excellent communications with the rest of the world, 
a great socio-economic asset, has inevitably exposed Singaporeans to 
the fads and fetishes of the Western societies. Many young Singaporeans, 
particularly part of the English-educated who have no grounding in their 
own cultural values, have become the consumers of the "unwanted 
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by-products of the Western way of life ll • Believing in hedonism-, they have 
tried. to imitate whatever Western youths have considered fashionable. By 
me2,ns cf imitation, an increasing number of young people in Singapore 
are fond of pop songs, psychedelic music and dances, keeping long hair, 
and wearing strange clothes. As a result, they steadily lose touch with 
their own cultural values and life styles. If possible, many of them would 
like to have their hair changed from black to golden yello~, their skin 
from brown and yellOW to white, and their eyes from brown to blue. In 
warning against the unwholesome influences of the West, the government 
leaders of the Republic have consistently condemned the blind imitators of 
the Western life styles and branded them as "WOG-s" -- Western oriented 
gentlemen. In recent years, drug-taking among many Singaporean youth has 
become a serious social problem. Despite the harsh disciplinary measures 
taken by the Government to eradicate drug addiction, the number of drug 
abusers (pushers and consumers) in Singapore has been on the increa.se. 135 
Even more \oJorrying is the fact that the ages of those found to be a.busing 
drugs are getting increasingly lower. It was reported that in 1975, out of 
a total of 4,201 people prosecuted for drug offences, 2,550 (61~) were in 
the 14-25 years age group.136 Since drug addiotion is detrimental to both 
the mental and physical health of the addicts, it has caused ooncern to 
parents and government leaders. 
135 It is generally believed that most Singaporean drug addicts were 
\3ither misled by their curiosity about the state of mind that drugs can 
bring about or trapped by their habits of imitating fashionable lifestyles 
of the Western youths. 
136 "Singapore: Social Affairs", Asia Yearbook, 1977, p. 283. 
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Indeed, the manpower development problems of Singapore are many. 
Although the existence of these problems does not necessarily mean 
great failure, they do constitute set-backs and diffic11lties for man-
power development. There is no cause for the leaders and people of 
Singapore to be complacent or too optimistic about the future progress 
of the Republic's manpower development and nation-building efforts. 
They should bear in mind that while the growing population may deny 
themselves as well as succeeding generations a comfortable and pleasant 
living, a~y further decline in the work ethic, mental health and morals 
of the people will deprive the infant Republic of the capacity to develop 
herself into a rugged society. 
-13.1.-
III. Possible Solutions to Manpower Development ProbLems 
Needless to say, if the manpower development work 'of Singapore is 
to proceed with greater success, the various problems with which it is 
confronted should be properly remedied. As to the ~uestion of what are 
the solutions to the problems being spotted, the writer does not pre-
tend to know the actual answers. Nevertheless, as an attempt to play an 
active part in the discussion of this matter, he has no hesitation in 
stating and commenting on the methods which he considers conducive to 
the minimization, if not the complete eradication, of the Republic's 
manpower development problems. 
In the field of population control, the current prescribed mission 
of the National Family Planning and Population Program is to bring about 
the state of two children per family and reduce the rate of natural 
population increase to 1.0~ by the end of the 1970s. It is the official 
demographical projection that if the average family size remains to be 
2 children in the coming decades, the population growth rate will be 
decreased to zero in the'yea-r2030._In presenting this projection, Dr. 
Wan Fook-kee, Chairman of the Singapore Family Planning and Population 
Board, explained, "We want to reach replacement level by 1980, that is, 
a net reproduction rate of 1, but the ultimate aim is to achieve zero 
popUlation growth in the year 2030, and the population then will be 
about 3.6 million. u137 For the attainment of both long-term and short-
term goals of population ,?ontrol, the Singapore Government ,:~nd Family 
137 Frank Ching, "Defusing a Fertility Bombn , The Asia Magazine, 
a weekly magazine of Singapore Straits Times, December 29, 1974, p. 27. 
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Planning and Population Board have steadily added fuel to the;j..r already 
strengthening "stop-at-two" family planning campaign. Even children 
age~ 11 and 12 in the fifth and sixth years of elementary school are 
taught the impo~tance of small family norms. 
So far, despite its vigorous "stop-at-two" family planning campaign, 
the Government does not deny the right of those who desire and can afford 
large families to have them. But what can constitutue a weak point of the 
family planning programs is that the Government has not taken enough 
measures to validate the "two-child family" norm. Up to now, the social 
disincentives are applicable only to those parents who give birth to 
their fourth child. It is true that these disincentives do not encourage 
parents to have 3 children. But they do not discourage them from having 
more than 2 children. They may induce some parents to think that they are 
expected to ·~stop-at-three" and not to "stop-at-two". They may become a 
counteraction of the Government's two-child family policy. There is no 
indication that all Singaporeans are prepared to observe the "two-child" 
norm. As we can imagine, if most or some Singapore families prefer to 
have 3 instead of 2 children as allowed by the social disincentive scheme, 
the time for the Republic to reach a zero population grow1h will be 
greatly delayed. The population will continue to grow for a longer period 
and the current family planning ,and population control program will fail 
to fulfil its prescribed missions. Based on this recognition, the writer 
is inclined to opine that if the ideal state of two children per family 
is to be brought about by 1980 and a zero reproduction rate is to be 
reached by 2030, the Government should adjust the social disincentiva 
scheme to discourage married couples from having three or more children. 
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And, if the disincentives introduced are to become more effective 
deterrents against the desirability of the Ularge family", their harsh-
ness should be intensified. 
In view of the small size and the vulnerable economy of Singapore, 
the writer also ten& to hold a pessimistic' view that even with a zero 
growth rate, a 3.6 million population may still be too big for the 
island-Republic. Even if the possibility of a population explosion is 
removed, the quality of life in an: eVeTcI'-o11'td.-eg. small island with a popu-
lation density of 6,000 persons per square kilometre is unimaginable. 
For the well-being of the succeeding generation, Singapore parents should 
in fact accept greater sacrifice in their desire for reproduction. As a 
rule, it is always better for us to take precautions beforehand to pre-
pare for the worst state of affairs ,no matter wheth@r- it is predictable or 
unpredictable. If Singapore parents do not want their descendants to 
experience great suffering and to blame them for it, they should exercise 
their reproductive "right" with great care. They should realize that 
their reproductive activities may become their inexcusable sins, even 
if they have only one or two children. In order to enhance our conscience 
and minimize our ignorance, perhaps we should give some thought to one 
serious question: Why do parents want to have children or for what 
purpose do they give birth to children.? 
In the case of those who want children, the most probable answer 
is: "it is just because we want childrenn • These people can explain in 
detail as to the many advantages of having children. In the 
case. of those who have "unwanted" children, the probable answers are 
two. Some may say that they are trying to conform to certain social 
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expectations, like the traditional bias of some Chinese that "more sons 
bring more wealthlt. Some may- confess that they- cannot exercise birth 
control. This is particularly true in those societies where people do not 
have the knowledge of and the devices. for birth control. At any rate, 
all this explains that children are the by--products of their parents' 
instinctive selfishness or ignorance. Being self-centred and subject to 
the ruling of their own desires, parents apparently think more of them-
selves than of their children. Does this fact not depict the true fea-
tures of "maternal love" "paternal love", or tlparental 10veH ? ]0 the 
parents not impose their own will on the lives they- bring into being? 
Should they- not be held responsible for their children's future well-
being?' Will they- not feel guilty if they- see that their children may 
encounter great suffering or calamity? In putting forth these questions, 
the writer does not attempt to propose that for the purpose of population 
control, all Singapore parents should be deprived of their reproductive 
"rightst~ No:rd.oes be suggest that Singapore should be left to have no 
succeeding generation. What l':1e .wishes to put across is: (1) that 
conscientious awareness of these problems may incline parents to have a 
stronger sense of responsibility- and discourage them from having many 
children; (2) that for the long-term survival of Singapore and the well 
being of Singaporeans, birth control is not a sacrifice but a kind of 
social obligation; and (3) that the Singapore Government has every good 
justification to take whatever measures seem reasonable to bring about 
a zero population growth rate as soon as possible. 
Interestingly, while taking great pains to minimize the growth rate 
of her population, Singapore is still a state which is in great need of 
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skilled and competent manpower. Of great consolntion to her i~ the fact 
that the magrli tude· of the shortages in skilled cmd competent manpo1JlTer 
for nation-building has been moderating in recent years. This is true 
not only in the aspects of socio-economic development but alse in the 
aspects of defence build-up. Having worked hard in the post-independence 
years, the Singapore Government has built up a systematic educational 
and training infrastructure. With a vtew to~becoming self-reliant in 
the acquisition of desired skills and kno1Jdedge, the Government has 
decided to put more investment in the development of educational and 
training programs and institutions. The Ministry of Education announced 
in 1974 that the Government had decided to build another 28 primary 
schools, 26 secondary schools and 10 junior colleges in the following 
five years~38 Plans have also been implemented to expand the ca,paci ties 
of the existing institutes of learning, the universities, the techniaal 
colleges, the vocational schools and the combined industrial training 
centres established by the Singapore Economic Development Board and the 
sponsoring companies. Again, greater emphasis is to be placed on the 
technical, vocational, technological and commercial training. In addi-
tion, the various overseas training programs have been greatly fostered. 
Since the inception of the Industrial Development Scholarship Scheme in 
1973, more than 600 skilled workers have gone abroad for training. Under 
the Scheme, skilled and competent workers are trained to become supen~ 
visors and technicians in their respective trades~39 In the four years 
between 1971 and 1974, 714 Singapore students have gone overseas to 
138 Wong Shu-lin, uThe Educational Trend of Singapore in 1974tt , 
The New Year Magazine of Nanyang Siang Pau, January 1, 1975, p. 24. 
139 "Overseas Training for Skilled Workers", Singapore Bulletin, 
Vol. .:4, No.4, December 1975, p. 3. 
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pursue specialized undergraduate courses with scholarships awarded by 
Public Service Commission~ 40 Many of the overse2,S scholarships are made 
available by Colombo Plan and leading Commonwealth state's such as the 
Uni ted Kingdom, C2,nada, Australia and New Zeland. 
Generally speaking, Singapore has had the necessary capabilities 
to acquire the skills and knowledge needed for her nation-building work. 
Only if the local educational and training institutes 'continue to 
expand their enrolments and improve the quality of their'programs, 
particularly in the technical, vocational and commercial fields, will 
the current and projected shortfalls in the necessary managerial and 
skilled workers be remedied. It is largely owing to their confidence in 
the growing potential output of Singapore's educationaR and training 
institutes that the government leaders of the Republic do not regard the 
current shortfalls in industrial skills as an unsolvable major problem. 
In recent years, they have paid greater attention to the social attitudes 
of the Singapore people. Tn their eyes, one of the most serious problems 
Singapore has now to face is how to put right the attitudes, habits and; 
value judgements of those'Singaporeans whose attitudes have been weakened 
by the current affluence. 
To begimwith, the present Singapore leadership has embarked on a 
zealous publicity campaign to warn Singaporeans against the shortcomings 
and dangers of complacency, itmoneythesismu , vanity, moral corruption, 
extremist individualism and ~,uch unwholesome imi tati ve behaviors as 
long hair, unconventional clothes and drug-taking. The rising tide of 
140 "Ensuring Optimum Use of Nation's Best Brainslt , Singapore 
Bulletin, Vol. 4, No.3, November 1975, p. 3. 
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this campaign reached its peak in 1974 and 1975, at a time when Singa-
pore's economic growth was hard hit by the world-wide recession. 
Obviously, it has been the attempt by the Singapore leaders to take the 
fullest advantage of the lean times to shake Singaporeans out of their 
complacency. In his message to the nation on the eve6f Singapore's 
tenth National Day, Premier Lee warned 
The oil crisis and worldwide recession are factors beyond our 
control. We have to learn to live with these upsets. But some 
factors are within our control, we will improve our investment 
rate, if workers and unions are known to be hard-working, will-
ing to learn and keen to make capital proctucti ve. • •• The days 
when young workers and young graduates were hopping from job 
to job, seeking more comfortable working conditions and more 
pay, are over. The sooner we realize this and. shake ourselves 
out of our complacency, the better •••• We cannot afford to have 
young men, including NS men (National Servicemen) on Run-out-
date {on comple~ion of National S-ervice), looking for soft jobs 
all the time. 141 
To give strength to his warning and appeal, Mr. Lee at the same time 
announced that it would be the Government's policy to employ girls for 
all jobs which are physically less demanding, and which girls can do 
as well as boys, and that the Government would ask private firms, 
wherever possible, to do likewise. In other words, most clerical jobs, 
service in shop, restaurants, hotels and light manual work, should be 
done by girls. If this personnel policy is accepted by the private firms, 
it has the effect of stopping many young Singapore men from shying away 
from hard,heavy blue-collar jobs and thus providing a remedy for the 
nominal manpower shortfalls of heavy manual work. 
In order to remove the wid.e-spread prejudice against manual work, 
141 "Shake Ourselves out of our Complacency", The Mirror, Vol. 11, 
No. 33, August 18, 1975, p. 1. 
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the Singapore leaders have striven to foster the deve1opmer.t Qf a new 
work ethic to give social c,pproval and status to the blue-collar workers. 
In their mass persuasion campaign, they have consistently reminded young 
Singaporeans to take note of the fundamental ~ualities which had enabled 
their parents to make Singapore what it is today. One of these ~ualities 
is the acceptance of hard work, including the grit and determination to 
stay on the course with the strength and stamina to rid,e over rough 
patches. The bitterness of the past, especially the spectre of unemploy-
ment, economic instability and political disorder in the fifties and 
sixties, is conjured up as an objerrt lesson to today's affluent and 
carefree youth. No:',one can argue that the government leaders have made 
little effort to propagate the virtue of industriousness and the social 
values of hard manual work. But, as most would agree, social persuasion 
alone is not adequate to promote the desirable work ethic and the social 
status of the blue-collar workers. If this campaign is to produce the 
expected results, it shoul& have a solid economic and material base. 
This is pc>rticularly true in a society where materialism has been a 
common feature, or where the social status of the individual is generally 
in terms of his income. The writer believes that if t.he incomes of most Sin-
gaporean mannual workers were' generally on par wi tIc those of the American 
workers or of the white collar workers in Singapore, there w,J)uld not be 
any soci8,1 prejudice against them. Even the manual worlwy,s may hold the 
views that what they are most concerned about is not the debate as to 
the respectability of their work but the problem of how to earn a better 
living. It is therefore the writer's belief that the most effective way 
to enhance the value of 18,borious jobs is to improve their working 
conditions, hat is to say, efforts should be made to bridge the income 
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gaps as well as the social gaps between the blue-collar workers and the 
white-collar workers. It is encouraging to note that this is precisely 
what the Singapore Government is striving to do. 
In the last few months of 1975, ,the Singapore Labour Minister, 
Mr. Ong Pang-boon, had called for a revision of the present wage stru~~ 
tures and conditions of service of white and blue collar workers. In 
making this appeal, the Minister pointed out: 
The present structures, which base rewards on educational ~uali­
fications rather than on the work done, favoured the white collar 
workers and are responsible for the increasing number of Singa-
poreans chasing after paper qualifications and cosy jobs. Conse-
quently, Singapore had to depend on foreign workers to do the 
blue collar jobs in the building construction, shipbuilding and 
repairing industries. 142 
Mr. Ong apparently holds the view that a revision which relates monetary 
rewards to work performed and provides unpleasant and hard work with 
added incentives will check the predisposition of young Singaporeans to 
seek soft jobs. It is self-evident that apart from being able to narrow 
the differentials in the incomes of white and blue workers, substantial 
improvement in the working conditions of hard manual work will contri-
bute towards removing the snobbery attached to white collar or soft jobs. 
Only when this presumption becomes a fact can the social status of 
manual workers be substantially enhanced and the desirable work ethic 
effectively promoted. 
At present, the Singapore Armed Forces are reaching the state of 
consolidation. In saying that the defence forces are adequate for the 
Republic's needs, the Defence Minister, Dr. Goh Keng-swee, has made 
142 "Give Better Deal for Blue Collar Workers", Singapore Bulletin, 
Vol. 4, No.3, November 1975, p. 2. 
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clear, nThis does not mean that the time has come for us to let up and 
to relax. Perhaps I should. have qualified that statement to read 'ade-
quate in number'. There is always room for improvement in quality and 
this is what everybody in the SAF should try to do in the years ahead.,~43 
Since this proclamation made in July 1974, members of the SAF, especially 
the national servicemen, have been continuously urged to do their work 
better and strive to improve themselves by study, by dilig-ent applica-
tion in training courses, and by conscientious effort on the job at hand. 
Carefully planned painstaking endeavours have been made to improve the 
efficiency of defence administration, the operational effectiveness of 
the defence forces, and the quality of the various military training 
programs. Apart from striving to better the working conditions of mili-
tary careers, the Government has introduced certain social incentives to 
cheer up the working and learning morale of both the regular soldiers and 
the national servicemen. The most encouraging ones are: the SAF Scholar-
ship Schema~44 the SAF Priority Allocation Scheme for the purchase of 
145 146 government flats, the establishment of SAF Economic Supermarkets and 
the entertainment facilities and activities provided by the various SAF 
Clubs and the SAF Music and Drama Company. The Government leaders have 
143 "Our Defence Forces are Adequate",. The Mirror, Vol. 10, No. 29, 
July 22, 1974, p. 8. 
144 Under the SAF Scholarship Schema:, promising servicemen who show 
leadership potential in their military careers are sent to overseas as 
well as local universities to pursue tertiary studies. Opportunities are 
also given to competent servicemen who wish to complete their secondary 
education with the Singapore Adult Education Board. 
145 The SAF Priority Allocation Scheme is implemented for regular 
and reservists as a recognition of their contribution to National Defence. 
It reduces the waiting period for the servicemen who want to purchase 
HDB (Housing Development Board) flats. 
146 The SAFE Supermarkets are operated to help servicemen and their 
families to meet the rising cost of living by providing them with essen-
tial supplies at the lowest possible prices. 
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also availed themselves of every opportunity to induce the general 
public to honour and respect the nation-defenders. Youths are told that 
it is an honour and a privilege to serve the state as a soldier. But, 
men. in unifonns are reminded that they should always have standards of 
moral rectitude and personal courtesy to win the respect and affection 
of the people. In line with this "morale-boosting" campaign, young men 
called up are sent off to do their national service with a well-organized 
community dinner; the families of the national servicemen are invited to 
witness passing-out parades; and, public parades and road-marches are 
frequently held. Needless to say, all these government-initiated efforts 
will greatly contribute towards removing the social prejudice against 
soldiering. As for the discrimination against military careers existing 
within the SAF, the writer believes that two remedial steps are necessary. 
First, in-depth studies should be conducted to unearth the causes of the 
unwholesome sub-culture within the SAF. Second, appropriate disincentives 
should be introduced to discourage servicemen from discriminating against 
those who show a keen interest in military careers. 
As a move to prevent the moral consciousness of the Singaporeans 
from declining, the Singapore leaders have made vigorous attempts to 
inculcate habits, attitudes and values conducive to the development of 
creativity, social responsibility, adaptability and loyalty to the 
Republic. Aside from the strengthening youth movement and social persuasion, 
another fundamental educational policy has been put into practice by the 
Governmen t. From the beginning of 1974, "life education" has been 
introduced as a subject of study in all Singapore primary schools. 
Singapore educationalist puts it, 
As one 
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Judging from the guidelines given by the lVlinistry of Education, 
the subject of life education is taught on the basis of ethics 
and civics. On the one hand, it aims to inculcate in young students 
the traditional virtues of the East like loyalty, filial piety, 
fidelity, justice, humanity and peace-loving. On the other band, 
it aims to foster the inculcation of s11ch vJholesome Western values 
like law abiding, truth-searching, collective participation and 
progressing outlook.147 
Strictly speaking, only through wider moral and civic education, then can 
the Singapore youths be effectively protected from Hcontamination" by the 
current permissive attitudes and behaviors of Western societies. "Cultural 
inoculation", in Premier Lee's 1.'\Tords, is lithe safest way to make the 
young understand that there are basic traditional values they should hold 
fast to -- what is good, what is bad, what is to be admired, what is to 
b d Od lOb " 0 011· ,,148 e esplse, WilO lS ,.ero, VJllO lS a Vl aln. 
Recognizing that social and moral development of the youths is 
something beyond their own capabilities, the government leaders and 
educationalists of Singapore have constantly appealed to parents and 
the society as a 1I\I"hole to play an active part in this important educa-
tional work. Parents are particularly urged to co-operate with school 
teachers. They are told that for the long:-term well being of their 
children and the sooiety, they should avoid giving love not balanced 
with a sense of responsibility. Starting from childhood, children should 
be taught to cultivate the good habits of self-constraint, self-reliance, 
147 Wong Shu-lin, OPe cit., p. 24. 
148 Teodore Geiger, TaLes of Two City-States: The,Development 
Progress of Hong Kong and Singapore, (Washington: National Planning 
Association, 1973), pp. 215-216. 
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industriousness and thrift. It is believed that the combined efforts 
of the Government, schools, society and parents will steadily enhance 
both the moral consciousness and the ruggedness of the Singaporean 
youths. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
All nations, whether "developed", "developing" or "underdevelopedlt , 
are established and run by ~. The growth of a nation is in essence 
the result of human efforts. Stemming from man's ideas, all the nation-
building endeavours are ultimately spurred on by men's initiative, 
talents, will and skills as well as experience. It is beyond doubt that 
natural resources and capital -- mate:rial and monetary resources -- are 
also basic conditions for economic and socio-political development. 
Nevertheless, if there are no capable and skilled persons to exploit 
them, they will not be of any use to their possessors. Good quc:,lity 
manpower, therefore, must be considered the most fundamental factor of 
nation-building. 
Judged from either the academic or the practical point of view, 
efforts to give greater emphasis to human resources in "developmentaln 
theories and in the nation-building process are both meaningful and 
constructive. They signify a great shift in our whole thinking about 
the problems of national growth and development. The fundamental pro-
blem is no longer considered to be merely the creation of wealth and 
strength, but rather the creation of the capacity to create them. Once 
a nation has acquired such a capacity, the generation of wealth and 
strength is almost sure to follow. Essentially, this capacity to create 
w_ealth and strength resides in the people of a country, in their brain 
power, their will, their skills and their dexterities. It is inherent 
in the quality of the people of a nation. 
As a process of increasing the knowledge, skills, and dexterity of 
the people of a society, manpower development is the most fundamental 
means of enabling a nation to acquire the capacity to bring about its 
desired future state of affairs. Its importance is reinforced by recog-
nition of the fact that most human ability is learned. The phenomenon 
that some people are superior to the others in skills, brain power and 
capability stems chiefly from the fact that they are better educated and 
trained than others are. It is perhaps true that 'genetic endowment 
does give strength to human ability. But at the same time, it is equally 
true that if genetic endowment is to be converted into functional capa-
bility, it should be appropriately developed. Otherwise, it can either be 
underdeveloped and underused or just simply wasted. 
As a prerequisite to successful nation-building, manpower develop-
ment is a means-oriented process. If a manpower development process is to 
be "goal-directed", its substance should,· in the. first -insta.noe, 'be made 
subject to the needs of nation-building -- the end it serves. But 
nation-building is not in itself an end. Its content is determined by 
the precribed national goals. Finding their place at the top of the 
nmeans-and-end" hierarchy, national goals decide the substance of 
nation-building directly and that of manpower development indirectly. 
Although stemming substantially from instinctive desires, national needs 
are inevitably conditioned by the objective setting of nations. They are 
responsive to the influences of such environmental factors as geographi-
cal positions, the availability of natural resources, and such man-made 
f~ctors as economic, socio-cultural and political situations. Since the 
objective settings of nations are varied, countries are bound to differ 
in their subjective needs and goals. And, consequently, no two nations 
would have exactly the same kinds of nation-building and manpower deve-
lopment processes. 
Singapore!s brief nation-building history suggests both that 
objective setting is crucial in shaping national goals and that good 
quality human resources and manpower development are highly important 
in economic and socio-politioal developments. In the Singapore context, 
manpower development is basically a two-faceted process. On the one 
hand, it is a matter of how to control population growth so as to avoid 
a population explosion and large-scale surplus of unneeded manpower. To 
meet these challenges, Singapore produced a manpower development process 
which is basically government-directed. It is designed, actuated and 
guided by the Government and its bureaucracy, including various minis-
tries, state-run information services, state-owned learning institutes 
and state-supported statutory organizations like Family Planning and 
the People1s Association. The Government's role is a paternal one. It 
has been in a posi-cion to tell the people what they should do and what 
they should not do. Social incentives and social disincentives have been 
put into effect to encourage or discourage popular action as appropriate. 
Mass education campaigns have remained the basic means of guiding and 
regulating the thinking and deeds of the people. It is therefore not an 
exaggeration to say that the basic philosophy of the Singapore Govern-
ment's manpower development policies and measures is one of "the end 
justifies the means". 
Undoubtedly, the present leadership of Singapore is tough. 
Inevitably, many of the measures taken for manpower development purposes 
are unpleasant and obnoxious to religious feelings and some traditional 
beliefs as well as restrictive of individual liberty. No one can argue 
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that most of these manpower development methods do not impose sacrifice 
and hardship on the Singapore citizens. This is particularly true in 
the cases of the regulative "stop-at-two" population control measures, 
the national service scheme and the measures adopted to combat unwhole-
some western influences and undersirable traditional thinking and 
practices. Nevertheless, the informed observer of the Singapore scene 
would be quick to point out that if the Republic is to succeed in her 
struggle for survival, all these "unpleasant" measures are undouptedly 
necessary. Nation-building, after all, is a ha.2tardous 2k"ldsosi;.ly enter-
prise that nearly always calls for many painful sacrifices and unaccus-
tomed efforts. As long as Singaporeans dislike the threat of a popula-
tion explosion and do not wish their country to be swallowed up by 
another nation, they certainly have no good reason to deny the validity 
and legitimacy of the unpleasant manpower development measures. On the 
contrary, for their own benefi tand the -long-term well-be.ing of their 
children and their fellow-countrymen, they should be prepared to 
tolerate the sacrifice and hardship which has been imposed on them for 
the desired manpower development purposes. These unpleasant measures 
are something like the food we eat. So long as we need food for survival 
and we do not want to die, we have to eat. Without a sense of necessity, 
the concepts of "right" and "wronglt cannot be objectively defined. 
Of course, if a rational social policy is to be implemented, it 
should be workable and functionally effective. The writer has observed 
that the manpower development policies and measures adopted by the 
J • 
Singapore Government are not only valid, pragmatic and timely but also 
quite workable. The success of the National Family Planning and popula-
tion program is illustrated by the speedy decline in the population 
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growth rate and the steady increase in the numbers of family planning 
acceptors, voluntary sterilizations and legal abortions. Aside from the 
upward trends in literacy rate and student numbers, the rapid expansion 
in education and. training capacities and the steady growth of skills 
and knowledge necessary for socio-economic and defence developments, 
the phenomenal success of today's Singapore can be seen as the most 
comprehensive indication of their effectiveness in qualitative terms. 
When Singapore was "expelled" from Malaysia, very few people really 
believed that she would survive even for a few years. To the surprise of 
many people, the infant Republic has not only failed to collapse and die 
but, on the contrary, has prospered until today. The Republic has attained 
a level of per capita income second only to Japan in Asia -- second to 
none in Southeast Asia (see APpendix 13). There is no denying that 
Singapore's on-going nation-building progress is in part attributable to 
her advantageous location, fine natural harbour and "chanoe tl to derive 
benefits from world events such as the defunct Indo-China War. However, 
any analysis which tries to explain the causes of Singapore's advance-
ment merely in terms of natural setting and chance is unconvincing. 
In addition to committing the grave error of neglecting the significance 
of human efforts in nation-building, such a "fortunate-unfortunate" 
analogy is tantamount to approving the fantastic idea that the rise and 
fall of a nation is merely a fortuitous phenomenon, an arrangement of 
nature or a verdict of God. It suggests that the leaders and people of 
Singapore have done nothing in the past ten years but just wait for 
good furtune to bring them prosperity. In reality, Singapore's continu-
ing prosperity and impressive success are attributable to her four 
"human" assets: efficient government and bureaucracy, political stability 
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with civil and industrial peace, a high level of education, and a hard 
working population. To put it precisely, they are brought about by the 
will, capabilities, skills and efforts of the Singapore leaders and 
people. It is these human factors that have enabled the Republic to 
adapt to its milieu and to take full advantages of its "chances" to 
survive and prosper. 
Even so, Singaporeans should take note of the fact that although 
Singapore has done well in her first ten post-independence years, she 
is not out of the woods yet. The battle of survival is by no means over. 
Singapore is still an easy prey to her evironmental conditions. Her 
economic, socio-political stability and defence are far from solid. They 
are extremely vulnerable to developments in the Southeast Asian region 
as well as in the international scene. The Republic's current prosperity 
and stability are not firmly rooted. For these reasons, Singaporeans 
cannot afford to relax. They have no cause for complacency. For the 
future, Singaporeans, especially the younger generation, should have a 
mature understanding of the interactions of world political and economic 
forces with respect to the milieu and needs of Singapore. They should 
keep increasing their knowledge and skills, remaining hard-working and 
thrifty" maintaining a higher standard of community discipline and a 
stronger sense of social responsibility, and cultivating only those 
attitudes and habits which are conducive to nation-building. It is 
naturally the respons'ibili ty of the government to guide the people and 
give them the opportunity to acquire all the knowledge, skills and 
c~pabilities necessary for them to guide Singapore's destiny in the years 
to come. 
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Having done well in the past eleven years, the present leader-
ship of Singapore is credited with the ability to sueceed in its search for 
solution of the existing manpower development problems. The overwhelming 
victory for the PAP in the 1976 Election149indicates the satisfaction the 
electorate has for the Government's past performances and its policies. 
Few can dispute that Mr. Lee Kuan-yew's cabinet contains some of the best 
brains in the country. Yet the Government is hardly capable of achieving 
anything entirely on its own. It needs the support and cooperation of the 
masses. Mere "strong arm" methods will not produce the expected results. 
Democratic persuasion is ultimately an indispensable means of widening 
the "mass base" of the government policies. Only when th.e people are con-
vinced of the legitimacy and validity of and the necessity for the 
government policies, will they be induced to support the policies volun-
tarily. To convince the people of its competence and creditability, the 
Singapore Government also has to keep up its administrative efficiency, 
to produce a higher output of "public goods" to serve the needs of the 
people, and to bridge the socio-economic gaps among the people so as to 
secure a higher degree of social justice. In a word, to the Singapore 
Government, the challenge in the years to come will not be primarily to 
seek those techniques and methods that can be used to better its manpower 
development and nation-building programs but rather to develop those 
qualities and strategies that will strengthen its ability to change those 
socio-political factors that stand in the way of a fruitful development 
of Singapore's human resources. In the long run, a drop in the population 
growth and an improvement in the quality of the people can only be 
149 There were 6 political parties (with two independents) and 120 
candidates contesting the elections. As a result, all 69 PAP candidates 
were returned, occupying all the parliamentary seats and hence maintain-
ing the "one-party" situation. 
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sustained by radical change in social values and attitudes. In this 
sense, the major challenge to be faced by the Government would be in the 
field of social education. 
While recognizing that the failure or success of nation-building 
process depends upon the skills, knowledge and capabilities of the people, 
we should not fail to note that the acquisition and application of the 
needed skills and knowledge are determined by the attitude and willingness 
of the persons who are expected to acquire them. As we can imagine, people 
who think only of themselves and nothing about the common interests of 
their country may be unwilling to learn and acquire the knowledge and 
skills necessary for nation-building. They may just indulge in the acqui-
sition of those capabilities which will benefit only themselves. On the 
other hand, if skilled and competent persons do not wish to do what they 
can to play an active part in the nation-building work, they are of no use 
to the country. All of the endeavours made to train them will be in vain. 
The progress of manpower development and nation-building processes will 
be set back. 
Axiomatically, manpower development of Singapore is a continuous 
circular process. Since the only major nation-building resource that Sin-
gapore has is human resources, manpower development vlTill continue to be 
an indivisible part of the Republic's life and death struggle. As long as 
the objective setting of Singapore remains what it is, the guiding prin-
ciple of the Republic's manpovJer development will remain "quality and not 
quantity". So long as the Republic is able to maintain and improve the 
quality of her people, skilled and disciplined workers with trained and 
competent technocrats, executives and bureaucrats to form the sharp 
cutting edge, she will always have the extra to maintain life at a 
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comparatively higher level. 
Judged from whatever angle, Singapore's manpower development and 
nation-building experience is a product of her unique objective environ-
ment. It is, however, the writer's preliminary view that the Singaporean 
experience does provide the framework in which problems of "manpower 
development for nation-building" common to a major portion of the "deve-
loping world" can be explored. On the whole, most developing countries 
have also faced two central manpower problems. The first problem is 
related to redundant manpo'lJlrer. It stems largely from overpopulation. 
Large scale unemployment, underemployment and poverty are patent symptoms 
of the excessive absolute pressure of population on the economic and 
ecological bases of these countries. Periodic shortages of food leading 
to near famine conditions and the chronic hunger and malnutrition of large 
segments of their peoples are other symptoms of overpopulation. The second 
problem is related to shortages of skilled and competent manpower. It 
arises in a great measure from the fact that the human resources of these 
developing states have not been properly developed or adequately trained. 
It is a logical necessity that if the developing states concerned 
wish to solve these manpo"lrJer problems, they should also launch two manpower 
development programs. One would be to control the growth rate of their 
population. The other one would be to provide their people with the 
opportunities to acquire the knowledge, skills and abilities necessary 
for them to play an active part in the nation-building process of their 
nations. In other words, the key motto of Singapore's manpower development, 
'fquali ty and not quantity", can also be the guiding principle of other 
developing states. But this is not to suggest that the manpower develop-
ment policies and methods which the Singapore Government has implemented 
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with much success are necessarily applicable to other developing nations. 
No matter whether in quantitative terms or in qualitative terms, manpower 
requirements and problems of no two countries are exactly alike. Thus, 
there is no one standard way of developing human resources. Each country 
has to assess its manpower requirements and problems and design its 
manpower development programs according to its own circumstances, priori-
ties and aspirations. The best possible and workable alternative, in 
general terms, is one that can IIsuit the remedy to the disease". 
Admittedly, in recent decades, the developing nations of the world 
have been in a state of revolt. They h~ve rejected the notion that 
poverty, squalor, ignorance, disease and their inferiority in socio-
economic and political development are preordained. No longer are they 
disposed to entrust their economic and political destiny to the omnipotent 
judgements of colonial rulers or the will of God. They want to be the 
masters of their own fate, running their own affairs. They are hoping and 
planning for accelerated development. In pressing for high-speed develop-
ment and growth, many of them even think in terms of leaps rather than 
mere steps forward. But it is important for 'them to realize that all this 
desirable state of affairs is to be brought about by the will, wits, skills 
and endeavours of their leaders and people, and not just by grand words 
and slogans. Manpower development, in the final analysis, is a prerequi-
site to successful nation-building. 
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APPENDIX 2 SINGAPORE: POPULATION AND VITAL STATISTICS (1901-65) 
Census Population (thousands) Population Increase (thousands) Annual 
Rate of 
Year Total Males Females Net Natural Migrational Increase 
1901 227.6 170.0 57.6 227.6 ----- ----- ---
1911 303.3 215.5 87.8 76.5 -59.5 136.0 2.4 
1921 418.3 280.9 137.4 115.0 -38.0 153.0 2.6 
1931 557.8 352.2 205.6 139.4 15.9 123.5 2.3 
1947 938.2 515.0 423.2 380.7 180.4 200.3 2.4 
1957 1446.0 762.8 683.2 507.8 395.3 112.5 3.9 
1965 1886.9 973.8 913.1 441.0 396.5 44.5 2.5 
-
-~ -----------~ ------------- ------_ ... _- -- - --
---- ---
Source: David C.E. Chew and Amina H. DeganiJ "Popu1ation and Manpower", Ooi Jin-bee 
and Chiang Hai-ding, eds., Modern Singapore, (Singapore: University of 
Singapore, 1969), pp. 85-108. 
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APPENDIX 3 POPULATION TRENDS (1966-76) 
Year 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Population 
(million) 1.93 1.98 2.01 2.04 2.07 2.11 2.15 2.19 2.22 2.25 
Number of Births 
(thousand) 54.7 50.6 47.2 44.6 45.9 47.1 49.7 48.3 43.3 40.0 
Crude Birth Rate 
(per thousand) 28.3 25.6 23.5 21.8 22.1 22.3 23.1 22.1 19.5 17.8 
Crude Death Rate 
(per thousand) 5.4 5.3 5.5 5.0 5.2 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.3 5.1 
Rate of Natural 
Increase (%) 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.7 1. 7 ' 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.3 
Sources: (1) Singapore, Ministry of Culture, Singapore Year Book, 1976, pp. 232-233. 
(2) Singapore, Department of Statistics, Yearbook of Statistics, 1976-77, p. 6. 
1976 
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APPENDIX 4 FAMILY PLANNING ACCEPTORS, STERILIZATIONS :':AND' ABORTIONS DONE {1966-74) 
Year 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Number of FP 
Acceptors 30.4 30.9 35.4 35.6 24.2 17.8 17.7 19.1 
(thousands) 
Number of Female 
Sterilizations 0.5 0.7 1.1 1.4 2.3 3.9 5.8 8.8 
(thousands) 
Number of Male 
0.93 Sterilizations 
(thousands) 
Number of 
2.84 Abortions 2.9 0:.8 
(thousands) 
1 43% of all women aged 15-44 years in 1974. 
2 5% of all women aged 15-44 years in 1974. 
3 Total number of male sterilizations done in the three years_from 1971 to 1973. 
4 Total number of abortions done since the passage of the Abortion Act in 1969. 
1974 Total 
18.3 229.41 
3.4 27.9 2 
0.2 1.1 
2.6 9.1 
Sources: (1) Margaret Loh, "The Two-Child Family: A Social Norm for Singapore", The NYLTI Journal, 
Vol. 7, March, 1974, p. 59. 
(2) Sin Chew Jit Poh, November 10, 1974; February 13, 1976. 
(3) Yearbook_of Statistics, Singapore, 1974-75, p. 211. 
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APPENDIX 5 FEMALE POPULATION BY SPECIFIC AGE-GROUP (1966-74) 
Thousand Persons 
Age Group 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
(In Years) 
No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. 
15 - 19 101. 7 105.4 108.9 113.2 120.1 124.8 130.0 145.0 176.2 
20 - 24 57.2 64.5 73.9 82.2 100.6 108.2 110.2 120.0 125.0 
25 - 29 66.5 64.9 62.8 60.7 66.1 65.1 73.1 70.0 80.6 
30 - 34 55.6 57.4 59.4 62.8 67.9 70.0 71. 3 75.0 76.0 
35 - 39 49.6 51. 1 51. 9 52.3 54.4 56.8 58.3 60 .. 0 68.0 
40 - 44 27.3 38.8 40.9 43.8 46.9 49.3 50.7 53.4 59 .. 0 
Total 367.9 382.1 397.8 415.0 456.0 474.2 493.6 523.4 584.8 
-----
---- ._ .... _---
Source Yearbook of Sta tistics, Singapore, 1974-75, pp. 14 and 15. 
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APPENDIX 6 ESTIMATES OF PERSONS AGED TEN YEARS AND OVER BY 
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND ACTIVITY STATUS, JUNE 1973 
Highest Economically Active Economically 
Education Inactive Total 
Attained Working Unemployed Total, 
No Education 130,228 3,113 133,341 266,897 400,238 
Primary 325,301 17,070 342,371 382,417 724,788 
Secondary 283~323 15,245 298,568 226,315 524,883 
Upper 40,045 1,181 41,226 13,420 54,646 
Secondary 
Tertiary 20,613 1,181 21,794 2,362 24,156 
Total 799,510 37,790 837,30b 891,411 1,728,711 
Source: Singapore, Department of Statistics, Report on the Labour Force Survey, 
June 1973, January, 1975, p. 21. 
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APPENDIX 7 ENROLMENT IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (1965-76) 
Year Total Primary Secondary Schools Technical & Univer- Colleges Schools Voca~iona12 sities 
Academic Others 1 Inst~tutes 
1965 486,811 357,075 102,861 11,875 1,193 4,996 8,801 
1966 511,527 364,846 116,956 15,132 1,409 4,863 8,321 
1967 527,857 144,448 124,701 19,747 1,752 5,033 7,972 
1968 537,257 150,641 127,866 22,775 2,199 5,705 6,742 
1969 531,704 147,981 131,455 16,526 4,129 6,598 6,115 
1970 527,668 363,518 136,782 8~958 4,727 6,990 6,693 
1971 531,790 357,936 139,251 14,271 6,063 7,102 7,167 
1972 537,278 354,748 144,145 17,226 5,841 7,822 7~496 
1973 542,442 345,284 155,050 18,059 7,124 8,220 8,705 
1974 536,045 337,816 154,606 19,571 6,250 8,228 9,174 
1975 532,956 328,401 153,029 23,195 9,830 8,540 9,961 
1976 526,602 316,265 152,713 25,279 11,751 8,875 11,719 
'- - --- ---~--.. - ---_ .. _--- .. ------.-~-.--~ '--------------
1 Include enrolment in technical, commercial and vocational streams. 
2 The 1969 and 1970 figures include the enrolment at the Industrial Training Centres. 
From 1971, the figure includes the enrolment at the Industrial Training Centres and 
the Boy's Town Trade School. From 1973, the figures include the enrolment at the 
Hotel and Catering Training School and the School of Printing. 
3 Include Singapore Polytechnic, Ngee Ann Technical College and Institute of Education. 
Source: Compiled from Yearbook of Statistics, Singapore, 1976-77, pp. 191 & 201. 
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APPENDIX 8 EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTES AND GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION (1966-75) 
Year l,C 
1966 1967 1968 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 , 1973/74 
Institutes No. 
mil. No. mit No. mit No. mit No. mit No. mit No. mit No. mit 
Primary 465 6.6 460 6.8 450 7.2 437 9.3 427 7.7 419 8.i 414 8.5 410 9.5 
Secondary 125 3.1 132 3.8 5 4.5 126 4.8 123 4.1 122 4.5 121 4.7 124 6.2 
Vocational 5 0.4 7 0.5 8 0.4 10 1.8 10 1.7 11 2.1 12 2.2 12 3.3 
Technical 
Universities 2 1.1 2 1.2 2 1.3 2 1.9 2 1.9 2 2.1 2 2.3 2 3.0 
Colleges 3 0.5 3 0.6 3 0.6 3 0.9 3 0.6 3 O. 7 3 0.8 3 1.0 
Adult 
Education 0~2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 
Other Educa-
tional Pro .. '/ 0.4 0.5 0.5 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.5 2.3 
grams 
Recurrent 12.4 l3.5 14.7 19.9 17.4 18.7 20.2 25.5 
Expenditure 
Development 
Expenditure 1.8 2.1 1.2 1.9 1.1 1.3 0.9 0.1 
Total ~ 600 26.5 604 29.2 468 30.6 578 41. 8 565 35 .. 8 557 38.7 552 41.3 551 51 .• 1 
- --- - -
-- - ~---.-.-
Source: Compiled from Yearbook ,Statistics, Singapore, 1974-75, pp. 188, 190 & 197. 
1974/75 
No. 
mit 
396 11. 8 
123 7.5 
12 4.1 
2 3.4 
3 1.3 
0.1 
1.5 
.... 
29.9 
4.5 
536 64.1 
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APPENDIX 9 STUDENTS ADMITTED TO AND GRADUATED FROM UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES (1970-74) 
Admitted Graduated 
, ' 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1970 1971 1972 1973 
University - Total: 2,137 2,196 2,590 2,596 2,382 1,776 2,132 2,032 2,064 
Arts and Social Sc. 486 516 633 622 622 557 700 542 613 
Science 379 380 413 461 278 615 668 628 469 
Law 93 108 132 143 122 62 85 80 87 
Medicine 130 145 143 138 121 135 158 154 128 
Dentistry 38 38 49 34 38 44 47 30 43 
Pharmacy 23 23 31 29 30 46 34 11 20 
Architecture, Engineer-
ing, Building & Estate 428 387 373 445 389 70 91 133 172 
Management 
Commerce and Business 560 599 812 717 776 247 346 451 532 
Administration 
Education --- --- 4 7 6 --- 3 3 ---
Polytechnic - Total 1,679 2,011 2,443 2,845 2,879 768 901 1,310 1,860 
Engineering 1,392 1,525 1,938 2,353 2,380 577 690 1, L05 1,604 
Architechtura1 185 384 392 371 357 123 135 135 188 
Building 
Nautical 102 102 113 121 142 68 76 70 68 
Colleges - Total: 1,961 1,253 649 920 885 1,495 1,197 1,327 660 
Ngee Ann Technical 481 625 340 465 649 ' --- 41 160 210 
Institutes of Education 1,480 628 309 455 236 1,495 1,156 1,167 450 
--- -
.. 
L-___________ 
Source: Yearbook of Statistics, Singapore, 1974-75, p. 194. 
1974 
2,181 
591 
415 
82 
147 
32 
23 
339 
552 
---
. 2,085 
1,759 
227· 
99 
444 
322 
122 
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APPENDIX 10 ENROLMENT IN ADULT EDUCATION COURSES (1966-76) 
Thousand Persons 
Courses 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Literacy and Language 37.8 41.0 37.5 18.9 17.3 16.0 14.6 14.6 12.3 8.4 10.0 
General Education 21.4 24.3 23.5 15.0 13.6 12.2 14.3 17.8 18.6 19.9 20.4 
Commercial 4.8 5.3 6.7 6.5 6.2 8.3 9.5 9.5 9.7 10.0 9.9 
Vocational and Technical 2.4 2.4 1.7 2.0 2.8 5.0 4.7 6.1 5.3 5.4 7.3 
Vocational Preparatory 
-
--
-
4.1 5.7 5.4 5.8 5.0 4.0 3.8 3.9 
Further Education 3.8 4.7 4.5 3.1 3.4 5.0 4.2 3.5 4.9 4.2 4.8 
Total 70.2 77.7 73.9 49.6 49.0 51.9 53.1 56.5 54.8 51.7 56.3 
____________ .~ ______ ._~ ___________ . ___ ~ ___ .. _____ - _I. . ____ 
Source: Yearbook of Statistics, Singapore, 1976-77, p. 204. 
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APPENDIX 11 PROFESSIONALS OF HIGH-LEVEL MA~OWER (1957) 
Occupation 
Teaching Professions 
Administrative - Managerial Professions 
Health Professions 
Construction Professions 
Natural Sciences 
Other Professions, Technical and Related Workers 
Number of 
Persons 
9,675 
8,699 
5,455 
2,965 
412 
5,616 
Total 32,822 
Source: David C.E. Chew and Amina H. Degani, "Population and Manpower", 
in Ooi Jin-bee and Chiang-ding, eds., Modern Singapore, 
(Singapore: University of Singapore, 1969), p. 97. 
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APPENDIX 12 PERSONS ENGAGED BY OCCUPATION (1969-76) 
Occupation 1969 19/0 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Professional, Technical 
and Related Workers 
44,310 46,459 47,880 51,431 54,767 90,526 89,078 86,864 
Administrative and 13,358 13,409 13,981 15,911 18,3/0 16,852 23,2/0 27,699 
Managerial Workers 
Clerical and Related 72,936 82,759 89,880 97,273 110,099 134,478 133,401 137,380 
Workers 
Sales Workers 44,297 49,164 55,765 59,006 63,581 117,334 127,015 136,159 
Service Workers 54,557 57,410 58,559 61,581 66,446 84,310 95,031 92,/01 
Agricultural and 2,363 2,218 2,815 2,957 3,294 24,477 22,946 23,984 
Fishery Workers 
Production and 167,399 
Transport Workers 
192,466 218,584 259,810 293,988 319,949 294,186 311,001 
Workers Not Classifiable -- --- -- 36,424 48,598 54,655 
by Occupation 
Total 399,220 443,8'85 487,464 547,969 610,545 824,350 833',525 8/0,443 
~- .. -- .. --
Note: Domestic servants t certain categories of own account workers (e.g. hawkers) and similar itinerant 
workers are exclUded. 
Sources: (1) Singapore Yearbook, 1976, pp. 240-241. 
(2) Yearbook of Statistics, Singapore, 1976-77, pp. 31 & 33. 
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APPENDIX 13 SOUTHEAST ASIA STATISTICAL INDICATORS BY COUNTRIES (1975) 
Countries South Key Burma Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand 
Indicators Vietnam 
Land Area 262,000 70,000 735,381 91,400 127,316 ll5,707 225.6 198,456 63,360 
(square miles) 
Population 31. 2 8.0 l32.1 33.3 11. 7 42.8 2.2 .41. 0 23.8 (million) 
Population 
Density: (Persons 110 114 179 264 92 369 976 206 375 
per sq. mHe) 
Birth Rate 39.5 44.6 44.0 47.0 33.3 41. 0 19.5 34.5 37.5 
(per thousand) 
Death Rate 15.8 17.0 20.0 23.0 6.9 11. 4 5.3 6.4 16. 1 
(per thousand) 
Population 2.2 2.5 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.8 1.3 2. 7 1.9 
Growth Rate (%) 
GNP (million 2,751 26,309 142 759 14,105 4,858 1,205 
(US dollars) 
Per Capita GNP 91 190 47 627 334 2,208 282 
(US dollars) 
Unemployment 6.1 7.2 4.8 4.5 
Rate (/0) 
--~-----.--~--.---- -- ----- -_ .. _-------- - - --"- - ... - ---- - -- _ .. - - - - ----- _ ... _- -----
Source: Compiled from, Asia Yearbook 1976, (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review Ltd., 1976), 
pp. 123, 127, 183, 184, 202, 205, 214, 219, 257, 263, 271, 276, 301, 307, 310, & 315. 
North 
Vietnam 
66,263 
21. 0 
317 
42.0 
24.0 
1.8 
I 
I-' 
0\ 
0\ 
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